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It has been well established that students enrolled

at public colleges and universities are entitled to the

protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
However, students attending private institutions of higher

learning today do not enjoy the same safeguards.
This study examines whether there are sufficient

educational and legal justifications for applying constitutional standards to private colleges in the areas of
due process, equal protection, and expression.

First, the

past legal relationship of the college to its students is
examined.

The doctrines of

in_

loco parentis

,

contract and

inherent authority are presented to illustrate the concepts

utilized by the courts in analyzing this relationship.
the
Although these doctrines have been modified because of

the
application of the Constitution to public institutions,
controlled
private college/student relationship is still

vi

by them.
Second, the study presents the rights of students

enrolled in public colleges.

Their rights to due process,

equal protection and expression are developed.

Next, the

rights of private college students are examined.
Third, after highlighting the distinction between
the rights of public and private college students, the

educational and legal arguments for and against the proposition that private colleges should be judged by constitutional standards are presented.

After analyzing the arguments for applying the

Constitution to private colleges through the use of the
state action concept, the study suggests that it is legally
and educationally desirable to apply constitutional stan-

dards to the private college/student relationship.

Recog-

nizing the risks in applying all constitutional standards,
the study presents the reasons for at least affording due

Several possible approaches for having the prin-

process.

ciples of due process apply to the private college/student

relationship are developed: through state and federal
legislation, the judicial process, and by executive

action

of the federal government.

The goals of the study are:

(1)

To provide students

studying in the area of higher education an in-depth

examination of the public/private controversy in higher
education;

(2)

of
to provide those interested in the area

vii

school law with a bibliography and case
law analysis of
the concept of state action as it applies
to higher education and the constitutional rights of students
to due
process, equal protection, and expression; and
(3)

to

present and analyze the educational and legal arguments

related to the application of the Constitution to private
colleges and universities.
The study concludes that constitutional standards
of due process should apply and that the possible risks

of such an application are outweighed by the probable

benefits to private colleges, their students and American
society.

Finally, it suggests that further research should

be undertaken to determine what effects, if any, private

colleges have had on student knowledge, attitudes, and

behavior in relation to the democratic values embodied in
the Bill of Rights in comparison to public colleges.

viii
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem
It has been well established that students
enrolled

at public colleges and universities are entitled
to the

protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

1

However, students attending "private" institutions of

higher learning today do not enjoy the same safeguards.
The Constitution protects persons against actions

taken by the federal and state governments and their agencies.

It does not prohibit actions taken by private per-

sons, whether acting individually or on behalf of corpor-

ations

2
.

State colleges are agencies of the state and, therefore, their actions are considered state actions which

subject them to the restraints contained in the Fourteenth

See Dixon v.
F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
Brown v. Knowlton
95 S.Ct.
v. Lopez
x

,

,

Alabama State Board of Education 294
1961), cert, denied 368 U.S. 930 (1961);
,

370 F. Supp. 1119
729 (1975).

(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Goss

"Persons" are of two kinds, natural and artificial.
Artificial persons
A natural person is a human being.
include a collection or succession of natural persons
forming a corporation to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. Henry C. Black, Black's
Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub7
Co., 1951), p. 1300.
2

2

Amendment.

3

Actions taken by private colleges have been

determined to be actions of private persons, thus not
coming under the prohibitions of the Constitution.

4

There are more than fourteen-hundred private colleges
in the nation, enrolling about one— fourth of all the stu-

dents in higher education.

5

It is the legal interpretation

of what is private about a private college that has made it

possible for their students to be suspended or expelled

without a hearing, punished for expressing their views on
controversial issues, and disciplined for violating rules
and regulations in ways that would be declared unconsti-

tutional at state institutions.
Yet, these same private colleges purport to educate

students to become better citizens and leaders in all

realms of our society.

Dr. Donald Cowling, once President

of Carleton College, declared:

Dixon v. Alabama Sta te Board of Education supra note 1.
Fourteenth Amendment, section 1, states:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const, amend.
3

,

XIV, sec. 1.)

See Browns v. Mitchell 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969)
and Powe v. Miles, 407 F 2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968)
4

,

.

Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, The Capitol
(New York: McGraw-Hill, April 1971), p. 63.
and the Campus
5

,

3

T he Amer i ca n college, especially the
organized and privately supported college, separately
is
enous to the United States, and is one of the indiqmost
important agencies our country has developed for
preserving and making effective its basic social and
political philosophy
that have led to the
American way of life. 6
.

.

.

The disparity between what is professed by the private

college and what is practiced therein is
facing our society today.

a

crucial issue

While this country is founded on

a Constitution and Bill of Rights which embody the social

and political philosophies of our society that Dr. Cowling

describes as the "American way of life,"

7

some of the values

inherent in the Bill of Rights are not practiced in many of
the private colleges.

Instead, they have often chosen to

suppress unpopular ideas of students and suspend or expel

them without the benefit of a hearing.

The effect such

practices have had on their students has been explored by
the President's Commission on Higher Education.

The Com-

mission found that:
To teach the meaning and the processes of democracy,
the college campus itself should be employed as a
Ideas and
laboratory of the democratic way of life.
common
a
in
cooperation
ideals, and the habit of

Donald Cowling and C. Davidson, Colleges for Freedom
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. vii.
6

,

Arval A. Morris, The Constitution and American Education, American Casebook series, (St. Paul, Minnesota:
West Pub. Co., 1974), pp. 113-114.
7

4

enterprise can be gained most surely in
But this learning cannot take place in practice,
of higher education that are operated oninstitutions
authoritarian
principles. 8
One possible outcome of the disparity between
what
is taught in the classroom and what is
practiced at private

colleges may be reflected in
Council on Education.

a study

conducted by the American

The Council reported that:

Private universities are the most likely to have
violent or disruptive protests.
[The study] said
that 34.4 percent of the private universities had
experienced violent protests, and 70.5 percent had had
disruptive protests.
[In contrast], public universities
had 13.1 percent experiencing violence and 43 percent
undergoing disruption. 9
.

.

.

Higher education is important to our society, for it

provides the learning experiences for students to develop
the skills and abilities necessary to live and practice

effectively in a democracy.

However, people cannot be

expected to develop an understanding of democracy and the
values inherent in the Bill of Rights if "their campus life
is carried on in an authoritarian atmosphere."

10

Higher Education for American Democracy. A Report from
(Washington,
the President's Commission on Higher Education
Government Printing Office, 1948) p. 51.
D .C
8

,

. :

,

Ian E. McNett, "A.C.E.'s Studies of Protesters Stir
Faculty, Student Critics," Chronicle of Higher Education 3
(September 15, 1969): 8.
9

1

°Arval A. Morris, supra note

7

at 14.

5

Purpose of the Study
This study will examine whether there are sufficient

educational and legal justifications for applying constitutional standards to private colleges in the areas of
student discipline, equal protection, and expression.

purpose is to:

(1)

Its

Provide students of higher education an

indepth examination of the public/private controversy in
higher education;

(2)

provide those interested in school

law with a bibliography and case law analysis of the concept
of state action as it applies to higher education, and the

constitutional rights of students to due process, equal
protection, and expression; and

(3)

present and analyze

the educational, and legal arguments related to the appli-

cation of the Constitution to private colleges and universities

.

Methodology
The purpose of the study will be pursued first by

reviewing the case law and the literature of the educational
The
and legal professions primarily related to the subject.
of higher
literature will be studied to examine the position

particular,
education in general, and private colleges in
The status of private education will be
in this society.
the relationexplored by utilizing case law to demonstrate
The concepts of
ship of the institution to its students.

*

6

•

in loco parentis

,

contract, inherent authority, and trust

fiduciary will be examined.
Second, the study will present the rights of students

enrolled in state colleges and universities.

Their rights

to due process, equal protection, and expression will be

developed.

Following this presentation, the rights of

students attending private institutions will be examined.
Third, after highlighting the distinction between
the rights of public and private college students, the

study will present educational and legal arguments for and

against the proposition that private colleges should be
judged by constitutional standards.
Finally, the study will explore a possible approach

and rationale for justifying the application of the

Constitution to private colleges in the area of student
discipline.

The impact of applying constitutional standards

to the private college will be highlighted by examining the

possible consequences this will have on the private institution and its students.
Delimitations
This study will examine only the rights of college

students to due process, equal protection, and expression.
It will not explore such areas as freedom of

(and from)

religion, association, and unreasonable search and seizure.

Although the distinction between public and private

7

includes more than higher education, the study will be
limited to exploring the relevance of the distinction in the

student/college relationship.

Furthermore, it will not

include an examination of state or federal legislation or
the common law as it might apply to this topic.

The relation-

ship of faculty and administrators to the private institution
\

will also be left for further research.

8

CHAPTER

II

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDENT/

UNIVERSITY RELATIONSHIP
Introduction
s

The rights of students to freedom and justice, and
the authority of colleges and universities to discipline at

their discretion, has been a pivotal issue in higher education for the last one-hundred years.

Educators and the

courts have been involved in controversies that reflect the

problems of our diverse culture.

Courts have been called

upon to adjudicate problems that are intrinsic to higher
education, namely. How much control does a college have over
its students?

And conversely, What rights and freedoms does

a student enjoy while attending a college or university?

It was not until the latter half of this century

that a real distinction was made between the rights of

students attending public or private colleges

1
.

Until that

time, both relationships were controlled by the legal doc-

trines of

in loco parentis , contract

,

and inherent authority

Trust and fiduciary theories have also been used to explain
the relationship, though to a much lesser extent than the

*The distinction between public/private colleges will
be explained in chapters IV and V.

.

9

first three doctrines.
In Loco Parentis

The doctrine of in loco parentis is a legal concept

dating back to Roman law.

2

It means that someone is dele-

gated the responsibility and authority over
of his/her parent.

child in place

a

Although it has predominately been

a

phenomenon of elementary and secondary schools, it has a
surprisingly strong legal basis in higher education.

This

theory places "the school in the place of the parent and
affords school control over students commensurate with that
of the parent in all matters pertaining to functions of the

school."

3

There are several early cases in point.

In North v. Board of Trustees of the University of

Illinois

4
,

Foster North was a student at the University of

Illinois in 1891.

The university had a rule that required

all students to attend nonsectarian religious exercises
in the university chapel.

North objected to the compulsory

attendance requirement and refused to attend the services
on the grounds that it was a violation of section
2

,

of the State Constitution which read in part:

3,

article

"No person

Henry C. Black, Black’s Law Dictionary Fourth Edition,
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1951), p. 896.
3
Kern Alexander and David Solomon, College and Unive r(Virginia: Michie Co., 1972), pp. 410-411.
sity Law
2

,

,

4

27 N.W.

54

(111.

1891)

10

shall be required to attend or support any ministry
or

place of worship against his consent."

5

The university suspended him for failure to comply

with its regulations.

The Supreme Court of Illinois ruled

in favor of the university, and described the student/

university relationship this way:
By voluntarily entering the university or being
placed there by those having the right to control
him, he necessarily, surrenders very many of his
individual rights. How his time shall be occupied,
what his habits shall be, his general deportment,
that he shall not visit certain places, his hours of
study and recreation,
in all these matters, and many
others, he must yield obedience to those who for the
time being are his masters; and yet, were it not for
the fact that he is under the government of the
university, he could find ample provision in the
Consitution to protect him against the enforcement
of all rules thus abridging his personal liberty.
In this case [he] could not say the faculty had not
the right to require him to spend his time in attending chapel, because they, and not himself, had the
right to say how he should spend his time. 6

—

Another case, Gott v. Berea College

7
,

decided in

1913, has also been cited as authority in this field.

8

Of-

ficials of Berea College created a regulation prohibiting stu-

dents from entering restaurants and places of amusement in the

5

Id

.

at 55.

6

Id . at 56.

7

156 Ky.

376,

161 S.W. 204

(Ky.

1913).

Alvin L. Goldman, "The University and
See for example:
L.J.
the Liberty of its Students: A Fiduciary Theory," 54 Ky.
Students:
of
643, 650 (1968); Warren A. Seavey, "Dismissal
1406, 1408 (1957); and
'Due Process'," 70 Harv. L. Rev.
Robert M. O'Neil, "Private Universities and Public Law," 19
Buffalo L. Rev., 155 (1950).
8

,

11

city of Berea which were not controlled by
the college.
Several students, who violated this regulation,
were dismissed from the college. Gott, the owner of a
restaurant
in Berea, brought an action against the college
seeking to

prevent enforcement of the regulation.

The court, finding

for the college, noted that:

College authorities stand in loco parentis
concerning the physical and moral welfare and mental
training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why,
to that end, they may not make any rule or regulation
for the government or betterment of their pupils that
a parent could for the same purpose. 9

Judge Nunn further stated that for the purposes of this
case.

The school, its officers and students, are a
legal entity, as much so as any family, and, like
a father may direct his children, those in charge
of boarding schools are well within their rights
and powers when they direct their students what to
eat, and where they may get it, where they may go,
and what forms of amusement are forbidden.
A discretionary power has been given them to regulate the discipline of their college in such a manner as they deem proper; and so long as their rules
violate neither devine nor human law, we have no
more authority to interfere than we have to control^
15
the domestic discipline of a father in his family.
.

In John B. Stetson University, et. al

.

v.

.

.

Hunt

a female student was summarily suspended from John B.

9

1

161 S.W. 204, 207

(Ky.

1913).

°Ibid.

^102

So.

637

(Fla.

1924)

.

1
,

12

Stetson University on account of her alleged
connection
with disciplinary troubles in a dormatory.
The Supreme
Court of Florida cited the above quotation from
Gott in
finding for the university. The court went on to
explain
that because college officials stand

iri

loco parentis to

their students,
every presumption must be indulged in favor
of the school authorities to the extent that they
acted in good faith, for the best interest of the
school and the pupil as they saw it, and no recovery can be had for error of judgments, ... 12
•

•

•

Summary and comment
J-

.

In the past, the concept of

oc ° parentis pervaded the student/university relation-

ship in this country.

But, today the influence of this

theory in higher education is not generally regarded as

having substantial impact on court decisions involving
college students.

13

A major factor that has led to the demise of the
in loco parentis doctrine has been the lowering of the age

of majority.

As D. Parker Young explains:

This change has many implications for higher
Instead of the majority of students
education.
being minors, colleges are filled with practically
This inherently causes both
all adult students.
the student and the institution to have a different
14
perspective than was formerly held.

1

1

14

at 641

Id.

.

Kern Alexander and David Solomon, supra note

3

at 411.

Parker Young, "Higher Educational Law: Current
Developments and Issues," Contemporary Legal Problems in
(U.S.A.: N.O.L.P.E., 1975), p. 196.
Education
D.

,

13

Whatever may have been the basis for in loco parentis
historically. Has it not long since passed away?

Professor

Henry Steele Commager believes that it has:
[In loco parentis was transferred from Cambridge
to America and caught on here even more strongly
for very elementary reasons:
College students were,
for the most part, very young.
A great many boys
went up to college in the colonial era at the age of
They were, for the most practical
13, 14, and 15.
purposes, what our high school youngsters are now.
They did need taking care of, and the tutors were in
loco parentis
This habit was re-enforced with the
coming of education for girls and of co-education.
Ours was not a class society.
There was no common
body of tradition and habit, connected with membership in an aristocracy or an upper class, which
provide some assurances of conduct.
]

.

All of this now is changed.
Students are 18
when they come up, and we have a long tradition
with co-education from high school on. Students
marry at 18 and 19 now and have families. Furthermore, we have adjusted to the classless society and
know our way about. Therefore, the old tradition
15
of in loco parentis is largely irrelevant.

Judge Doyle, in Soglin v. Kaufman

1

,

appears to be

in agreement with the observations of Professor Commager

when he noted:
Underlying these developments in the relationship of academic institutions to the courts has been
a profound shift in the nature of American
colleges and universities and in the relationships
between younger and older people. These changes
seldom have been articulated in judicial decisions
but they are increasingly reflected there. The
.

.

.

as quoted in William Van Alstyne, "Procedural Due
Rev.
Process and State University Students," 10 U.C.L.A. L.
368 (1968).
1

295 F. Supp. 978
(7th Cir. 1969)
1

6

(W.D. Wis.

1968), aff'd 418 F.2d 163

14

facts of life have long since undermined the
concepts,
such as in loco parentis which have been
invoked
historically for conferring upon university authorities virtually limitless disciplinary discretion. 17
,

Although the United States Supreme Court has not
ruled directly on the contemporary state of the doctrine
l° co parentis

,

in so far as it concerns public

schools
•
it has indirectly modified its possible
•
•
applications.
It is clear that parents have
enormous power over the lives of their children.
Principles of constitutional law are violated in
private homes with impunity. They are never intended to operate in one's home, however desirable
it might be that they permeate our lives.
The court,
however, has declared that the "Constitution does not
stop at the public school door." Thus, to the extent
that civil rights enter school doors, the principle
of in loco parentis is modified.
Even though some
courts still use the latin phrase in explaining the
reasons for their decisions, it is likely that the
doctrine is in decline. The courts are more likely
to rely on the general principle that constitutional
rights apply to students in public schools and then
proceed with the application of that principle to the
unique factors of each controversy. 18

Contract
The "contract theory," apparently rather popular

with the courts, is based on traditional legal principles.
This theory assumes that the student and the college are

1

Ibid

.

Schimmel and Louis Fischer, The Civil Rights of
(N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 10

le David

Students,

15

P art ies to a contract.

The school advertizes and seeks

students, thereby making an offer; and the student, by

registering, accepts.

The student agrees to pay tuition

and other fees, and the college agrees to provide instruction
and, subsequently, a degree if the student remains in good

standing academically and abides by the school's rules and

regulations

1

In recent years, courts have drawn a distinction

between private and public schools, maintaining that the

contract theory can apply to private schools but must be

modified by constitutional considerations at public institutions.

20

Although the courts now differentiate between

private and public colleges, the contract theory prevailed
for over one-hundred years without such a distinction.

21

22
For example, Goldstein v. New York University

concerned the expulsion of a student from the law school
in 1902 for allegedly passing a note to a female student

19

Kern Alexander and David Solomon, supra note

20

See chapters IV and V.

3

at 413.

Chambers, "Legal Rights of College and University
82.
Students," N.O.L.P.E. School Law Journal 1 (Fall 1970):
2

im.

22 77

m,

N.Y.S. 80, rev'd 78 N.Y.S. 739

(N.Y.

1902).

16

and then denying that it was sent by him.

23

The court, in

establishing the relationship of Goldstein to the law
school,
stated:
The relation existing between the university and
the student is contractual.
Plaintiff became a student
in the defendant's law school through an invitation
contained in a circular issued by the authority of the
university, in which it was stated that tuition [instruction] ..would be given to law students who were at
least 18 years of age and of good moral character, and
who would pay the university the sum of $100 a year.
He was accepted as a student
when a student matriculates under such circumstances, it is a contract between the college and himself. 24
.

.

.

Once the court had established the relationship as

contractual. Judge Patterson went on to explain that.

Obviously, and of necessity, there is implied in such
contract a term or condition that the student will not
be guilty of such misconduct as would be subversive of
the discipline of the college or school, or would show
him morally unfit to be continued as a member thereof.
The power of suspension or expulsion of students is an
attribute of government of educational institutions. 25

2

The cases cited herein are for the purpose of highlighting the position the courts have taken in the past
involving both public and private colleges. There are many
recent cases that have upheld the right of private colleges
to remove students without affording them the same protections as required of public colleges, because of the contractual nature of the relationship. See for example: Carr
v. St. John's University, 187 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1962); Jones v.
Vassar College? ’299 N.Y.S.2d 283 (N.Y. 1969); Greene v. Howard
University 271 F. Supp. 609 (D. D.C. 1967) moot 412 F.2d
1128 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Grafto n v. Brooklyn Law School 478
378
F 2d 137 (2d Cir. 1973); Brown v. Villanova University
Washington
v. George
F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Greeny
and Slaughter v.
1975);
Cir.
(D.C.
556
F.2d
512
University
The
Cir. 1975).
(10th
622
2d
514
F
Brigham Young University
current rights of students enrolled in private colleges will
be explained in Chapter IV.
3

,

,

,

,

.

,

,

2 4

Goldstein

2 5

Id.

v.

at 741.

.

New York University, supra note 22 at 740.

17

Thus, the court upheld the expulsion as a proper

consequence of Goldstein's actions.

By not living up to

the standard that "the student will not be guilty of such

misconduct as would be subversive of the discipline of the
college," the school was well within its authority to expel
a student for such a breach, as determined by the university

in good faith. 26
In Booker, et. al, v. Grand Rapids Medical College

27
,

two Black students, upon satisfactorily completing the first

year of a three year course in veterinary medicine, were

denied admission to the second year solely because white
students objected to their presence.

The Supreme Court of

Michigan stated:
When one is admitted to a college, there is an
implied understanding that he shall not be
arbitrarily dismissed therefrom. The required
fees may be paid annually, and may be no more
than fair fees for the advantages received by
the students during the year, and yet is clear that
the fees for the first year are, in fact, paid and
received with the understanding that the work of
the year will not be made fruitless, and graduation
and a degree made impossible, by an arbitrary
There
refusal to permit further attendance.
is no good reason why the law should not recognize,
as growing out of these relations, a right of
relators resting in contract to be continued as
students 2 8
.

.

.

Because the court recognized the contractual relationship between the students and the college, it refused the writ

2 6

Id.

at 742.

2 7

120 N.W.

589

(Mich.

1909).

28 Id.

at 591.

18

of mandamus sought on the ground that this extra ordinary

remedy is not available for the enforcement of
contract.

29

a

private

The court did intimate that the students were

entitled to redress, and the available remedy would be an
equitable decree of specific performance of the contract.

30

Anthony v. Syracuse University 31 is a case often
\

cited by proponents and opponents of the contract theory.
At Syracuse University, a student, Beatrice Anthony, in the
school of home economics was dismissed at the beginning of

her fourth year of residence in 1922.

It was done without

the assignment of any cause other than the vague statement
that, "It was understood that she had caused trouble in

the sorority house where she lived, and that she was not

thought to be a typical Syracuse girl."

32

In defending its action, the university referred to

were
a statement in the school catalog which all students

required to sign:

Attendance at the University is a privilege and
In order to safeguard its scholarship
not a right.
the University reserves
atmosphere,
and its moral
of any student
withdrawal
the
the right to require
to it,
sufficient
deemed
at any time for any reason

2

Ibid.

3 0

Ibid

3

.

231 N.Y.S. 435

32 Id.

at 437.

(N.Y.

1928).

19

and no reason for requiring such withdrawal need
be given. 3
lb is interesting to note that both parties claimed

that a contract existed.

Anthony argued that a contract

existed between her and the university for her continued
attendance.

Therefore, she was seeking a specific perfor-

mance of this contract.

34

The university, however, relied

on what it claimed to be one of the terms of the contract;
namely, that Anthony's continuance as a student was strictly
at the pleasure of the institution, which she agreed to when

she signed her registration card.

35

The court, in citing the Goldstein case, recognized
that;

Under ordinary circumstances and conditions a
person matriculating at a university establishes a
contractual relationship under which, upon compliance
with all reasonable regulations as to scholastic
standing, attendance, deportment, payment of tuition,
and otherwise, he is entitled to pursue his selected
36
course to completion, and receive a degree.
.

.

.

The court, however, went on to differentiate this case

from the general rule because here was an express contract,
a right to dismiss the student at any time for any cause

whatever, and the court is obliged to enforce contracts as

3 3

3 4

Id.

Ibid

at 438.
.

3 5

Ibid.

3 6

Ibid.
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they are written.

37

Judge Sears also explained that:

(The relation between plaintiff and defendant was
wholly contractual. it was voluntary in its
(^inception on both sides.
A student is not
required to enter the University, and may in fact,
after entry, withdraw without reason at any time.
The University need not accept as a student one
desiring to become such.
It may, therefore, limit
the effect of such acceptance by express agreement,
! and thus retain the position of contractual freedom
in which it stood before the student's course was
entered upon.
I can discover no reason why a student
may not agree to grant to the institution an optional
right to terminate the relations between them. The
contract between an institution and a student does
not differ in this respect from contracts of employment . 3 8
In alleging a breach of contract, the court stated

that the burden of proof rests upon the student.

She must

show that her dismissal was not for a reason within the
terms "scholarship" or "moral atmosphere" of the catalog
statement.

39

In other words, she must affirmatively prove

her conduct had been such that her summary dismissal could
not possibly be justified as falling within the meaning of
the catalog reservation.

40

In 1958, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a

similar dismissal of a student from the University of Miami.

3 7

Id.

3 8

Ibid

.

Id.

at 440.

39

at 439.

Elliott
For a detailed account of this case see, Edward
(N.Y.:
Courts
the
and
and C. C. Chambers, The Colleges
Carniege Foundation, 1936), p. 33.
40

,

21

Robinson v. University of Miami 41 concerned the expulsion of
a student who had written a letter to the editor of a local

newspaper dealing with the subject of atheism.

Thomas

Robinson was an undergraduate at the college's school of
education; and to become a teacher, it was necessary for him
to intern in a local public school.

Before beginning his

internship, the principal of the school in which he was to
do this practice teaching, read his article on atheism.

The

principal notified the university and suggested that they
make an inquiry into Robinson's views.

The college conducted

a hearing and concluded that Robinson was an atheist and

that he was "fanatical in his views."

Under these circum-

stances, the university requested Robinson to withdraw from
the school. 42

Robinson believed that this was a breach of

his contract and sought to have the university held to

specific performance of the contract.

As in the Anthony

case, the court rejected this argument, but did recognize

that the university and student relationship was contractual
in nature. 43

It also noted that the university bulletin had

the following provision in effect at the time:

This case is of particular
100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1958).
interest because the action was implemented by a public
school official in notifying the university of Robinson's
personal beliefs, yet the court did not even consider thiswas
The question is raised whether or not the action
point.
case.
solely private or was there state duplicity in the
See Chapter IV.
41

^

4 2

Id . at 444.

4 3

Ibid.
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Terms of Admission:
.
.
the University reserves the right to change
any provision or requirement at any time within the
students' term of residence. The University further
reserves the right to ask a student to withdraw at
any time. 4 4
.

The court recognized this provision as part of an

express contract and noted that the "courts are obliged to

enforce contracts as they are written." 45

Chief Judge

Carroll declared:
The rule seems to be well established that where
a university reserves the right to have a student
withdraw at any time after his acceptance, it may
do so without the necessity of furnishing the student
46
with a reason or cause.
.

Summary and comment

.

.

.

In the past, courts consistently

held that the relationship of students in either public or

private colleges was contractual.

This theory, as inter-

preted by the courts, provided students with little protection.
Colleges were granted the power of dismissing students "at
any time for any reason" without having to present their

reasons to the student.

Although the courts required the

schools not to act arbitrarily or capriciously, it would be
a difficult task to prove the action unwarranted when the

4 4

Id

.

at 443.

4

Ibid.

4 6

Id.

at 444.

23

student is not informed of the
grounds of his/her dismissal.”
The contract theory is still the
controlling concept
concerning the relationship of students
to private colleges.”
It has been modified in relation
to public colleges because
of the acknowledgement that students
in public schools "do
not shed their constitutional rights at the
schoolhouse
gate

.

4 9

There have been other objections to the use of the

contract theory in education.

It has been argued that the

environment in which a student deals with a university is far
removed from the marketplace, and it is unwise, therefore, to
judge student/university conflicts by the law of the market.

"Contract rules were developed to deal with the hard bargins

made by self-interested persons operating in a commercial

47

In contrast to the above cases, it is interesting to
note that as early as 1887 a court of common pleas in Pennsylvania ordered a student reinstated after he had been summarily
expelled by the president of the college for alleged misconduct.
The court said:
There is no reason to fear that the perpetuity or
utility of educational institutions depends upon their
successful assertion of the right to exclude students
without pursuing the forms of trial recognized not only
as wise, but demandable as well, and never denied in any
Commonwealth ex. rel. Hill v.
other relation in life.
See also, Edward
McCauley, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 77 [1887].
Elliott and C. C. Chambers, supra note 40 at 30.)
This opinion was rejected as precedent then, and is still not
recognized by the courts in public or private colleges today.
(

48 This
4 9

will be examined in chapters IV and V.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

24

setting."

50

Moreover, to the extent that courts have

insisted on deciding these cases under this concept,
they
have not applied the multitude of devices developed
in

recognition of the fact that the further a bargain is
removed from the open market, the more sensitive courts
should be to the demands of fair and honest conduct.

51

It has also been urged that because a university is expected

to deal fairly with its students and because it sets the

terms of enrollment, the courts should not enforce con-

tractual reservations without requiring a showing by the
school of compelling reasons for invoking sanctions and a
fair fact-finding procedure.

52

Inherent Authority

Courts have consistently held that educational

institutions have the inherent authority to maintain order
and freedom and to discipline those students whose conduct

50

Alvin Goldman, "The University and the Liberty of
A Fiduciary Theory," 54 Ky L J 643, 653 (1968).

Its Students
51

—

.

.

Ibid., i.e. unconscionable contracts; use the constructo rewrite contracts; unenforcable terms when
conditions
tive
See also Friedman, "Private Governthey are unreasonable.
ment on the Campus," 72 Yale L.J. 1362, 1377-79,(1963). (The
student contract with the university is surely a contract of
adhesion, and hence, should not be given literal effect in
enforcing it against him.
5 2

Ibid.

25

is disruptive.

5

.
.
[A] College has the inherent power to
promulgate
rules and regulations; that it has the inherent power
to discipline; that it has power appropriately
to protect itself and its property, that it may expect
that its students adhere to generally accepted standards
54
of conduct.
.

.

.

.

The foundation of this authority has been held to be

based on the long-standing custom of schools.

55

This custom

may be thought to be institutionalized in the common statutory charter grants to colleges of power
.
to make and establish such Ordinances, Orders
and Laws as may tend to the good and wholesome
government of the said College and all the Students.
.

.

56

5

John B. Stetson University, et. al, v. Hunt 102 So.
(Fla. 1924 ; Goldberg v. Regents of^University of Cali fornia , 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. 1967); Zanders v. Louisiana
State Board of Education 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
,

637

)

,

,

Esteban v. Central Missouri State College
393 U.S. 503
1969
415 F.2d 1077 (5th Cir. 1969); Slaughter v. Brigham Young
University, 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975); Goss v. Lopez, 95
S.Ct. 729 (1975).
(

54

1089

637

;

Esteban v. Central Missouri Stat e College

(5th Cir.
55

)

,

415 F.2d 1077,

1969)

John B. Stetson University, et

al. v.

.

Hunt, 102 So.

1924).

(Fla.

The Charter of Dartmouth College, reprinted in Charters
and Basic Laws of Selected American Universities and Colleges
by Charles Elliott (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1974),
It should be noted that the term "government" as
pp. 227-250.
used above,
incorporates a trinity of functions: The enactment
of laws, rules, and regulations, judicial construction
of the same as applicable to their suggested violation,
[It] ... is broad enough in
and their execution.
its scope ... to include administrative rules and
regulations affecting scholastic procedure as well as
disciplinary measures affecting only moral conduct or
order. (14 Corpus Juris Secondum section 26, p. 1360.)
5 6

,

.

.

.

,

,
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Some courts have said that there is also
inherent in
any college or university a duty on the
part of its students
to conduct themselves in a manner conducive
to the proper

administration of the institution.
In the school as in the family, there exists on
the part of the pupils the obligations of obedience
to lawful commands, subordination, civil deportment,
respect for the rights of other pupils and fidelity'
to duty.
These obligations are inherent in any proper
school system, and constitute so to speak the common
law of the school. 57
,

This authority is not limitless.

Schools may

establish only those rules and regulations that have a necessary relationship to the legitimate goals and purpose of the

institution.

As long as a college enforces suitable rules

and regulations in a reasonable and not arbitrary manner,
the courts will not interfere with their proper adminis-

tration.

5 8

In Woods v. Simpson

5 9
,

a

female student in 1924 was

not allowed to register for her third year of study because
she was accused of writing letters to a local newspaper

accusing male officials of the university of making objectionable suggestions to female students, and otherwise exhibiting
"a wrong moral attitude toward them.

"

The administration

contended that the letter was a serious attack on the

5 7

John B. Stetson University, et. al. v. Hunt, supra note
55 at 640.
5

5 9

Anthony
126 A.

v.

882

Syracuse University
(Md.

1924)

,

supra note 31.

27

institution and depicted a dangerous condition which was
not
conducive to the proper atmosphere of an institution of

higher learning.
The court, in upholding the university's dismissal
of the student, defined the authority inherent in educational

institutions:
The maintenance of discipline, the upkeep of the
necessary tone and standards of behavior in the body of
students in a college, is of course, a task committed
to its faculty and officers, not to the courts.
Only in extraordinary situations can a court of law
ever be called upon to step in between students and
the officers in charge of them. When it is made clear
that an action with respect to a student has been, not
an honest exercise of discretion, looking to the proper
ends, but beyond the limits of that discretion, or
arising from some motive extraneous to the purposes
committed to that discretion, the courts may be called
upon for relief.
In such case, the officials have, as it
is sometimes stated, acted arbitrarily, or abused their
discretion, and the courts may be required to remedy
.

that.

.

.

6 0

The courts are not anxious to become administrators

and handle acts of student disobedience and disruption.

They

will interfere only where school officials act outside their
authority.

6 0

6

1

Id

.

6

at 883.

the closer a school rule or administrative action
rights, the more
comes to infringing upon basic
the rule or
for
have
justification [officials] must
and
"Rights
action taken. ... (D. Parker Young,
Overview,
An
Responsibilities on the College Campus:
N.O.L.P.E. School Law Journal 3 (Spring 1973): 64.
.

.

.

.

.

.

^
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In R^an v. Hofstra University 62 a
student was
.

accused of destroying school property.

He was expelled and

fined over $1,000 for the damages done.

The expulsion

was the result of a hearing held contrary to the process
called for in the university's disciplinary procedures.
The provision stated that the student is given a choice of
s

appearing before either the Student Judiciary Board or

members of the Dean of Students' Staff.

63

The dean testified that Ryan was not given the

choice of the Student Judiciary Board, based on a school
rule which provided that a student "whose records suggest

significant emotional or psychological disturbances" will
be heard only by the dean's staff.

64

The dean did not

consult any psychologist or psychiatrist before making the

disciplinary reference to his staff committee.
Hofstra'

rules do provide an "appeal" procedure for

non-academic disciplinary situations.
granted Ryan for over six months.

However, no appeal was

In ordering the student

reinstated, the court declared:

324 N.Y.S. 2d 964 aff'd 328 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y. 1971).
Although the case is used herein to denote a school's
unreasonable use of authority and discretion, it will be
used in the subsequent chapters for its significance in
It is also of interest
applying the state action concept.
because it rejects the implied contract theory as used in
6 2

"less enlightened times."
63 Id.
6 4

at 970.

Ibid.
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Ho ^stra University, though termed
a "private
1
cannot expel, bar and fine a student'
wShnnf
without ?!
following fair and reasonable procedures.
It cannot be arbitrary.
it must abide by constitutional principles of fair conduct implicit
in
^
our society. 65

1

.

The court found that the dean's denial of
access to
the Student Judiciary Board was arbitrary and
an abuse of
his discretion, because there was no "finding of
proof that

any such record of emotional problems existed prior to
his

referral to the Dean's Staff."

66

Justice Harnett also found

that the amount of time that elapsed between the first hearing
and the appeal was unreasonable.
the procedure adopted will necessarily deprive
of a semester's attendance in class.
This delay works the imposition of a significant
penalty which entirely by-passes the review procedure,
and must be termed arbitrary and capricious, and
abusive of discretion on the part of Hofstra University. 6 7
•

•

•

[Ryan]

.

Summary and comment

.

.

.

American colleges and univer-

sities have a tradition of autonomy.

It has been said that

they merit this autonomy because they are experts in higher

education, and only with expertise can one make adequate
judgments.

65 Id.

68

The courts have accepted this notion.

In doing

at 968.

6 6

Id.

6

Ibid.

at 975.

John Brubacher, The Courts and Higher Education
Jossey-Bass Inc., 1971), p. xi.
6

,

(Calif.

30

so, they have acknowledged the inherent
authority that

institutions have in promulgating regulations
for "the
necessary tone and standards of behavior in a body
of

students" and in the power to discipline "to protect
itself
and its property." The bench has also pointed out that
this

authority is not limitless.

The universities' rules and

actions may not be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.

Although the schools were given broad discretionary powers
the past, the courts have modified the college's authority

when it conflicts with the student's private rights.
the University too is a creature of law.
The University must abide by legal procedures and
respect private rights.
If the University is to
break the law by violating private rights, it has no
superior legal or moral position to one whose law
breaking consists of breaking windows. 69
.

.

.

Trust/Fiduciary 7

0

Another theory of the relationship between the

university and its students is one of trust.

The college is

considered the trustee with the student the beneficiary
(

cestui que trust)

7

There appears to be only one case that raised this
concept.

6 9

It was a 1947 decision:

Ryan v. Hofstra University

,

People ex. rel. Tinkoff v.

supra note 62 at 968.

Although these concepts are interrelated, they will be
examined separately for the purposes of this study.
7

71

Kern Alexander and David Solomon,

s upra

note

3

at 413.

31

Northwestern University

72

The Supreme Court of Illinois,

.

rejecting the position that a person has
to a private college, noted

iii

a

right to admission

dicta that,

Plaintiff has no right based upon a trust relationship with the university.
Tinkoff did not become a
beneficiary upon compliance with the entrance requirements. We think he remained, at most, a potential
beneficiary until he was actually admitted 73
.

This theory has not been raised in any modern cases,
and as Professor Alexander declares,
it has
trustee does
ficiaries as
ary function
.

.

.

the overriding weakness, that normally a
not have the legal power to change benedoes the university when in its disciplinit is forced to expel a student 74
.

A fiduciary theory has also been advanced by

a few

legal educators to explain the student/university relation-

Although the concept does not appear to have been

ship.

raised in any student cases, it is worth noting.
In general, a fiduciary is one whose "function it is

to act for the benefit of another in matters relevant to the

relation between them ."

75

The fiduciary relationship is

characterized by the "confidence subsisting between two
parties; that if one party reasonably reposes confidence in
the fidelity and integrity of another, a fiduciary relation

7 2

77 N E 2d 345
.

.

(111.

1947), cert, denied 335 U.S. 829

(1947)
7 3

Id..

at 350.

74

Kern Alexander and David Solomon, supra note

7 5

Warren Seavey, "Dismissal of Students: Due Process,

70 Harv.

L.

Rev.

1406,

1407

(1957).

3.
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exists.

The relationship is often evidenced by
the making
of confidential disclosures of a moral, social,
legal, domestic
or personal nature. 77 Examples of this
relationship
are:

attorney/client

,

guardian/ward, doctor/patient, husband/wife,

and clergyman/parishiner

7

Professor Goldman contends that all the elements of
a fiduciary relation are present in the student/university

relationship:

—

It is no small trust no small display of confidence
to place oneself under the educational mentorship of a
particular university. The value of an educational
experience is directly affected by the school's
conscientious, faithful performance directed toward the
students' benefit.
The educator has the responsibility
of setting out tasks, the performance of which will
presumably benefit the student. The student performs
these tasks in reliance upon the educator's good faith
performance of his duties as a teacher.
In addition to
often making confidential disclosures about his background, health, financial situation ... a university
[also] commands the student to disclose opinions on art,
religion, history, philosophy, political theory and the
like, in order to discover the extent of his learning
ability and potential.
In making these disclosures,
the student reposes confidence in the school's skill
and objectivity in evaluating, scoring and reporting
ability and potential.
those manifestations of
This reposing of confidence is that which is placed in a
fiduciary. 7 9
.

.

.

If the proposition is accepted, that there is a

fiduciary relationship between the student and university.

76 Alvin
7

Goldman, supra note 50 at 668.

Ibid.

78

Id.

at 669.

79

Id.

at 671.

.

.

.
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Professor Goldman argues that:
Contrary to past practice, the courts have a
positive duty to scrutinize carefully any action which
might blemish the high standard of conscience and honor
which should govern the conduct of a fiduciary (the
university) in dealing with entrustees (its students). 80
Thus, the university should have the responsibility

of showing that any action it takes is just and reasonable,

and in the best interests of the students as well as itself.

81

Goldman summarizes the relationship of the student
and university in this manner:

The university, like any fiduciary, and not the student,
should have the burden of demonstrating that any disciplinary action:
(a) was reasonably imposed for cause
consistent with its function of maintaining an openminded atmosphere conducive to the acquisition and use
of tools for freely inquiring into and exploring ideas;
and (b) was imposed in a manner consistent with scholarly
integrity and fair process.
In addition, as a fiduciary
the university ought to afford the student every opportunity and means of rehabilitation. On the other hand,
the university's fiduciary responsibility should not
extend beyond those activities in which it acts in a
fiduciary capacity with relation to the students. 82
Regretably, no court has had the opportunity to rule
on the applicability of this theory to date.

The concept

would unquestionably have a great impact on private and public
It would require the schools to treat students

colleges.

with one of the highest degrees of fairness and equity
recognized by law.

8

°Id.

8 2

Ibid

at 674.
.

8 2

Ibid.

8 3

Ibid

83
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Conclusion
The student/university relationship has been con-

trolled by the concepts of in loco parentis

inherent authority

.

contract

,

and

,

By utilizing these legal doctrines,

the courts have granted schools wide discretionary powers.
In their concern for protecting the autonomy of colleges,

they have been unwilling to impose their judgments upon the
institutions.

In the past, judicial noninterference has

resulted in students being dismissed "at any time, for any
reason," or for not being a "typical Syracuse girl."

One

judge has said that the court can no more control a school's

disciplinary actions than "control the domestic discipline
of a father in his family."

The courts have, however, declared that a college's

authority and power to discipline students is not limitless.
If a school's actions are arbitrary, unreasonable or capri-

cious, the judiciary could be called upon for relief.

what is unreasonable or arbitrary?

But

As the cases presented

illustrate, the courts allowed schools to act in ways that

today would be considered unconscionable by educators.

Professor Seavey aptly states:
Our sense of justice should be outraged by the denial
[It is]
to students of the normal safeguards.
[the
shocking to find that a court supports
given
protection
college] in denying to a student the
84
to a pickpocket.
.

.

.

8

''Warren Seavey,

supra note 75.

.

.

.
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The courts today have modified these doctrines.

85

Constitutional standards are now applied to public colleges.

Although constitutional restraints do not now apply directly
to private institutions, the values embodied in the Bill
of

Rights have been used as "benchmarks" in determining the
"reasonableness" of private administrative actions.

86

in

order to understand what these standards are, the following

chapter will examine the rights of students enrolled in
public colleges and universities.

85 This

"modification" will be examined in the following

chapter
86 Friedman,

supra note 51 at 1383-90.

36

CHAPTER

III

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

AND STUDENT RIGHTS

Introduction
Courts have recognized a university's right to have

order and discipline on its campus for the purpose of maintaining the proper functioning of the educational institution.

When the rights of students conflict with the legitimate
interests of the university, the courts must determine whose
rights should be protected.

Therefore, the study of college

students' rights should be explored through recent court

decisions which delineate their rights in public higher
education.

This chapter will present the leading cases that

have established and defined the rights of public college

students to due process of law, equal protection, and freedom
of expression.

1

Although the chapter will explore these rights, students
are also guaranteed rights such as freedom of (and from
religion, associ ation and unreasonable search and seizure
For key cases on freedom of religion see: Hamilton v. Regents,
of the University o f California 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Everson
v7 Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Engel v. Vitale
School District of Abinaton Township v.
370 U.S. 421 (1962
For recent cases on freedom of
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
association, see: University of Mississi ppi Chapter of_^h^ 64
j
M.C.L.U. vT University of Southern Mississippi 452 F.2d
..of
tate
73 th Clr. 1971); Mulkey v. Board of Regents of S
Jam es., 92
Florida, 344 F. Supp. 1296 (D. Fla. 1972); Healy. v.
)

.

,

,
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Due Process: Minimal Requirements

N2 §-tate sh a11
deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process
of lawT~nor
deny to any person within its“jurIsdictTon“tKe"equal
protection of the law.^ (Italics mine.)
•

-

•

•

.

Judicial disposition of due process cases
turns on
the kind of violation that is alleged. Thus,
any explanation
of due process of law must consider its two
aspects--sub-

stantive and procedural.

Although neither is readily de-

finable, it is essential to understand a general distinction

between the two
Substantive due process refers to the content or
subject matter of a law or an ordinance; whereas procedural
due process, by far the more litigated of the two, refers to

the manner in which a law, an ordinance, an administrative
practice, or a judicial task is carried out.

In both the

substantive and procedural due process concepts, the judicial
test of constitutionality or legality is the same:

Is the

S-Ct. 2338 (1972); Gay Students Organization of the Univer sity of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
For recent cases on freedom from unreasonable search
T973T.
and seizure,
see: Moore v. StudentT~A~f fairs Committee~of Troy
State University 284 F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Ala. 1968); People
292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. 1968); Speake v. Grantham
v. Cohen
317 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.M. 1970); Keene v. Rodgers 316 F.
Supp. 217(N.D.Me. 1970); Piazzola v. Watkins 442 F.2d 284
362 N.Y.S.
(4th Cir. 1971); People v. Boettner and Gottshall
(La.
2d
343
304
So.
2d 365 (N.Y. 1974); State v. Boudreaux
1974); State v. Johnson 530 P.2d 910 (Ariz. 1975).
,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

2

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, sec.

I.
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governmental action "arbitrary," "capricious,"
or "unreasonable" either in content or in procedure? 3
Due Process and the state college student

.

The

leading case concerning constitutional due
process rights
of students is Dixon v. Alabama State Board
of Education 4
,

In this case, Dixon and five

other students of Alabama State

College allegedly disrupted the college campus by taking
in a sit-in demonstration at the cafeteria of the

county court house.

Because of this action, they were

expelled from college without a hearing.

Furthermore,

the letter by which they were notified did not specify the

reasons for their expulsion.
The students filed suit to restrain the State Board
of Education from obstructing their right to attend college.

The assertion that they had a right to due process was

This constitutional guarantee demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious,
and that means selected shall have real and substantive
relation to object. (Henry C. Black, Black's Law
Dictionary Fourth Edition, [St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub.
,

Co.

,

1951]

,

590)

p.

The phrase "due process of law," when applied to
substantive rights, as distinguished from procedural
rights, means that the state is without power to deprive a person of life, liberty or property by an act
having no reasonable relation to any proper governmental purpose, or which is so far beyond the necessity
of case as to be an arbitrary exercise of governmental
power. (Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 159 P. 2d
[Ariz. 1945]).
292
4

294 F 2d 150
(1961).
.

930

(5th Cir.

1961), cert, denied 368 U.S.
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unsuccessful in the district court, and the students
appealed.

5

The United States Court of Appeals held that due

process requires notice to the students and the opportunity
for a hearing before students of public colleges could be

expelled for misconduct.

The court set forth what it

\

considered to be the notice and hearing required by due
process at state institutions of education.

Since this

decision is relied upon heavily by other courts, it will
be quoted at length.

The notice should contain a statement of the specific
charges and grounds which if proven woul d justify
expulsion under the regulations of the Board of
The nature of. the hearing should vary
Education
depending upon the circumstances of the particular
case The case before us requires something more than
an informal interview with an administrative authority
By its nature, a charge of misconduct,
of the college.
as opposed to a failure to meet the scholastic standards
of the college, depends upon a collection of the facts
concerning the charged misconduct, easily colored by
In such circumthe point of view of the witnesses.
Board
or the adminthe
gives
which
a
hearing
stances,
to
opportunity
an
college
the
of
istrative authorities
suited
best
is
detail
hear both sides in considerable
This is not
to protect the rights of all involved.
with the
hearing,
to imply that a full-dress judicial
right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such
a hearing with the attending publicity and disturbance
of college activities, might be detrimental to the
college's educational atmosphere and impractical to
carry out. Nevertheless, the rudiments of an adversary
proceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon
In the instant case, the
the interest of the college.
of the witnesses
names
student should be given the
report on the facts
written
against him and an oral or
,

,

.

.

5

186 F. Supp.

945

(M.D. Ala.

1960)
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to which each witness testifies.
He should also be
given the opportunity to present to the
Board, or at
least to an administrative official of
6
the colleqe
his own defense against the charges and to
either oral testimony or written affidavits produce!
of
tn SSe
hlS behalf
the
hearing
is
not before
ri
o
?
the Board
directly the results and findings of the
hearing should be presented in a report open to the
students' inspection.
If these rudimentary elements
°f fair play are followed in case of misconduct of
this particular type, we feel that the requirements
of due process of law will have been fulfilled.
(Italics mine
*

,

>

.

In reaching this decision, the court indicated the

value of education for the students and pointed out the

probability that these students would not gain admission to
other colleges.

The court recognized that the college had

the power to expel students, but that the school could not

arbitrarily exercise the power.
Admittedly, there must be some reasonable and
constitutional ground for expulsion or the court
would have a duty to require reinstatement (of
The possibility of arbitrary action is not
students)
excluded by the existence of reasonable regulations.
There may be arbitrary application of the rule to
Indeed, that result
the facts of a particular case.
is well nigh inevitable when the Board hears only one
In the disciplining of college
side of the issue.
which should
students there are no considerations.
prevent the Board from exercising at least the fundamental principles of fairness by giving the accused
students notice of the charges and an opportunity to be
Indeed, the example set by
heard in their own defense.
the Board in failing to do so, if not corrected by
the courts, can well break the spirits of the expelled
students and of others familiar with the injustice,
and do inestimable harm to their education.''
.

.

Dixon
v. Alabama State Board of Education,
” 294 F 2d 150,
19611
(5 th CTr
6

159

.

.

.

7

Id.

at 157.

.
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Although this case was not decided by the
United
States Supreme Court, by denying certiorari 6 to
the plea
from the Board of Education, the Court of Appeals'
decision
was sustained.
^PP^-^^tion of the Dixon ruling

In the same year,

.

a similar decision was reached in the case of Knight
v.

State Board of Education 9 involving students at Tennessee
A.

State University who had been summarily dismissed

I.

&

following their arrest for participating in "sit-ins" at
public facilities.

The students argued that the action

taken by the university through its discipline committee

violated their rights under the due process clause by not
giving the students proper notice of the charges against
them, or an opportunity to present their side of the case.

The court held that the students' claim to a

deprivation of procedural due process was well taken.
the conclusion appears inescapable upon the
present record that the rudiments of fair play and
the requirements of due process vested in the
plaintiffs (students) the right to be made aware of
the evidence made against them and to be afforded an
opportunity to present their side of the case before
such drastic disciplinary action was invoked by the
It is undeniable, in the
university authorities.
first place that the plaintiffs in being suspended
.

.

.

An order from a higher court to a
Writ of. Certiorari
lower court to provide, for the higher court, the record of
a particular case ajudicated by the lower court.
8

:

9

200 F. Supp.

174

(M.D. Tenn.

1961)

.
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.
.
were deprived of a valuable right of interest,
i.e., the right or interest to continue their
training at a university of their choice.
10
.

.

.

.

Whether attendance at a state university be described as
a
right or privilege, the court held that the students had the
right of due process, including notice and hearing.

Expansion of the Dixon ruling

.

The courts have

further defined the due process ruling in the Dixon case by

determining which procedural safeguards apply and when.
The extent of procedural rights required by courts depends

on the severity of the possible punishment, the nature of
the substantive issue presented, the actual fairness of the

procedure adopted, and the circuit in which the case was
1

heard.

In 1967, a federal district court in Missouri

stipulated ten essential elements of student due process.
The case, Esteban v. Central Missouri State College

12
,

involved two students who were suspended for taking part in
mass demonstrations which caused substantial disruption and

destruction of school property.

The students filed suit

alleging that they were deprived of procedural due process
because the hearing afforded them was insufficient.

1

°

Ibid

.

"Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in
Colleges and Universities," (N.Y.: A.C.L.U., 1970), p. 27.
1

1

2

277 F. Supp.

649

(W.D. Mo.

1967).
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The critical defect in the hearing procedure
used
by the college was the fact that ;Ke person to
whom
the students were permitted to make their explanation
or showing Dr. Chalquist, was only one of a number
of persons on the board which made the recommendation
of suspension.
,

1

Accordingly, the court directed the college to grant each of
the students a new hearing.

The court prescribed the

procedure to include:
1.
A written statement of the charges to be furnished
the student on at least ten-days notice;
2.
A hearing before the college president, as the one
person possessing authority to expel or suspend;

Advance inspection by the student of any affidavits
or exhibits which the college intended to submit at
the hearing;
3.

The student s rig ht to have counsel present with
him at the hearing
4.

1

;

5.
The right to present his version of the case and to
present affidavits, exhibits, and witnesses as he
desired;
10.
6.

The right to hear the evidence;

The president's determination of the facts solely
7.
on the evidence presented at the hearing;
8.
A statement by him in writing of his findings as to
guilt or innocence of the conduct charged;

9.

A statement of any disciplinary action; and

Permission to each side to make a record of the
(Italics mine.)
events at the hearing.
1

1

Ibid.

1

415 F 2d 1007
.

(8th Cir.

1969).
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Right to C ounse l and Due Process

.

Another federal

district court did not go as far as the
Esteban ruling
concerning the right to counsel. French v.
Bashful
decided in 1969, was a civil rights action by
suspended
and expelled state university students who alleged
1

,

that they

were denied procedural due process at hearings held before
the university discipline committee.

The district court

held that where the prosecution of the students before

a

discipline committee was conducted by a senior law student,

who was chosen to prosecute because of his familiarity with
legal proceedings, due process was denied the students by

not permitting the students to retain counsel.

The failure

of the committee to put its findings into a report open to
the students' inspection was an additional infirmity.

The court relied on Dixon and a 1967 case, Wasson
v.

Trowbridge

1
.

The court in the Wasson case held that a

student did not have the right to be represented by counsel
in expulsion proceedings.

The court, however, qualified

its holding by saying:

The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of
fairness is a function of all of the other aspects
Where the proceeding is noncriminal
of the hearing.
in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not
adversarial and the government does not proceed

15
1

6

303 F.

Supp.

382 F . 2d 807

1333

(E.D.

(6th Cir.

La.

1969).

1967).
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through counsel
due process does not require
representation by counsel. 17
.

.

.

The court held that in view of the
special circumstances of this case procedural due
process requires that
those students be permitted to be
represented by retained
counsel.
The court made it clear that they did not
believe
a university should be required to
appoint counsel for
,

students, for this would be too high a price for
a college
to pay for the privilege of enforcing discipline among
its

students
Right to a hearing before an interim suspension

.

Some fairly recent decisions have held that unless the element
of danger to persons or property is present, students are

entitled to a hearing before suspension may be imposed.
Thus, students at Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh,

suspended for destroying university property, were ordered

reinstated by the federal district court pending

a fair

hearing unless the university could show that the students'

presence on campus posed a danger.

17

303 F. Supp.

1333, 1338

18

(E.D.

La.

1969). The court then

went on to cite a constitutional authority, Professor Charles
Wright, who noted that:
a leading case holding that counsel need not be
allowed qualifies this by saying that this is true so
long as "the government does not proceed through
provide their own
If universities
counsel.".
cases at least
those
in
lawyer to assist a tribunal,
right
of his own
the
the student can hardly be denied
counsel.
.

.

.

.

1

Marzette

.

.

.

.

v.

McPhee

.

294 F.

Supp.

.

.

562

(W.D. Wis.

1968).
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This test was also invoked in a decision
involving
students at the University of Wisconsin at
Madison who were
suspended for 13 days pending a full hearing on
charges of

participation in violent disruptions.
v

*

Regents of University of Wisconsi n.

The case, Stricklin
19

was an action by

students against the university which argued that their

suspensions violated the due process clause.

The students

asked for a temporary restraining order requiring their

reinstatement in the university.

The court held that the

suspension of a student from a state university for a period
of 13 days as a sanction of misconduct, without specifi-

cation of charges, notice of hearing, or hearing violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

20

The

court further held that students should not be suspended
from a state university without a specification of charges,

notice of a hearing or

a

hearing unless

(1)

danger to persons or property is present, or

an element of
(2)

unless it

can be shown that it is impossible or unreasonably difficult
to afford it prior to an interim suspension.

Due process

facilities

.

1

9

2

°Ibid.

2

1

to university functions and

In Watson v. Board of Regents of University of

297 F. Supp.

Ibid

— access

21

416

(W.D. Wis.

1969).
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Co l orado

2 2

a non-student was denied access to the
University

,

of Colorado by the university's special
admissions

committee apparently for the reason that he had a prior
criminal record.

The university president wrote Watson a

letter directing him to

"

.

.

.

refrain from entering upon

the campus of the University of Colorado."

This action was

taken pursuant to the Board of Regents' regulation which
stated that,
the university, acting through its administrative
.
.
officers, reserves the right to exclude those deemed
detrimental to its well-being or incompatible with
its function as an educational institution. 2
.

Watson claimed that the Regents' regulation was

unconstitutionally vague and that his right to procedural
due process had been denied since he was not afforded a

hearing prior to being denied access to the university.
Does the constitutional right to procedural due

process require a public university to offer a hearing to
a non-student prior to excluding him from university

property?

The court held that it does where the university’s

facilities are generally open to the public at large.
Accordingly, on this basis the court held that

a

non-student's

right to access to university functions and facilities which
are open to the public— at— large cannot be permanently denied

2 2

512 F 2d 1162
.

2 3

Ibid.

(10th Cir.

1973).
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without due process of law under
the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. 2 '
On the other hand,
the court acknowledged that the
language of
the Regents-

regulation was not impermissibly vague
since the university
is often a focal point for the
discussion of public questions, cultural events, recreational
activities,

and general

educational functions ," 25 and as such,
opens its doors to
the public.
The court likened the procedural due
process neces-

sary in this case to that which is required
in suspension
or expulsion of students for disciplinary reasons.

It

stated that a valid Regents* regulation should provide
for
a hearing.

But like the decision in Stricklin

,

the court

made it clear that:
.
.
when a genuine emergency appears to exist and
.
it is impractical for university officials to grant
a prior hearing, the right of non-students to access
to the university may be suspended without a prior
hearing so long as a hearing is thereafter provided

with reasonable promptness.

6

Immunity of school officials

.

In a recent decision,

the Supreme Court of the United States held that in the

specific context of school discipline, school officials are
not immune from liability for damages if they knew or rea-

sonably should have known that the action they took within

24 Id.

at 1162.

25 Id.

at 1164.

26

Donald D. Gehring, College Students and the Courts
(New York: College Admin. Pub., 1973), p. 104.

,
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their sphere of official responsibility would violate
the
constitutional rights of the student affected or if they
took the action with the malicious intention to cause a

deprivation of constitutional rights.

27

Although the case concerned high school students, it
applies to higher education as well.

Statute 42 U.S.C.

section 1983 declares that:
Every person, who under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State
or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit of
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
In the past, school officials were considered immune

from liability under this section.

The Strickland decision

has modified that immunity:

A compensatory award will be appropriate only if
the school [official] has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the
student's clearly established constitutional rights
that this action cannot reasonably be characterized
as being in good faith. 28

2

Wood v. Strickland

,

95 S.Ct.

992

(1975).

at 994. The doctrine of governmental immunity is a
commonTaw concept evolved from the English theory that the
"King can do no wrong." Hence, the government cannot be held
liable for acts committed by its officers or employees.
Because a school district is a local subdivision of the state,
the school district is covered by the cloak of governmental
For an interesting discussion on governmental imimmunity.
Kern Alexander, Ray Corns, and Walter McCann,
munity, see:
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1969),
Public School Law
pp. 335-357.
2

Id.

,
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Enough time has not elapsed for the
ramifications
of this decision to be realized.

But, the decision should

surely enhance the right of students to be
free from

arbitrary and unreasonable actions by school officials.
Summary

.

Students at a state college or university

are constitutionally guaranteed the right to notice and
a

hearing, prior to suspension or expulsion, by the Four-

teenth Amendment to the Constitution.

Procedural due process

requires that students be given written notice of the
specific charges against them, the time and place of the
hearing, evidence which will be presented against them, and
the possible action to be taken if the charges are supported.
The notice should be provided to the students in enough time
to allow the students to prepare a proper defense before

the hearing.

Unless there is a clear and present danger to life
or property, students should not be suspended until they

have had a hearing.

If a clear and present danger does exist,

the students may be dismissed; but a hearing must follow in
a reasonable time.

The hearing should provide the students an oppor-

tunity to present their defense and present witnesses in
support of their case.

There is no general requirement, at

this time, that the student be warned against self-

incrimination or be permitted to cross-examine witnesses.
There is also no general requirement that students be

51

permitted to be represented by
counsel.
Only in unusual
cases where the university proceeds
through counsel must
the students be permitted
representation.
If the hearing is not before the
highest adminis-

trative authority at the institution, the
student is
entitled to appeal the decision to that
authority.
The
p
earing is not Considered to be criminal in
nature and
t2
y/
therefore the student is not entitled to all the
raiments
of an adversary proceeding.
The hearing should simply

—

.

1

'

i

;

„

l

be

a fair and ample opportunity for both sides
to present the

facts of the case.

There is no precise definition of due process of
law.

Courts have preferred to define it by the gradual

P roc ®S£> of judicial inclusion and exclusion because "pro-

cedures are subject to refinement and improvement in the

never ending effort to assure not only fairness, but every
semblance of fairness."

procedures

— those

not arbitrary.

29 Due

(N.D. Fla.

v.

29

In general, due process means fair

procedures that are reasonable, just, and

30

Florida A.

&

M.

University, 233 F. Supp. 396

1963)

30

See also, Soglin v. Kaufman 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis.
1968), aff'd 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969); Scott v. Alabama
State Board of Education 300 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ala. 1969);
Lowery v. Adams 344 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Winnick v.
Manning 460 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1972); Edwards v. Board of
Regents of Northwest Missouri State University 397 F. Supp.
822 (W.D. Mo. 1975)
,

,

,

,

,

.

0)

r
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Equal Protection

^

1
eny t0 any person within
its
ts jurisdiction the equal
f protection
of the laws. 31
'

’

*

Throughout our history, American schools
have often
been segregated in a variety of ways—
religion,
by

class and wealth, and by sex and race.

by social

No method of segre-

gation in the schools has thus far led to
greater social,
educational, political or legal conflict than
segregation
by race.
That our elementary and secondary schools are
the scene of racial conflicts and court orders is

perhaps the most eloquent testimony to the devisiveness of
this issue.

Although racial discrimination is still prevalent
in our society, courts have uniformity ruled that schools

cannot discriminate on the basis of race.

Today, another

form of discrimination is also being challenged.

Colleges

are now being forced to defend their policies and actions

which are based on classifications of sex.

This section

will explore the aspects of race and sex discrimination as
it pertains to public higher education.

Race

.

In 1896, the Supreme Court of the United

States recognized the concept of "separate but equal"

3 1

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, sec.

1.
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as a constitutional principle.

32

However, 46 years before

that land-mark decision, the Supreme
Judicial Court of
Massachusetts established the doctrine in
relation to

public education.
The case was Roberts v. City of Boston

33
.

By 1850,

Boston had maintained a system of racially segregated
public
schools.
Benjamin Roberts, a Black, attempted to enroll
his daughter in a White primary school.

The child's

application was repeatedly rejected, and Roberts retained
counsel to sue the City of Boston school officials.

34

Roberts argued that the separation of children in
the public schools on the basis of color or race established
a caste system and denied equality as guaranteed by the

Constitution of Massachusetts.

He also claimed that

although the teachings of both a White and Black school are
the same, they are nevertheless not equivalent.

35

Separate

schools

3 2

Plessy v. Ferguson

,

163 U.S. 537

(1896).

33

It is interesting to
59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850).
note that a court in a northern state first propounded the
doctrine of "separate but equal."
34

He retained a Black attorney and Mr. Charles Summer,
See,
later the fervent abolitionist United States Senator.
Separate
Levy and Phillips, "The Roberts Case: Source of the
but Equal Doctrine," 56 Am. Hist. Rev. 510 (1951).
3 5

Roberts v. City of Boston

,

supra note 33 at 203.
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Si
1
deV °^ e t0 ° ne class must differ
^
essentiialiy, Tn
essentiallv
in T+its spirit
and character, from
that public school known to the law,
classes meet together in equality. 36 where all

The court rejected this plea, and in
finding for the school
committee created the "separate but equal"
doctrine.
Chief Justice Shaw explained:
The great principle, advanced by the learned
and
eloquent advocate of the plaintiff, is, that by the
constitution and laws of Massachusetts, all persons
without distinction of age or sex, birth or color,
origin or condition, are equal before the law. This,
as a broad general principle, such as ought to appear
in a declaration of rights, is perfectly sound; it
is not only expressed in terms, but pervades and
animates the whole spirit of our constitution of
free government.
But, when this great principle
comes to be applied to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant
the assertion, that men and women are legally clothed
with the same civil and political powers, and that
children and adults are legally to have the same
functions and be subject to the same treatment; but
only that the rights of all, as they are settled and
regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal
consideration and protection of the law, for their
maintenance and security. What those rights are, to
which individuals, in the infinite variety of circumstances by which they are surrounded in society, are
entitled must depend on laws adapted to their respective relations and conditions. 37
Thus, a northern court sanctioned the use of racial

classifications and sustained a dual system of public
education.
In Plessy v. Ferguson , the Supreme Court of the

United States was called upon to determine whether

3 6

Ibid

3 7

Id.

-it

206.

a
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Louisiana law segregating railroad passengers
violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The

issue was essentially the same as was brought
in the Roberts
case, except now the Supreme Court would set
judicial

precedent that would decide the fate of Blacks for over
half a century.
In 1890, Louisiana passed a law that in part

required:

...

that all railway companies that carry passengers
in their coaches in this state shall provide equal
but separate accommodations for the white and colored

races .

3 8
.

.

.

The statute was to be enforced by train officials, and

violation of this law could result in a fine of $25 or
imprisonment for no more than twenty days.

A conflict arose when Mr. Plessy refused to leave
a coach reserved for Whites,

and occupy a "seat in a coach

assigned for persons not of the white race."

39

Because of

his refusal, he was ejected from the train and "hurried
off and imprisoned in the parish jail.

"
.

.

40

.

plessy

believed that the statute under which he was arrested and
convicted was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's

3 e

3 9

4 °

Plessy v. Ferguson
at 538.

Id.,
.

Ibid

,

supra note 32 at 540.
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equal protection clause.

41

In affirming the constitutionality
of the statute,

the Supreme Court applied the test of
reasonableness to
the legislation.
Justice Brown, delivering the majority

opinion, saw the case resting on the question of
what

constitutes reasonable regulation under the Fourteenth
Amendment:
So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to
the question whether the statute of Louisiana is
a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this,
there must necessarily be a large discretion on the
part of the legislature.
In determining the question
of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with
reference to the established usages, customs and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of
public peace and good order.

Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a
law which authorizes or even requires the separation
of the two races in public conveyances is unreason42
able.
.

.

,

Justice Brown also cited the Roberts case as evidence
that the "separate but equal" doctrine had been accepted in

states with very liberal attitudes toward the rights of
Blacks.

43

The court explained the concept of "separate but

equal" in relation to the Fourteenth Amendment:

4

Although Plessy alleged other violations

(i.e. the
oneand
Caucasion
seven-eighths
"was
assertion that he
is the
question
eighth African blood") the constitutional
hallmark of this decision.
4 2

Id.

at 550.

4 3

Id.

at 544.
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The object of the amendment
was undoubtedlv t-n
G
absol te equality of the two
races'beLe
the°^
^ nature
law bab ln the
of things it could not have
^
een intended
to abolish distinctions based
upon
to
enforce
social, as distinguished from
°F
political equality, or a commingling
upo° terms unsatisfactory to either? of the two races
Laws permitting,
6 1
q rlng their separation in places where 9
th^/
K^ to be brought
they I
are f®
liable
into contact
not
necessaniy imply the inferiority of either dorace
to
tne other, and have been generally, if
not universally,
recognized as within the competency of the state
legislatures in the exercise of their police
The most common instance of this is connected power.
with the
establishment of separate schools for white and colored
children which has been held to be a valid exercise
the legislative power even by courts of states where of
the political rights of the colored race have been
longest and most earnestly enforced. 44

^\

*

r

The court ruled that "separate but equal" did not

violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Although some argued that this "tended to stamp

the colored race with a badge of inferiority," the court

dismissed this, "because the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it."

The court went one step

further and added that "if one race be inferior to another
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put

them upon the same plane."

45

In eloquent anger. Justice Harlan rejected the major-

ity opinion:
The arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis
of race, ... is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality of

4 4

Ibid.

4 5

Id.

at 551-52.
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the law established by the Constitution.
it cannot
be justified upon any legal grounds.
The thin
disguise of "equal" accommodations for passengers
railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, nor
atone for the wrong this day done. 46
.

.

.

m

In memorable language, he went on to note that:
.
in view of the Constitution, in the eye of
.
the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens
... the law regards man as man, and takes no
account of his surroundings or of his color when
civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the
land are involved. 47
.

In a prophetic statement. Justice Harlan was correct when

he declared:
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered
will in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as
the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred
Scott case 4 8

The separation of the races in the United States

extended not only to Black and White, but to Yellow, Brown
and Red as well.

4 6

Id.

at 562.

4 7

Id

at 559.

48

.

A case in point is Gong Lum

v.

Rice.

49

In Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1857),
the Supreme Court held that any individual of African descent
could not be considered a citizen of the United States or of
any state in the sense that the word citizen was used in the
The case also upheld the right of people
U.S. Constitution.
to own slaves, maintaining that any state that tried to
abolish slavery violated an individual's right to "property."
It may be of interest to note that Justice Harlan's
grandson would be serving as a Supreme Court Justice when the
"separate but equal" doctrine was declared "inherently unequal.
4 9

Ibid.

275 U.S. 78

(1927)
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In 1927, the Supreme Court held that
states could segregate

children of the Caucasian race from children
of not only
Black but Yellow and Brown as well. Martha Lum,

an Oriental,

claimed denial of equal protection when she was
forced to
go to a Black school in Mississippi.
The Supreme Court
held that the issue is no different whether the state

segregated "White from Black" or White from Yellow."

The

same principles that were established in Plessy applied
here; the state was not unreasonable in segregating the

races, and the exercise of this disrection was not a vio-

lation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In attempting to define and apply the doctrine of

"separate but equal" to higher education, it became apparent

that the states were not financially able to provide equal

educational opportunities.

The Supreme Court was confronted

with this problem in 1938.

What was the minimum that

a

state could provide and be in compliance with the "equal"

portion of the Plessy doctrine?

The conflict arose over

whether the University of Missouri could be compelled to
accept a Black student to its law school.

50

Lloyd Gaines

was a resident of Missouri, and upon completion of his

undergraduate study, wished to enroll at the law school of
the university.

There was no claim that Gaines lacked the

proper qualifications for acceptance except that he was of

5

°Missouri ex. rel

.

Gaines v. Canada

,

305 U.S.

337

(

1938

)
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the Black race, and a Missouri statute
provided for the education of the races separately but equally. He
was, therefore, refused admission. An alternative proposal
was

presented that, in accordance with another statute, would
provide the funds necessary for Gaines to acquire a legal
education in a school of an adjacent state which provided

unsegregated facilities.

Gaines refused the alternative

and brought his case to court arguing that he had a right
to attend the state law school and practice in the state

because he was a "citizen and taxpayer of Missouri."

His

denial was thus a violation of the equal protection clause.
Chief Justice Hughes praised the State of Missouri for
the financial arrangements it had offered Gaines, but found

that since there was no law school for Blacks in the entire
state, the equal protection clause was in fact violated.

The

court, continuing to maintain the "separate but equal" doc-

trine explained that Missouri could have fulfilled its obli-

gation to provide legal instruction to its Black citizens
"by furnishing equal facilities in separate schools, a method

the validity of which has been sustained by our discussions."
In lieu of this decision, Missouri was forced to allow Gaines

into the all White law school.

Twelve years past, and again the Supreme Court was
faced with applying the Plessy doctrine.

5

Id.

at 340.

The case was

5

61

Sweatt v. P ainter

52
.

In compliance with the Gaines
decision,

Texas had established a law school
for Blacks.
Herman
Sweatt refused to attend the separate
law school, and
demanded to be admitted to the all White
University of
Texas Law School.
His demands were rejected,
and he

brought his case to court claiming that the
Black law
school was inherently unequal to that of the
all White
school and, thus, a violation of the equal protection

clause.

The Texas trial court found that the newly-estab-

lished state law school for Blacks offered Sweatt "privileges, advantages, and opportunities for the study of law

substantially equivalent to those offered by the state to
White students at the University of Texas."

53

The court,

utilizing a strict interpretation of the "separate but
equal doctrine," rejected his petition.

Sweatt, believing

he still had a right to go to the all White school, appealed

his case to the Supreme Court.
The Court first compared the facilities of the two
schools.

The all White school was staffed by sixteen full-

time and three part-time professors,
some of whom are nationally recognized authorIt's library contained over
ities in their field.
Other facilities available to the
65,000 volumes.
students were a law review, moot court, scholarship
.

.

.

5 2

339 U.S.

5 3

Ibid.

629

(1950)
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funds, honor society and its alumni
occupy the most
distinguished positions in the private
practice of
the law and in the public life
of the state.
It mav
^° nSidSred ° ne ° f the nati ° n s
law^schools.
'

In comparison, the law school for
Blacks was not yet

accredited, had a faculty of five, and a
library of some
16,500 volumes.
The school also had a moot court

and legal

aid association, and one alumnus who had
become a member of
the Texas Bar.

After comparing the two schools, the Court declared:
we cannot find substantial equality in the
educational opportunities offered White and Negro law
students by the State.
In terms of number of the
faculty ... scope of the library
the University of Texas Law School is superior. What is more
important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to
a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. ... It is difficult to believe
that one who had a free choice between these law
schools would consider the question close. 55
.

.

.

.

.

.

The Chief Justice went on to point out some of the intensely

practical considerations that rendered the Black law school
so decidedly inferior:

The law school to which Texas is willing to admit
Sweatt excludes from its student body members of the
racial groups which number 85 percent of the population of the state and include most of the lawyers,
witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with
whom Sweatt will inevitably be dealing when he becomes
a member of the Texas Bar.
With such a substantial
and significant segment of society excluded, we cannot

5

Id.

5 5

Id . at

at 633.
6

3 4

.
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conclude that the education offered Sweatt is substantially equal to that which he would receive
if admitted to the University of Texas Law School

56

.

While the court held that there was simply no way
to make the two schools equal and yet separate, it still
had

stopped short of declaring the doctrine null and void.

During the same session, the Supreme Court went a
step further in expanding the concept of "equal protection
of the laws."

In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for

Higher Education

57
,

a Black was admitted to the graduate

school of the state supported University of Oklahoma as a

candidate for a doctorate in education, because no Black
school had such a program.

He was permitted to use the

same classroom, library, and cafeteria as White students.
In lieu of a state law requiring that the instruction of

Blacks in institutions of higher education be "upon

a

segregated basis," he was assigned to a seat in the class-

room in a row specified for Black students, was required
to sit at a special table in the library, and although

permitted to eat in the cafeteria at the same time as other
students, was assigned to a special table

believed that the school

5 6

Ibid

1

s

58
.

McLaurin

action by setting him apart from

.

It may be of interest to note
that Justice Thurgood Marshall was at that time McLaurin'
5 7

339 u.S.

counsel
5 8

Ibid.

637

(1950).
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the other students solely because
of his race was a denial
of his right to equal protection
of the laws.

Chief Justice Vinson delivered the
opinion of the
He found that the university's
treatment

Court.

of

McLaurin, which set him apart from the
other students,

handicapped him in his pursuit of effective
graduate
education.
Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability
to study, to engage in discussions and exchanges,
views with other students, and in general, to learn
his profession. 59

Justice Vinson elaborated on the consequences of
this unequal treatment:

...

he is attempting to obtain an advanced degree
in education, to become, by definition, a leader and
trainer of others. Those who will come under his
guidance and influence must be directly affected by
the education he receives.
Their own education and
development will necessarily suffer to the extent
that his training is unequal to that of his class-

mates.
State imposed restrictions which produce
such inequalities cannot be sustained. 60
In concluding, the Court found that:

the conditions under which this appellant is
required to receive his education deprive him of his
personal and present right to the equal protection of
the laws.
We hold that under these circumstances the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the state based upon race. Appellant, having
been admitted to a state-supported graduate school,
must receive the same treatment at the hands of the
state as students of other races. 61
.

Id
60
6

.

.

.

at 641.

Ibid.

McLaurin

v.

Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education

supra note 57 at 642.

,
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Thus, the reasoning of the Court
in expanding the rights of
Blacks had progressed as far as possible
without contesting
the entire "separate but equal" doctrine.
By 1954, the stage had been set in the
evolutionary

process for overturning the "separate but equal"
doctrine.
The landmark decision of Brown v. Board of
Education
of

Topeka

,

Kansas G

2

would change and challenge the social,

political and legal concepts of society.
Acting under the authority of a 1949 Kansas statute,
the Topeka Board of Education established segregated elemen-

tary schools.

The law permitted, but did not require,

separate schools for Black and White students.

Brown, a

student, and others filed a class action challenging the

constitutionality of segregated schools.

They claimed that

the maintenance of segregated schools by the state was an

infringement on their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal

protection of the laws.

The Court did recognize that

"segregation in public education has a detrimental effect
upon Negro children,

63

but it rejected Brown's assertion
*

The court

on the basis of the "separate but equal" doctrine.

found that the Black and White schools "were substantially

Although the Court heard cases
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware, it will
be sufficient for the purpose of this study to highlight
The other cases were: Briggs v. Elliott
the Kansas case.
Davis v. County School Board and Gebhart v. Belton
6 2

,

,

e 3

Id. at 484.

.
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equal with respect to buildings, transportation,
curricula,
and educational qualifications of teachers." 64
Brown,

believing this arrangement was unconstitutional,
appealed
to the Supreme Court.

Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanomous

opinion of the Court.

He rejected the state's assertion

that the case must be decided on the basis of the "separate

but equal" doctrine; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was
not intended to apply to public education when it was
adopted.

He stated:

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the
clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted,
or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of
its full development and its present place in
65
American life throughout the Nation. .
,
.

The Court next explained the importance of education
In an often quoted paragraph. Chief Justice Warren declared:

Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of the state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic
It is required in the performance of our
society.
most basic public responsibilities, even service in
It is the very foundation of good
the armed forces.
Today, it is a principal instrument in
citizenship.
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping
In these
him to adjust normally to his environment.
reasonably
days, it is doubtful that any child may
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,

6 4

Ibid.

6 5

Id.

at 493.

67

where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal
terms 6 6
He then concluded that the segregation of children in public

schools solely on the basis of race, does deprive the

minority group students of equal educational opportunity.
"Even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible'

factors may be equal."

67

The Court, relying on the work of social scientists

that had established the negative effects of discrimination
and prejudice on the development of children, quoted, with

approval, an earlier Kansas case:

Segregation of white and colored children in
public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children. The impact is greater when it has
the sanction of law; for the policy of separating
the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority
Segreaffects the motivation of a child to learn.
a
has
therefore,
law,
of
gation with the sanction
mental
and
educational
tendency to [retard] the
development of Negro children and to deprive them of
receive in a racial [ly]
some of the benefits they 6 would
8
integrated school system.

Justice Warren eloquently declared:
age
To separate [Blacks] from others of similar
race
and qualifications solely because of their
status
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
hearts and
in the community that may affect their
undone.
be
to
minds in a way unlikely ever
of Plessy v.
Thus, the Court rejected the precedent
public education
"We conclude that in the field of
Ferguson
.

6 6

Ibid.

6 7

Ibid.

G8 Id.

at 494.

6 9

Ibid.
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the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has
no place.

educational facilities are inherently unequal

mine

.

7 0

Separate
(Italics

.

The late 1950

and early 1960

's

extreme difficulties for the nation.

was no exception.

's

were times of

The university campus

Colleges confronted with public pressure

tried in vain to thwart the Supreme Court's ruling.

were suspended or denied admission for fear

tftat

Blacks

their

presence would cause disruptions and threaten lives and
property.

71

These attempts at depriving Blacks equal

educational opportunity were rejected by the courts.

72

It is urged that this proposed segregation will
promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts.
Desirable as this is, and as important as is the
preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be
accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights
created or protected by the Federal Constitution.
Thus, law and order are here to be preserved by
.

.

.

70

Id. at 495.
In order to carry out the Brown decision,
the Court requested the parties to submit arguments for its
implementation. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown II ("all deliberate speed") was essentially concerned with desegregating
secondary schools. The important principles effecting higher
education were established in Brown I.

See Lucy v. Adams, 228 F.2d 619 (3rd Cir. 1955), cert,
denied 351 U.S. 931 (1956); Florida ex. rel. Hawkins v. Board
of Control of Florida 350 U.S. 40 (1956)
7

,

72

Lark v. State Board of Education, 150 F. Supp. 900 (E.
D. La.T957), aff'd 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958); Booker v.
State of Tennessee Board of Education 240 F 2d 689 (6th Cir.
1957)"; and Hunt v. Arnold, 172~F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1959).
,

.
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rights!??

^

NGgr ° Children of the

^

constitutional

In a dramatic attempt to prevent
the desegregation

of the University of Alabama,
Governor George C. Wallace
declared that he would personally "bar
the door." The

district court issued a temporary injunction
restraining the
Governor from interfering with the enrollment
of students.

Judge Lynne considered the problem in this
way:

Thoughtful people, if they can free themselves
from tensions produced by established principles
with which they violently disagree must concede
that the governor of a sovereign state has no authority to obstruct or prevent the execution of the lawful
orders of a court of the United States. No legalistic
formula is required to express the craving of honest,
hard working God-fearing citizens for a moral order
logically supported, an attitude long ago expressed
when Coke informed King James tht there was a law
above the King. 74
The two students in this case were enrolled with the

help of the Office of the Attorney General of the United
States.

The legal principles were clear

—a

qualified

minority person could not be denied admission to
college or university solely on account of race.

a state

No dis-

tinction would be made among undergraduate, graduate or

professional programs.

A qualified person could and would

be able to enroll.

7 3

Cooper v. Aaron 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In Watson v. Memphis
the Supreme Court later declared, "The best guarantee of civil
peace is adherence to, and respect for, the law." 373 U.S.
,

526

(1963).
74

291-92

United States v. Wallace, Governor, 218
(N.D. Ala.

1963)

F.

Supp. 290,

,
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Reverse Discrimination.

Although race discrimination

is still prevalent in society,
some efforts have been made

to alleviate the injustices of
the past.

in 1973, an

approach that some label "reverse discrimination,"
met with
immediate opposition. The case was DeFunis
v. Odegaard 75
.

In 1970, Marco DeFunis, a white male, applied
to the

University of Washington's School of Law.

He was not

accepted, but was told that if he applied in 1971, he
would
have a better chance of being admitted. DeFunis reapplied
and again was rejected.

DeFunis discovered that the school

had accepted minority students with grades and law school

aptitude test (L.S.A.T.) scores lower than his own.

He

also learned that the admissions procedure used for minority
and non-minority candidates was not the same.

Minority

persons were compared with other minority candidates, and
not with the non-minority applicants.

Because race had

been used in evaluating the applicants and "several minority
students were admitted to the first year class who, if they

had been white, would have been denied admission," 76 DeFunis

believed that the school's policy was a violation of the
equal protection clause.

with him.

7 5

76

The state district court agreed

Relying on the Brown decision, it declared:

507 P . 2d 1169

(Wash.

1973), 94 S.Ct. 1704

(1974).

Parker Young & Donald Gehring, The College Student
(N.C.: College Admin. Pub., Inc., 1973),
and the Courts
D.

,

p.

106.
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After that decision, the Fourteenth Amendment
could no longer be stretched to accommodate
the needs
Policies of discrimination will inevitably lead to reprisals
the only safe rule is
treat all races alike, and that is what is required
under the Equal Protection Clause. 77
.

.

.

The Washington State Supreme Court reversed the
tr a l coaE’t
^-

s

decision, and supported the university's

right to consider the racial and ethnic background of

applicants in their admissions process.

The court noted

that the Brown decision did not prohibit racial classifications, but only those which were invidious and stigma-

tized a racial group.

Decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
made it clear that in some circumstances a racial
criterion may be used and indeed in some circumstances must be used by public educational institutions in bringing about racial balance.
The
Constitution is color conscious in order to prevent
the perpetuation of racial discrimination and to
correct the effects of segregation which took
place in the past. 78

—
—

.

.

.

One of the purposes of this admissions policy was to

insure the participation of racial and ethnic groups in the
legal profession.

These groups had historically been denied

such participation and were under-represented in the legal

community.

The court stated that:

Clearly, consideration of race by school authorities does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, when
the purpose is to bring together rather than separate,
The minority admission policy of the law
the races.

7 7

7 8

DeFunis v. Odegaard
Id. at 1179-80.

,

supra note 75.

72

school, aimed at insuring a reasonable representation
of minority persons in the student body, is not invidious.
Consideration of race is permissible to carry
out the mandate of Brown and as noted, has been
required in some circumstances. 79
,

The court agreed that the university had shown why

this admission policy was necessary in order to accomplish
a compelling state interest.

The educational interest of the state in producing
a racially balanced student body is compelling
we do not find the consideration of race in the admission
of these minority applicants who indicate competence to
successfully complete the law school program to be
.

arbitrary or capricious.

.

.

80

Thus, the court found that the university's admission policy

was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal pro-

tection clause.
This decision was not unanomous.

Chief Justice Hale

wrote a scathing dissent.
Racial bigotry, prejudice, and intolerance will
never be ended by exalting the political rights of
one group or class over that of another. The circle
of inequality cannot be broken by shifting the inequalities from one man to his neighbor. To aggrandize the first will, to the extent of the aggrandizement, diminish the latter. There is no remedy
at law except to abolish all class distinctions
heretofore existing in law. For that reason, the
[Federal and State] are and ever
constitutions
ought to be color blind. Now the court says it
would hold the constitution color conscious that they
I do not see how they can be
may stay color blind.
both color blind and color conscious at the same time
toward the same persons on the same issues.
.

.

.

He also stated that the majority opinion,

7 9

Id.

at 1182.

0O

Id.

at 1184-85.

8

1

Id.

at 1189.
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... suggests a new rule of constitutional interpretation to be applied here that, if the administrative
intentions are noble in purpose (a person) may be
deprived of equal protection of the laws and certain
special immunities and privileges may be granted to
others which, on the same terms, are denied to him. 82
Marco DeFunis appealed, and the United States
Supreme Court agreed to hear his case.

While the court

battles were raging, DeFunis had been allowed to attend
the law school.

When the Supreme Court finally heard his

case, he was in his last year of school.

Because he had

brought suit on behalf of himself and not as the representative of any class, the Court declared that.
Because the petitioner will complete his law
school studies at the end of the term for which he now
registered regardless of any decision this court might
reach on the merits ... we conclude that the court
cannot
consider the substantive constitutional
issues tendered by the parties. 83
.

.

.

Thus, the Court, by declaring the case moot,

8

relieved itself of deciding one of the most controversial
issues confronting our society today.

Justice Douglas, in a lengthy dissent, declared:
in endeavoring to dispose of this case as moot,
.
the court clearly disserves the public interest. The
constitutional issues which are avoided today concern
vast numbers of people, organizations and colleges
.

8

8

.

Ibid

.

DeFunis v. Odeqaard

,

94 S.Ct.

1704, 1707

(1974).

Moot: "A judgment on some matter which when rendered
for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect."
If a
Courts will only deal with actual controversies.
the
involved,
parties
the
decision will have no effect on
become
has
fact
in
what
court will not render a verdict on
3 at 1
an academic question. See, Henry Black, supra note
84

74

and universities.
Few constitutional questions
in recent history have stirred
as much debate and they
d sappear
The y niust inevitably return to
2
^
t e c
federal
courts and ultimately again to this court. 85
.

.

.

*

The interpretations of "equal protection"
have evolved
and matured since the doctrine of "separate
but equal" was
advanced in Plessy v. Ferguson
This evolutionary process
has not ended, nor have the controversies associated
with it.
.

It is inevitable that the Supreme Court will be called
upon

again to declare the meaning of the equal protection clause

regarding race.
Sex.

While progress has occurred in the area of

racial equality, almost half the population of the United
States is still faced with discriminatory practices solely

because of their sex.

As Susanne Martinez explains:

it is almost inconceivable that a public school
would openly and blatantly exclude students from
particular high schools because of their race, or deny
minority students access to
programs.
Substitute the word sex, however, and such practices
are not only commonplace, but openly performed and
righteously defended. 86
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Colleges and universities have not been immune to
the pervasiveness of this discrimination.

In 1958,

a

Texas

court ruled that the refusal to accept women applicants to

85

See also, Fred M. Hechinger, "The Case
Against Preferential Racial Quotas: Justice Douglas' Dissent
in the DeFunis Case," N.O.L.P.E. School Law Journal 4 (1974) :8.
Id.

at 1122.

86

Susanne Martinez, "Sexism in Public Education: Litigation Issues," Inequality in Education no. 18, edited by
Leah Levy (Cambridge, MA: Center for Law and Education, October
,

1974)

,

p.

5.

75

The Agricultural and Mechanical College
of Texas solely
because of their sex was unconstitutional. 87
Citing the
Brown decision, the court announced that:

... as a matter of law separate but equal facilities
are inherently unequal as applied to males and
females,
and as a matter of law any attempt at classification
of
males and females for educational purposes ... is
irrational and immaterial to the educational objectives
sought, and does violence to
and is in clear
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 8
.

.

.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the decision,

noting the co-educational and women's schools the applicants
could attend.

Thus, by implicitly holding that in regard to

sex the "separate but equal" doctrine applied, the court
stated:

A state, as a matter of public policy, may as a
part of its total system of higher education, maintain, for the choice of its citizens, one all male and
one all female institution,
along with institutions which are co-educational.
Such a plan
exalts neither sex at the expense of the other, but
to the contrary recognizes the equal rights of both
sexes to the benefits of the best, most varied system
of higher education that the state can supply. 89
.

.

.
.

.

.

This case is illustrative of the position the courts

took until the late 1960's.

Sex was a legitimate classifi-

cation, and if the sexes were treated separately but equally,

there was no constitutional infringement.

87
8 3

Heaton v. Bristol
Id.

,

317 S.W.2d 86

(Tex.

1958).

at 91.

In rendering its decision, the court also
at 100.
reviewed the many areas of legislation that classified persons
on the basis of sex, e.g. minimum wage, jury service and types
of employment.
89

Id.

76

In 1970, a case that seemed reminiscent of the

Sweatt decision was Kirstein v. The Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia

90
.

The State of Virginia operated

institutions of higher education, some of which were all
male, all female and co-educational

.

The University of

Virginia, traditionally an all male institution, developed
a three-year plan for the admission of females.

Four women

filed a class action suit to compel the university to admit

Failure to do so, they urged, would be a violation of

them.

the equal protection clause.
The court agreed.

Although Virginia did maintain

colleges for women, and co-educational institutions, it
found that the University of Virginia was superior.

The

school offered programs not available at any other state

institution, and the school had a national reputation which
the others did not.

In so finding, the court explained:

The plain effect of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is "to prohibit prejudicial disparities before the law. This means
prejudicial disparities for all citizens including
women." We hold, and this is all we hold, that on
the facts of this case these particular plaintiffs
have been ... denied their constitutional right to
an education equal with that offered men at Charlottesville and that such discrimination on the basis of
Protection Clause of the Foursex violates the Equal
9
teenth Amendment.

—

However, the court proceeded to state:

9 0

951

309 F. Supp.
(1971).
9
at 187.
Id
1

.

184

(D.C. Va.

1970),aff'd Mem. 401 U.S.
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Be c aU se the university had
submitted a plan for •'desegregating
the school, the court
declined to grant an injunction
and

declared the case moot.
By applying the same legal
principles, a three judge
federal district court in South
Carolina upheld a statute

providing for the maintenance of
the all female Winthrop
College.” Four males sued to enjoin
enforcement of
the

statute limiting enrollment to women,
claiming that it was a
violation of their rights under the equal
protection clause.
The court held that the classification
by sex was not unreason
able or arbitrary, and, in this particular
case, was not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court distinguished the case from Kirstein by
also

utilizing the rationale of the "separate but equal"
doctrine.
There the women plaintiffs were seeking admission
to the University of Virginia and it is conceded that
the University occupied a preeminence among the Statesupported institutions of Virginia and offered a far
wider range of curriculum. No such situation exists
here.
It is not intimated that Winthrop offers a wider
range of subject matter or enjoys a position of outstanding prestige over the other state-supported institutions in this state. 94

9

Ibid.

9 3

951

316 F. Supp.
(1971).

9 4

Id.

134

at 138 - 39.

(D.S.C.

1970); aff'd Mem.

401 U.S.

78

It has been established that race is a suspect

classification and a state must have a "compelling interest"
in making such a classification.

However, sex classifi-

cations have not been determined to be "inherently suspect."
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on student sex

discrimination in higher education.
Reed

9 5
,

However, in Reed v.

the Court did enunciate a standard of review for

sexual classifications under the equal protection clause:
[A classification] must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike. 96

The Court used this standard in striking down a

statutory preference given to men in matters concerning the

appointment of an administrator for an estate.

The Court

found this to be a sexual classification which did violate
the equal protection clause.

97

It appeared that the Supreme Court was moving toward

finding sex to be a suspect classification and, therefore,
the "strict judicial scrutiny test" would have to be applied.

9 5

404 U.S.

9

Id.

9

Ibid.

98

In Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.Ct. 1764

71

98

(1971)

at 76.

(1973), the

"uniformed services" maintained a policy under which males
were permitted to claim their wives as dependents automatically,
while females had to show that their spouses were financially
dependent upon them. The "uniformed services defended its

79

However, in 1974, the Court in Kahn
v. Shevin " relied once
again on the "fair and substantial
relation test" enunciated
in Reed in upholding a Florida statute
which granted a property tax exemption to widows but not to
widowers. The
Court implicitly suggested that the "strict
scrutiny" is

not the appropriate standard for sex classifications. 100

Another example of the Court's hesitancy to declare
sex a suspect classification is Cleveland Board of
Education
v.

LaFleur

1

0

.

in this case, the Court refused to find that

mandatory maternity leave for teachers violated the equal
protection clause as did both lower courts.

The Court

found it necessary only to find that the policy was arbi-

trary and thus violated the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

1

0 2

actions on the grounds of administrative efficiency.
In a
plurality decision, the Court rejected this argument and
found the policy to be a violation of the equal protection
clause.
Four justices held that sex is an inherently suspect classification subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Three justices concurred, but found it unnecessary to reach
the question of whether sex is a suspect classification,
they merely noted that "administrative efficienty" did not
pass the "fair and substantial relation" test.

"94

S.Ct.

100 Susanne

1734

(1974)

.

Martinez, supra note 86 at 61.

1

0

1

"Because of the uncertainty the Supreme Court has shown

2

94 S.Ct.

791

(1974)

in determining what standard to apply to this issue, the 4th
Circuit Court of Appeals established what would seem to be
By holding that the South Carolina
an intermediary test.

80

Regardless of the precise standard,
the courts
are grappling with sex discrimination,
and women are being
afforded some protection by the courts
under the equal
protection clause.
In a recent college case, the Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas found that a
parietal
rule of

Texas Woman's University which required women,
but not
men, to live in on-campus housing was declared
unconsti-

tutional

1

0 3

.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

.

Another avenue for ending sex discrimination is Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972.

1

04

Although no cases

have been reported as yet utilizing Title IX, it will

undoubtedly provide more protection.

The key provision reads:

Senate could not refuse to comply women as pages the court
declared:
A classification based upon sex is less than suspect;
a validating relationship must be more than minimal.
What emerges is an "intermediate approach" between
rational basis and compelling interest as a test of
validity under the equal protection clause.
(Eslinqer
v. Thames
476 F.2d 235, 231 [4th Cir. 1973].)
,

1 0

Texas Woman's University v. Chayklintaste

949, 951

,

521 S.W.2d

(Tex. 1975).
It is Therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed, that

[the university's] Parietal rule, which, requires every
adult undergraduate woman student to live in a unit of
.be, and the same is hereby
the residential system,
proas
unenforceable
declared invalid, void and
Fourteenth
the
hibited by the Equal Protection Clause of
Amendment
.

.

.

104 Education

.

.

Amendments of 1972, sections 901-907, 20
U.S.C. sections 1681-86 (1972).
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No person in the United States shall,
on the basis
.£
5^1 excluded from participation in, be denied
k
°f
° T be sub ^cted to discrimination
under^nv dUCatl on Program or activity
receiving
federal ?•
5
financialJ assistance.
S X'

^

1

.

.

.

Except for the specific exemptions of religious
or
military schools, any educational institution which
receives
federal monies by way of a grant, loan or contract is
required
to comply with the requirements of the act.
This includes

all

levels:

kindergartens, preschools, elementary and secondary

schools, vocational schools, junior and community colleges,

four-year colleges, universities and graduate and professional
schools.

Private, as well as public schools are subject to

the requirements of Title IX if they accept federal financial

assistance
If an institution does not comply with the law, the

government may delay awards of money, revoke current awards
or debar institutions from eligibility for future awards.

The Department of Justice may also bring suit at the request
of the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health,

Education and Welfare.
When, and if, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment

becomes law, women and men would be guaranteed a strict
judicial test in sex discrimination cases.

It reads:

Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any
state on account of sex. 106
105 Id.

at section 901(a),

10e Proposed:

tution.

Section

1

20 U.S.C.,

section 1681 (1972).

of 26th Amendment to U.S. Consti-

82

Summary

.

Sex discrimination seems to be
ingrained

in the American culture.

But, as we have slowly progressed

with the problem of racial discrimination,
it appears that
legitimate efforts are being made in this
controversial
area.

However, as the Texas court remarked in the
Chayklin -

taste case:
It is to be observed as we anticipated that our
courts
are about to embark upon tasks like unto that made
necessary by the litigation over racial discrimination.
Hopefully, it will be neither as extended nor as
bitter. 0 7
1

Classifications of students can be made and college
rules can apply to certain classes of students and not to
others.

However, classifications based upon race will be

inherently suspect, and the state will have to show a com-

pelling interest in using it as a criterion.

The DeFunis

case illustrates one use of this standard in redressing past

discriminatory affects on minority students.
College officials also must insure that a classifi-

cation of students is not arbitrary and that there is some
l07 Texas Woman's University v.

Chayklintaste sup ra note
See also, Mollere v. Southeastern "Louisiana
103 at 950.
Sail'er Inn, ~Inc
College 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La~. 1969
485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971); Bucha v. Illinois High
v. Kirby
School Association 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. 111. 1972); Bray
344
377 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1972); Davis v. Meek
v. Lee
School
Independent
Brenden
v.
Ohio
(N.D.
1972);
Supp.
298
F.
District 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Berkelman v. San
Francisco Unified School District 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1974); Anne Dellinger, "Sex Discrimination in the Public
Schools: Title IX and the Education Amendments of 1972,"
(October 1974); and Carolyn
School Law Journal Bulletin
Rusch, "Equality in Athletics and the Cheerleader v. The
Athlete," 19 S.D. L. Rev. 428 (1974).
,

)

,

.

;

,

,

,

,

,

,

,
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educational or other sound rationale which
supports such
classification.
In areas other than race, the
standard
used has been the "fair and substantial
relation"

a

test as

developed in the Reed case.

It would appear that classifi-

cations based on sex seem to lie somewhere
between these two
standards, when relying upon the equal protection
clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

A more scrupulous standard will

undoubtedly be applied when alleged sex discrimination is

brought under Title IX and, if adopted, the proposed equal
rights amendment.

Regardless of the standards employed by the court,
one thing is clear, students at public colleges and univer-

sities are entitled to the guarantees of the Fourteenth

Amendment's equal protection clause.
Freedom of Expression
The Fourteenth Amendment specifically prohibits the

state from depriving any person of due process or the equal

protection of the laws.

But, what of the liberties enumer-

ated in the original Bill of Rights?

Although in the past the first ten amendments only

restricted fereral actions, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Fourteenth Amendment to bring the actions of the state

84

under the restraints of the Bill of Rights.

100

Public

colleges and universities, as agencies of the state,
must
also respect the students

1

legitimate exercise of these

rights.

One of the fundamental liberties protected by the

Constitution is freedom of expression.

109

The First

Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press the right of the people peaceably to aisemble
and to petition the government for a redress of griev,

;

ances.

1

0

(Italics mine)

Freedom of expression has been described as "the
freedom to express and to defend views or beliefs, and the

0 8

For an interesting discussion of the Bill of Rights and
its applicability to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment see: Arval A. Morris, The Constitution and American
Education
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1974), pp. 82110.
See also: Gitlow v. New York 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
Palko v. Connecticut 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); and Duncan v. L ouisiana 291
1

,

,

,

,

U.S. 145

(1968).

109 Although

freedom of expression is not specifically
addressed in the First Amendment, it is used herein to denote
the rights of students to symbolic, oral, and written expression (speech, press)
Freedom of expression will be used to illustrate that
colleges are required to respect the constitutional rights of
students beyond the specific prohibitions of the Fourteenth
This area was chosen because of its importance
Amendment.
The investigation of knowledge
in the field of education.
active and open exchange of.
the
involve
must necessarily
particular interest to examine
of
It is, therefore,
ideas.
in its use and restraints.
students
its effect on colleges and
110 U.S.

Const, amend.

I.
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freedom to question and differ

.

.

.

without authoritative

repression and without scholastic
penalization." 111 i n the
past, however, schools had been able
to prohibit student
expression (whether symbolic, oral, or
written)

in further-

ance of promoting discipline among its
students. 112

it was

not until 1965 that students were recognized
as having
legitimate interests in expressing their views
and ideas.

Symbolic expression

.

In 1965, the United States was

becoming more involved in the war in Viet Nam.

Anti-war

protests were being conducted throughout the nation.

There

were rallies and marches held for and against the war in
Washington, D.C. and New York.
In Des Moines, Iowa, a group of Quakers planned to

wear black armbands to publicize their support of

a truce

called for by Robert Kennedy and to mourn the dead of both
sides in the Viet Nam conflict.

School officials of the

Des Moines public schools, aware of this plan, adopted a

policy that forbid the wearing of these armbands in school.
If a student refused to remove it, he/she would be suspended.

The school board ratified this policy.

R. M. Maclver, Academic Freedom in Our Time
Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 207.
1

1

,

(N.Y.:

Goldberg v. Regents of the University o f C alifornia
As long as the school could show
Rptr 463 (1967
a reasonable relationship between its policy and goal of
maintaining "good order and decorum," courts would not substitute their judgment for that of the school's.
1

1

,

57 CalT

.

)

.
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Aware of the policy, a group of
students wore the
black armbands to school. They were
suspended and not
allowed to return until they would
remove the armbands.
John and Marybeth Tinker and Chris
Eckhardt did not return
to school until after the period for
wearing the armbands
had expired.

In order to prevent the school officials
from

taking disciplinary action for their absence,
the students
(through their fathers) brought suit in a federal
district
court.

They alleged that the policy of prohibiting the

wearing of armbands in school violated their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech.

Thus was born Tinker v. Des

Moines Independent Community School District

1

1

.

District Court Judge Roy Stephenson outlined the
legal principles applicable in this case.

First, "an

individual's right to free speech is protected against state

infringement by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."

114

The wearing of an armband for the purpose

of expressing certain views is a "symbolic act and falls

within the protection of the First Amendment's free speech
clause. 115

Second, freedom of speech is not absolute, and,

in some circumstances, may be abridged by the state.

Third,

school officials have the "responsibility for maintaining a

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

258 F. Supp.
Id. at 972.

5

Ibid.

971

(S.D.

Io.

1966).
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scholarly, disciplined atmosphere within the classroom

they have an obligation to prevent anything which might
be

disruptive of such an atmosphere."

should not interfere." 117
is.

Fourth, unless the

school officials are unreasonable, the courts

^-^^-ions of

case

116

Thus, the question posed by this

How to resolve the conflict between the needs of

school officials to maintain discipline and the rights of
the students to freedom of speech?
By reviewing the facts, the court determined that,
"it was not unreasonable in this instance for school

officials to anticipate that the wearing of armbands would
create some type of disturbance. 118

Judge Stephenson thus

concluded that the school officials had a "reasonable basis
for adopting the armband regulations." 119

The judge noted that the students' freedom of speech

was limited only during school hours.
to wear armbands off school grounds.

They were still free
In upholding the school

regulation, the court declared:
School officials must be given a wide discretion,
and if, under the circumstances, a disturbance in
school discipline is reasonably to be anticipated,
actions which are reasonably calculated to prevent
such a disruption must be upheld by the court.
.

1

Ibid

1

117
1

1

1 1

Ibid.
Id.

9

.

at 973

Ibid.

.

.
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:LnStanCe
lt is the disci Plined atmosphere
of
i"Sc
ClaSSr
°° m/ not the [students'] right to
wear
armbands on school premises, which is
entitled to
t
the
th
protection of the law 120
'

th

\

3

.

The Tinkers, dissatisfied with the
district court's
decision, appealed their case. The U.S. Court
of Appeals
affirmed without opinion. The Tinkers next
appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
In a landmark decision, the Court reversed the
lower

court decisions. 121

On behalf of the Court, Justice Fortas

reviewed the facts and the legal principles involved in the
case.

Contrary to the lower court, Justice Fortas emphasized

that constitutional rights are available to students and

teachers in our public schools.
It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. 122

By citing Justice Jackson in an earlier Supreme Court

ruling, Justice Fortas supported this assertion:

The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
states, protects the citizen against the state itself
and all of its creatures Board of Education not
excepted.
These have, of course, important, delicate
and highly discretionary functions, but none that they
may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.
That they are educating the young for citizenship is
reasonable for scrupulous protection of constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle

—

1

2 0

1

2

1

2 2

J

Ibid

.

393 U.S. 503
Id. at 506.

(1969)
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the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount
important principles of our government as mere plati3
tudes.

On the other hand, the Court also recognized the right

and obligation of school authorities to maintain discipline
and provide the "proper educational atmosphere."

Thus, the

case concerns the collision of the students' exercise of
%

First Amendment rights and the rules of school authorities.
The district court concluded that the action of the

school officials had been reasonable because it was based

upon their "fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the

armbands."

1214

This finding was rejected by the Supreme

Court
In our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression. 125

Justice Fortas eloquently continued by explaining that:
Any departure from absolute regementation may
cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's
opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken in class,
in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from
the views of another person may start an argument or
cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
our history says that it
must take this risk
is this sort of hazardous freedom this kind of openness that is the basis of our national strength and of
the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and
live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious
society 2 G
.

—

.

.

—

1

West Virginia State Board of Education v.
at 507.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
1

2

1214

id

.

Ibid

.

1

2 5

Ibid.

1

2 6

Id . at 508-9.

7V>
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The Court rejected the "reasonable relation test"

followed by the district court.

In setting forth the

legal principle to be applied, the Court stated:
In order for the State in the person of school
officials to justify prohibition of the particular
expression of opinion, it must be able to show that
its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always, accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that
engaging in the forbidden conduct would materially
and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,
the prohibition cannot be sustained. 127
(Italics
mine.

Thus, the Court developed the legal principles to

be applied.

Where there is no evidence that the forbidden

conduct would "materially and substantially interfere" with
school work and discipline, its prohibition is unconstitutional.

But, conduct by students which does materially and

substantially interfere with school work or infringes on
the rights of others is not protected.
In this case, the Court found no evidence to support

the school officials' prohibition on the wearing of armbands.
It, therefore,

reversed the lower court's decision.

Although this was a case concerning the rights of
legal
public secondary school students, it established the

principles to be applied to public college cases.
were
An example of how the Tinker principles

applied at the college level was Williams

1

2 7

Id.

at 109.

1

2 8

333 F. Supp

.

107

v.

(D.

Eaton

Wy

.

12

8

.

1971)
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Fourteen members of the University of
Wyoming informed
their coach that they were going to wear
black armbands
during the game to be played between Wyoming
and Brigham
Young University. The purpose of the armbands
was
to

protest the racially discriminatory practices
of the Mormon
Church which operated Brigham Young University. A
coaching
rule which forbids players from participating in
demonstrations was made known to players several times, but the

players insisted that they would wear the armbands.
coach suspended the players from the team,

and, at a

The

hearing

before the trustees, the suspensions were upheld. Believing
that they had a constitutional right to wear the armbands,
the students sought a restraining order from the court.

Judge Kerr acknowledged that the wearing of armbands
can be a symbolic form of free speech.

He noted that this

case concerned more than a collision of the rights of

students and the authority of the college to prohibit certain
conduct.

Tinker

,

Although Judge Kerr distinguished this case from
he also utilized its legal principles.

He agreed

that the school authorities did not have evidence to show
that the wearing of the armbands would cause a material and

substantial disruption.

However, this was not necessary,

because the wearing of the armbands would haver as the Supreme
Court stated, "infringed upon the rights of others," since
they were to be worn to protest the alleged religious beliefs
or tenets of the Mormon Church.

Judge Kerr pointed out that

92

the students were members of the University
of Wyoming
(a

state institution) football team.

sent the school whenever they play.

As such, they repreif they were allowed

to wear the armbands, it would be considered a
form of

state action, and thereby in violation of Brigham Young

University's rights to freedom of religion.
The fullest realization of true religious liberty
requires that government neither engage in nor compel
religious practices, that it effect no favoritism
among sects or between religion and non-religion, and
that it work deterence of no religious belief. 129
In balancing the rights involved in the case, Judge Kerr

declared:
The rights of the [students] to freedom of speech
as guaranteed by the First Amendment cannot be held
paramount to the rights of others to practice their
religion free from state-supported protest since
individual liberties cannot be left completely uncontrolled to clash with similarly asserted liberties of
several thousand others. 130

The court, therefore, upheld the suspension of the
students.

Although the students did not win this case, the

Tinker principles were still applied.
is not absolute.

Freedom of expression

In this case, the expression would have

infringed upon the rights of others; it was, therefore, the
duty of the school authorities to prohibit the conduct.

Written expression

.

The written expression of

student ideas and opinions is another area of controversy
for students and college officials.

1

2 9

Id.

at 115.

1

°ibid.

Most of the cases in

93

this area concern college supported and
underground student
publications

A leading "student press" case is Dickey
State Board of Education

131
.

in early April,

v.

Alabama

1967, Dr.

Frank Rose, the President of the University of Alabama,
came
under attack by a few Alabama state legislators for his
censor a University of Alabama student publication
that included some articles written by communists.

Gary

Clinton Dickey, editor of the Troy State College student
newspaper, the Tropolitan, "should be heard on this matter."
He prepared an editorial supporting the position of Dr.

Rose and presented it to the paper's faculty advisor who

instructed him not to publish it.

Dickey went to the

president of the college, who also determined that the
editorial could not be published.

The decision was based

on a Troy State College rule that precluded the carrying of

articles or editorials in the school paper which were

critical of the governor or legislature of Alabama.

However,

the rule did not prohibit editorials or articles of a lauda-

tory nature concerning the governor or legislature.
The faculty advisor furnished a substitute article

concerning "Raising Dogs in North Carolina."

An editor, Dickey,

did not believe this to be suitable material, and acting

against the specific orders of his advisor and President

1

3

273 F. Supp.

613

(M.D. Ala.

1967).
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Adams, arranged to have, with the exception
of the title,
A Lament for Dr. Rose," the space ordinarily
occupied by
editorials left blank, with the word "Censored"
diagonally

across the blank spaces.

In addition, Dickey mailed his

editorial to a Montgomery newspaper.

Because of this "will-

ful and deliberate insubordination," Dickey was expelled.

Believing that his expulsion was a violation of his
right to freedom of speech and press, Dickey took his case
to court.

In reviewing the facts of the case. Chief Judge

Johnson acknowledged that an educational program requires
certain rules and regulations necessary for "maintaining
an orderly program, and operating the institution in a manner

conducive to learning." 132

However, he also stated that the

right to communicate on matters of public interest is

"embraced in the First Amendment right relating to freedom
of speech" and is protected against infringement by state

officials, "and these First Amendment rights extend to
133
students insofar as unreasonable rules are concerned"

Was the college rule precluding critical editorials

unreasonable?

Judge Johnson believed that it was.

opinion delivered two years before Tinker

,

In an

he declared:

A state cannot force a college student to forfeit
his constitutionally protected right to freedom of
expression as a condition to his attending a state
State school officials cannot
supported institution.

1

32 Id.

at 617.

1

3 3

Ibid.
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infringe on their students' right
of free

anrt

srs^ysa.
Thus, the court held that the rule
was an unreason-

able infringement on Dickey -s right
to freedom of expression.
Judge Johnson pointed out that the rule,
in fact, had nothing
to do with maintaining discipline. As to
the charges of
insubordination the court stated:
,

The attempt to characterize Dickey's conduct,
and
the basis for expelling him, as "insubordination".
does not disguise the fact that Dickey was expelled
from Troy State College for exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right of academic and/or political
3 5
.

expression

.

The court also noted that there was no legal obli-

gation on the school officials to operate a school newspaper.
However, since they did, they could not punish its editor
for utilizing his constitutional rights.
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Papish v. Board

of Curators of University of Missouri 136 A graduate student,
.

Barbara Papish, was expelled for distributing on campus

a

newspaper "containing forms of indecent speech" in violation
of the by-laws of the Board of Curators.

The newspaper,

the Free Press Underground, had been sold on campus for over

four years.
two reasons.

1 3

4

Id.

However, this issue was found unacceptable for
First, on the front cover was a reproduction of

at 618.

1

3 5

Ibid

1

36

93 S.Ct.

1197

(1973)
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a political cartoon depicting a
policeman raping the Statute
of Liberty and the Goddess of
Justice.
Second, the issue
also contained an article entitled
"Mother Fucker Acquitted,"
which discussed the trial of a youth
who was a member of an
organization known as "Up Against the Wall
Mother Fucker." 137
Following the hearing, the student was
expelled for
violating the college's Code of Student
Conduct which
requires students "to observe generally accepted
standards
of conduct," and specifically prohibits
"indecent conduct or
speech." 138 Ms. Papish believed that her expulsion
was

improperly premised on activities protected by the First
Amendment.

The Supreme Court agreed.

The Court recognized

that a university has the legitimate authority to enforce

reasonable regulations "as to the time, place, and manner
of speech and its dissemination." 139

it also acknowledged

the university's right to enforce reasonable rules governing

student behavior.

However, the Court declared that, "State

colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the
sweep of the First Amendment." 140
In reviewing the articles, the Court found that

"neither the political cartoon nor the headline story can

1

37

1

3 6

1

1

39

Id.

Ibid
Id.

at 1198.
.

at 1199.

°Ibid. The Court also found no evidence indicating any
disruption of university functions because of the distribution
of the newspaper.
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be labelled as constitutionally obscene." 141

Because the

newspaper was not legally obscene, the Court
stated:
The mere dissemination of ideas no matter how
offenSlve to 9 °°d taste on a state university campus
may
not be shut off in the name alone of "conventions
of
H 2
decency.

—

1

The Court concluded that Ms. Papish was expelled

because of the content of the newspaper.

In so finding,

the Court declared:

Since the First Amendment leaves no room for the
operation of a dual standard in the academic community
with respect to the content of speech, and because the
state university's action here cannot be justified as
a non-discriminatory application of reasonable rules
governing conduct
the case is remanded to the
District Court, and that court is instructed to order
the University ... to reinstate her as a student in
the graduate program. 4
.

.

.

1

In Thonen v. Jenkins

3

1

4 4

,

the 4th Circuit Court of

Appeals relied on Tinker and Papish to uphold the right of
a student to use a "four letter word" in depicting the

president of East Carolina University in the school newspaper.

The court merely pointed out that there was no

evidence of disruption because of the editorial and that
"the mere dissemination of ideas

1

4

142

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

at 1200.

1

4 3

Id.

1

4 4

491 F 2d 722
.

(4th Cir.

— no

1973).

matter how offensive
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to good taste- on a state university campus may
not be shut

°ff in the name alone of "conventions of decency." 145

Summary

.

These cases illustrate that students at

state colleges and universities are guaranteed the right to

freedom of expression.

As long as the expression does not

materially and substantially disrupt school work or discipline, or infringe upon the rights of others, the expression
is protected by the First Amendment.

A school may reason-

ably regulate the time, place and manner of expression and
its distribution.

It may also prohibit any "legally"

obscene material.

But a state school may not shut off

the dissemination of ideas "in the name alone of 'conventions
of decency,' no matter how offensive to good taste."

The

courts have also recognized that a school does not have to

operate a newspaper, but if it does, it can not punish
students for exercising their constitutional rights.

An

issue which has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court
in college student press cases is that of prior restraint.

However, a federal district court in Massachusetts held
that a rule requiring the prior submission of material to
be published to an advisory board was a prior restraint on

the students' right to freedom of expression.

"Having

fostered a campus newspaper, the state may not impose

145 Id.

at 724, quoting Papish at 1199.
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arbitrary restraints on the matter to
be communicated.

1 " 6

Conclusion

Students enrolled in state colleges are
entitled to
the protections guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United
States.
The cases presented in this chapter have
illus-

trated the legal principles involved in public
college
students' rights to due process, equal protection,

and

freedom of expression.
It has also been shown that the Fourteenth Amendment

restrains the state and its entities, such as state colleges
and universities, from prohibiting the free exercise of

constitutionally protected liberties.
ment only prohibits state actions.

However, the amend-

Actions by private

colleges are not bound by its provisions.

Therefore, stu-

dents at these schools do not enjoy the same safeguards
from institutional actions as do students at public schools.
The following chapter will examine this distinction and

will present those cases which establish the rights of
students at private institutions.

Antonelli v. Hammond 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970)
For an interesting discussion of the rights of students to
freedom of expression see: Richard L. Berkman, "Students in
Court: Free Speech and Schooling in America," 40 Harv. Educ.
Rev., 567 (1970); Charles Allan Wright, "The Constitution and
the Campus," 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027 (1969); Edmund Reutter Jr.
The Courts and Student Conduct, (Kansas: N.O.L.P.E., 1975);
Barbara Gold, "The Student Press: An Update," Inequality in
pi /4
Education, no. 20 (Mass: Harvard Univ. July 197b)
1

4 6

,

,

,
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CHAPTER

iv

THE CONCEPT OF STATE ACTION

Introduction
The distinction between a public and
a private

college,

Christopher Jencks and David Riesman have
explained,
was of no special importance during the first
two centuries of American higher education.
Then
after the Civil War, it became one of the central
issues and divisions within the emerging academic
system.
Today
the distinction seems once again
to be losing some of its importance.
.

.

.

.

.

.

1

To the students in these colleges, however, the distinction

has again become important.

While demands for freedom and

justice have been met by the constitutional safeguards

afforded them at public colleges and universities,

2

students

at private colleges have not received the same protections.

Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic
Revolution
2

,

(New York: Doubleday

&

Co.,

Inc., 1968), p. 257.

By "public college or university" is meant an institution of higher learning, whether or not granting degrees,
which is "operated by a State, subdivision of a State, or
governmental agency within a State." All else for these
purposes is private. This definition is from Title IV of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 401(c), 12 U.S.C. section
2000-1 (c) (1964).
The act also states that colleges and
universities are public when they are "operated wholly or
predominantly from or through the use of governmental funds
or property, or funds or property derived from a governmental
source."
Many of the difficult cases we shall examine fall
It is interesting that Congress had no
into this category.
problem calling these institutions "public" when the courts
have been reluctant to do so.
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The Private College and Student Rights
It is generally understood that the
Fourteenth

Amendment restrains the state and its entities,
such as
state colleges and universities, from prohibiting
the

free exercise of constitutionally protected
liberties.

Actions by private institutions do not come under the
scrutiny of its restrictions.

3

The amendment is not binding

on private colleges or universities.

Therefore, students

at such institutions do not enjoy the same protections as

do students at public schools.

For example, in 1967, a

federal court in Greene v. Howard University 4 upheld the

right of the college to summarily expel students without

affording them a hearing as required by public colleges.
Judge Holtzoff explained that:
It is clear that a government college may not expel its
students without notice of charges and an opportunity
to be heard, but this is not applicable to Howard
University, for it is not a public institution nor
does it partake of any governmental character. 5
In finding that Howard University was not a public

institution, the court found the relationship between the

The only rights exactly correlative to the duties
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment are rights against the
state, not against private individuals." Archibald Cox,
"Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights," 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 110 (1966).
3,,

4

271 F. Supp. 609
(D.C. Cir. 1968)
.

5

Id.

at 612.

(D.

D.C.

1967), moot 412 F.2d 1128
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institution and student to be primarily
contractual.

6

Therefore, the court turned to the university
catalog,
which enunciated the relationship between the
institution
and its students as follows:

Attendance at Howard University is a privilege.
In
to protect its standard ... the university
reserves the right and the student concedes to the
university. the right, to deny admission to and to
require withdrawal of any student at any time for any
7
reason deemed sufficient to the university.
.

.

.

After reviewing this provision. Judge Holtzoff declared:
If there is any contractual relation between the
university and its students, the foregoing provisions
are part of the contract. 8

The court also noted that nowhere in the catalog

did it state directly or by implication that a student would
be afforded a hearing before his connection with the school

could be terminated.

Therefore, the court concluded that:

statutory
the students had no constitutional,
.
or contractual right to a notice of the charges and
a hearing before they could be expelled. ... It was
entirely within the discretion of the university
authorities to grant or withhold a hearing. 9
.

.

Similar results were reached in a private secondary
school in 1970 where students were summarily suspended for

attending a pep rally at the public school across the street.

For a discussion of the contract theory,
id . at 613.
see Chapter II, pp. 14-23.
6

7

Ibid

.

8

Ibid.

9

Id

.

at 614.
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Because the school was private,
not public, the court
found that there was no "state
action" and, therefore,
the requirements of due process
guaranteed by the Four
teenth Amendment were not applicable.
The origins and central meaning of
the
Amendment and our basic societal values,Fourteenth
as expressed
law ®' d °
indicate that the constitutional
requirements of due process which establishes
the
the relationship between government and
i
i°^
individuals should also be the standard for
the
relationship between private individuals and
organi10
zations
(Italics in original}

^

.

The court explained that although it may disagree

with the action, it would not substitute its opinion
for
that of the school.
it was well within the discretionary
authority of the school to promulgate such a policy.

The

court also emphasized that the relationship between the

student and the school is one of contract.

Because the

school's rules do not provide for hearings, the student
is therefore not entitled to one.
In Ryan v. Hofstra University ,

accused of destroying school property.

1

a student was

He was expelled

and fined over $1,000 for the damage done.

Although

Hofstra was considered to be a private university, Ryan was

reinstated because the hearing he was afforded was contrary
to the procedures called for in the university catalog.

°Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1393
Ind. 1970) , ~aff 'd 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
1

1

1

324 N.Y.S. 2d 964, aff'd 328 N.Y.S. 2d 339

(N.D.

(N. Y.

1971).
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The court found this to be an abuse of the
college's

discretionary power.

Relying upon the catalog provision,

the court found the university's action to be a
breach of

contract
In 1973, two students were dismissed from Brooklyn

Law School for "poor scholastic performance."

12

The

students alleged that the real reason they were dismissed

was because they had, as co-editors of the school's student
magazine, printed articles unfavorable to the legal profession.

Therefore, they were being punished for exercising

their constitutional right to freedom of speech.

Court of Appeals found Brooklyn Law School to be

The U.S.
a

private

institution; therefore, the court found its actions were

not restrained by the Fourteenth Amendment.

1

These cases have illustrated that students in

private colleges are not entitled to the protections

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Thus, these stu-

dents do not enjoy the same rights as students in public

12

Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School

,

478 F.2d 1137

(2d Cir

1973.
In general, federal courts can only hear cases that
For the purposes of this study,
raise federal questions.
it is sufficient for a person to show that his/her constitutional rights have been violated for a federal court to
Because the Constitution only prohibits
have jurisdiction.
governmental actions, by finding the college private, no
constitutional question arises. Thus, the court has no
407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
See, Powe v. Miles
jurisdiction.
443 F.2d 121 (6th
niversity
1968); Blackburn v. Fisk U
Cir. 1971)
1

,

,
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institutions.

The relationship between the private
school
and its students is contractual in
nature.
Such schools
may promulgate regulations that are not
arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious or an abuse of its discretionary
powers. 14
As Greene and Bright demonstrated, if a school's
rules do not

provide for a hearing, it is not obliged to afford it.
However, once the college establishes procedures or regu—

lations

,

they are required to follow them.
In a few cases, the courts have held or implied

that a private college should "be bound by the principles
of fairness and justice,"

15

and that the school "must abide

by constitutional principles of fair conduct implicit in
our society."

16

However, these opinions are not consistent

with the overwhelming majority of the decisions in this
area.

17

Today, private colleges are not generally bound

Slaughter v. Brigham Young University 514 F.2d 622
(10th Cir. 1975)
"It is apparent that some elements of the
law of contracts are used and should be used in the analysis
of the relationship between [students] and the university.
." Id. at 626.
.
1

,

;

...

.

15

See, Sturm v. Trustees of Boston Un iversit y, Equity
Number 89433 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County, MA. 1969) as reprinted
in Michael Nassbaum, Student Legal Rights , (New York: Harper
& Row Pub., 1970), p. 64.
,

1

Ryan v. Hofstra University

,

supra note 11 at 970.

See also, Powe v. Miles 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968);
Blackburn v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971);
Jones v. Vassar College, 299 N.Y.S. 2d 283 (N.Y. 1969); Brown
These cases
378 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
v. Villanova
actions,
alleged
held that unless the state is involved in the
Private
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions do not apply.
actions are not prohibited by the amendment.
1

,

.

,
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by the restraints of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Unless state action is involved, the
Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees are not applicable
to the student and
college relationship. But can a private
college become so
entwined with the state so as to constitute
state action?
To answer this question, it will be
necessary to examine

what it means to be a public or private college as
well as
the concept of state action.

Public or Private College
In the first two centuries of American higher edu-

cation, there was no real distinction between public or

private colleges.

Most institutions were established by

various Christian

churches.

The main purpose of the colleges

was to train men to become leaders in the church and state.
As the Yale Charter states:

"[Men] may be fitted for public

employment both in church and Civil State."

18

Harvard, William and Mary, and Yale served as training

centers for their colonies' political and professional leaderSince the colleges were providing this service, they

ship.

were considered to be performing a public function.

Thus,

higher education was viewed as closely linked to the interests

As quoted in Jurgen Herbst, "The Eighteenth Century
Origins of the Split Between Private and Public Higher
Education in the United States " History of Education Quar terly Fall 1975, pp. 278-279.
1

,

,

107

of the state and church.

19

Because of this close relationship between laymen
and the government, the legislatures often assisted the

colleges by contributing land or financially supporting
the institution.

Jencks and Riesman have succinctly

recounted this history:
The colonial college was neither "public" nor "private"
in the modern sense.
It was seen as a public trust,
subject to state regulation. Chartered by the state,
its board of trustees often included public officials,
ex officio, and sometimes other public appointees. On
a year to year basis, the colonial college was usually
expected to balance its books without tax assistance,
but when it needed a new building or had other special
expenses, it often appealed successfully for legislative help.
Its activities and solvency were viewed
as public rather than private questions, yet it was
not an arm of the state in the same sense that a modern
state university is. 20
In general, this arrangement lasted until the early 1800's

when opposition began to develop over this relationship.
Then, these colleges began to be viewed as denominational

and elitest institutions which deprived the public of oppor-

tunities to higher ecuation, and they began to lose the

support of the state governments.

This was due partly to

the mounting pressures against public aid to religious

institutions, now enforced by constitutional provisions.
responIt was also due to the attempt to make these colleges

sive to the "democratic movement of the day"

19

Id.

at 273.

20 Jencks

and Riesman, supra note

1.

to make the
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institutions open to the public, and
nonsectarian. 21 The
efforts to turn these colleges into
"open" public institutions
met with little success. 22 One such
effort resulted in the
Da rtmouth College case of 1819, 2 3
which "slowed down and
effectively stopped the transformation of
private sectarian
colleges into public institutions." 24

^e

D ar tmouth College case was concerned with the

legal issues surrounding the right of individuals to
con-

tract and the constitutional restrictions upon the state
not to impair the obligation of such contracts.

25

The case

is important to this study because of the observations the

Supreme Court made concerning higher education in general
and private colleges in particular.

21

R. Freeman Butts, "The Relation of Higher Education to
Society: Two Historical Examples," Higher Education Crisis
and Support
(New York: Int. Council for Ed. Dev., 1974) p. 11.
,

2 2

•

Ibid

Thomas Jefferson was able to get the University
of Virginia established in 1818.
2

(

4

.

3

Trustees of Dartmouth Colleqe v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
Wheat.) 518 (1819).
24
2

R.

Freeman Butts, supra note 21.

The Supreme Court held that the charter granted by the
British Crown to the Trustees of Dartmouth College was a
contract and that the State of New Hampshire replaced the
Crown after the revolution. The State's attempt to alter
the charter without the consent of the college was an impairment of the obligation of the charter and was therefore
declared unconstitutional. The college was found to be a
private corporation, not public, and therefore it was not
under the control of the legislature.
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In delivering the opinion of
the Court, Justice

Marshall perceived a difference between
"a civil institution to be employed in the administration
of government
and a private eleemosynary institution." 26
Dartmouth was
considered to be the latter, and thus. New
Hampshire could
not alter its character by legislation.
Because

the Court

found Dartmouth to be a "private eleemosynary
institution"
(founded by individuals and private funds)

public but private endeavor.

,

it was not a

The Court explicitly rejected

New Hampshire's claim that the college was performing

a

P u klic purpose and, therefore, should be considered a

public corporation.

The rejection of this argument may

have been based on the Court's observation that private

institutions like colleges and universities "do not fill
the place which would otherwise be occupied by government,

but that which would otherwise remain vacant." 27

Thus,

higher education was an essentially private activity which

might occasionally be supplemented by the public sector.

28

These assumptions have lasted over a century and a
half.

"The federal courts

.

.

.

still view private higher

26

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra note
23 at 640-41.
2 7

Id . at 647.

28

The history of higher education has demonstrated the
involvement of the states in education from the beginning, and
as Judge H. Friendly stated, "Marshall may have made things
The Dartmouth College
too easy for himself" in this regard.
Hampshire: Dartmouth
(New
Pnumbra
Case and the Public-Private
College 1969)
pp. 10-11.
,

,

,
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education in Marshall's terms." 23

By holding that insti-

tutions privately established to conduct
higher learning
are private corporations, it effectively
removed these
colleges from the constraints of the Constitution
which

restrains public not private actions.

30

While in the Dartmouth College case the states lost
in an effort to control the private colleges, they now
began
to establish public colleges

(in the modern sense)

Private

.

colleges still sought and received governmental support, but
they were now competing with public colleges which were

financed and controlled by the state.

The public college

movement was further reinforced by the passage of the
Morrill Act (Land Grant Act of 1862)

.

The bill granted

federal land worth millions of dollars to the states according
to the size of their congressional delegation.
[The state] was expected to use its portion to establish

at least one college where major, but not exclusive,
attention would be devoted to "agriculture and the
mechanic arts." 31

29

Law

,

"

Robert M. O’Neil, "Private Universities and Public
19 Buffalo L. Rev.
155, 157 (1970).

30

These assumptions and their significance will be
explored in the next chapter.
For an interesting account of the history of higher
education in America, the split between private and public
education, see: Jurgen Herbst, "The Eighteenth Century
Origin of the Split Between Private and Public Higher
Education in the United States," History of Education
Quarterly Fall 1975, pp. 273-280; Essay Review, "American
College History: Re-Examination Underway," History of
Education Quarterly Summer 1975, pp. 259-266; Natalie A.
3 x

,

,

Ill

With the exception of M.I.T. and Yale, the
resources went
to the establishment of public colleges
or the enlargement
of already existing state institutions.
Thus, the complete bifurcation of public and
private

colleges seemed probable.

The last century has, however,

partially restored the colonial pattern.

Many of the large

private schools have become secularized, thus opening the
doors for governmental assistance.

Both the state and

federal governments are, in fact, contributing millions of

dollars to private colleges and universities.
Jencks and Riesman observed, "Today

.

.

.

So, as

the distinction

seems once again to be losing some of its importance."

32

The colonial pattern was marked with the state's

direct involvement with private colleges.

The Dartmouth

case established that states could not materially interfere

with the internal operations of private colleges.

Today,

both the state and federal governments are once again

becoming more involved with private education.

This raises

the question of whether or not a private college's actions

Naylor, "The Ante Bellum College Movement: A Reappraisal
of Tewbury s Foundings of American Colleges and Universities,"
History of Education Quarterly Fall 1973, pp. 261-274; John
H. Florer, "Major Essues in the Congressional Debate of the
Morrill Act of 1862," History of Education Quarterly Winter
1968, pp. 459-478.
'

,

,

John H. Florer, "Major Issues in the Congressional
Debate of the Morrill Act of 1862," History of Education
Quarterly Winter 1968, p. 459.
3

,
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can become so entwined with the state
as to constitute
state action for purposes of the law.
In order to understand the probable
application of

state action to private colleges, it
will be necessary to
examine the cases which employed the concept
to determine
whether private actions may at times be considered
actions
of the state.
State Action Concept
The Supreme Court first set out the distinction

between public and private actions based strictly on the

presence or absence of direct state action in 1883.

3

The

rights cases established that unless there was direct
state action, the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply.

The

cases concerned the constitutionality of the Civil Rights

Act of 1875, providing for the equal enjoyment of all,

without regard to color or race of the accommodations of
inns, public conveyances on land and water, theatres, and

other places of public amusement.

The Court took a strict

view of the state action requirement and held the act
unconstitutional as it applied to prevent racial segregation
in privately owned and operated facilities.

Justice Bradley

explained that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits "state
action of a particular character

33

....

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.

3

Individual

(1883).
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invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter
of
34
the amendment."
The view that only direct state action was controlled
by the Fourteenth Amendment was followed for many years.

Through the gradual process of judicial interpretation and
the changing of the times, many inroads were made into the
%

state action requirements by the Supreme Court.
In Marsh v. Alabama

3 6
,

35

the Court held that a company

town, although owned completely by a private corporation,

could not prohibit a Jehovah's Witness from standing on
one of its street corners and distributing religious pam-

phlets.

The Court found that the company town was performing

a public function and was,

therefore, under the prohibitions

of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Black declared:

People living in company-owned towns are free citizens
of their state and country, just as residents of
municipalities. And there is no more reason for
depriving them of liberties guaranteed by the 1st and
14th Amendments than there is for curtailing 37these
freedoms with respect to any other citizens.

34

Id. at 11.
[The amendment]

only nullifies and makes void all State
legislation, and State action of every kind, which
impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens
or which injures them in life, liberty or property
without due process of law, or which denies to any of
them the equal protection of the laws.
.

Johnson, "The Constitutional Rights of
Students," 42 Texas L. Rev. 344, 346 (1964).
3 6
326 U.S. 501 (1946)
35 Michael T.

3 7

Id.

at 508.

.

.
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The Supreme Court found that the
company-owned town
was providing the same functions as any
other "town" and
was thus so entwined with the state as to
constitute state
action.

Similar results were reached in Terry v. Adams 38

where the Supreme Court held that a private political
association that did not allow Blacks to be members and vote in
their primaries violated the Fifteenth Amendment.

The

found that the association's slate of candidates was

always accepted by the Democratic Party as the nominees to
run in the elections.

Therefore, the Court

likened the

association to a political party which is performing

a

public function and was thus so entwined with the state as
to constitute state action.

By depriving Blacks the oppor-

tunity to vote, they were effectively denied their Fifteenth

Amendment rights.

39

Although the Supreme Court has ruled on the question
in several other controversies,

3 8

345 U.S. 461

(1953)

40

the leading case in this

.

39

The amendment provides that: "The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude."
40

323 U.S. 192
e.g., Steele v. Louisville and N. Ry.
(1944)
Labor union bargaining representative so clothed
with governmental authority that he was said to be performing
a quasi-public function and could not discriminate on a racial
State court's
basis; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
constitutes state
covenants
restrictive
enforcement of racially

—

,

—
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area is Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, et. al.

41

In 1958, Mr. Burton, a Black man, entered
the Eagle Coffee

Shop located in a building owned and operated
by the

Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the State
of
Delaware. He was refused service because of his color,
and he filed suit in a state court claiming that this

refusal abridged his rights under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The lower court agreed

with Burton, but the Supreme Court of Delaware held that
the restaurant's action was not state action.

Eagle was

acting in "a purely private capacity" when he refused to
serve Burton, and therefore, the amendment was not applicable.

42

Burton, still believing his rights had been

violated, appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice

Clark noted that the Wilmington Parking Authority was

created by the City of Wilmington as a "public body corporate

action violative of equal protection clause of Fourteenth
Amendment; Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323
F 2d 959 (4th Cir7 1963), cert, denied 376 U.S. 938 (1964)
Private hospital received federal and state money, state
contributed land and buildings sufficient to warrant state
action in hospital which discriminated; Evans v. Newton
Services rendered by a park are munici382 U.S. 296 (1966)
state maintained facilities,
because
and
pal in nature,
park is subject to the equal
the
regardless of ownership,
protection requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.

—

.

—

4

4 2

365 U.S. 715
Id.

at 716.

(1961)

,
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and politic exercising public
powers of the State as an
agency thereof."" To provide adequate
parking facilities
for the people of Wilmington, the
Authority decided to build
a downtown parking facility.
it acquired the land
by

purchases from private owners.

Before the facility was

constructed, the Authority was advised that it
would need
additional revenues beyond that received from parking

fees

to finance the building.

Therefore, the Authority decided

to lease some of the space of the building to the public.
In 1957, a private lease for twenty years was made

with Eagle Coffee Shop, Inc., for use as a restaurant.
The space allotted to Eagle was located within the building,

but had a separate entrance.

Eagle agreed to pay an annual

rent of $28,700, and the Authority agreed to provide Eagle's
heat, gas service, and to make necessary structural repairs.

Eagle spent some $220,000 to make the space suitable for
its operation, and to the extent such improvements were

attached to the building they were tax exempt.

Upon com-

pletion of the building, the Authority placed official signs
indicating the public character of the building and flew
on the roof both state and national flags.

After presenting the facts of the case. Justice
Clark considered whether Eagle's private "racially discrim-

inatory action was beyond the prohibitive scope of the

43

Id.

at 717.
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Fourteenth Amendment?" 4

To answer this question. Justice

Clark noted that this "Amendment erects no shield
against
merely private conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful." 45
Thus, he explained that private conduct abridging

individual rights does no violence to the Fourteenth Amend%

ment "unless to some significant extent the State in all
of its manifestations has been found to have become involved
in it." 46

He further explained that "only by sifting facts

and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement
of the State in private conduct be attributed its true

significance

.

4 7

Therefore, Justice Clark weighed the circumstances
to see the extent of the involvement of the state with

Eagle's Coffee Shop.

He noted that the land and building

were publicly owned.

The building was dedicated to "public

uses" in the performances of the Authority's "essential

governmental functions."

The costs of the land acquisitions,

construction and maintenance are defrayed by the City of
Wilmington, and from the proceeds of rentals, and parking
Indeed, the Court noted that both benefited from

services.

13

4 4

Id . at 721.

4 5

Id.

(19^48")
4 6

4 7

at 721, quoting Shelley v. Kraemer
.

Ibid
Ibid.

,

334 U.S. 1,
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one another:
Eagle;

(1)

The convenience of the parking
area to

more customers for the Authority from
the patrons
of his restaurant; and (3) the fact
that any improvements
made by Eagle are tax exempt because the fee
is held
(2)

by a

governmental agency.

Justice Clark poignantly declared:

Neither can it be ignored, especially in view of
Eagle's
a ff lrm ^tive allegation that for it to serve
Negroes
would injure its business that profits earned by discrimination not only contribute to, but also are indispensable elements in, the financial success of a
governmental agency. 4 8
The Court found that the cumulative effect of all

these
.
.
activities, obligations and responsibilities of
the Authority, the benefits mutually conferred, together
with the obvious fact that a restaurant is operated as
an integral part of a public building devoted to a
public parking service, indicates that degree of state
participation and involvement in discriminatory action
which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to
condemn. 4 9
.

Justice Clark explained that the Authority could have

affirmatively required Eagle to discharge the responsibilities
of the Fourteenth Amendment "imposed upon the private enter-

prise as a consequence of state participation."

50

He then

declared:
But no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities
by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge
It is of no consolation
them whatever the motive may be.
to an individual denied the equal protection of the laws
51
that it was done in good faith.

Therefore, Justice Clark stated:

4 8

Id.

at 724.

4 9

Ibid.

5 0

Id. at 725.

5 1

Ibid.
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The State has so far
insinuated itself infn
Position
of interdependence with
Eagle that it mu«t h 6 reco 9mzed as a joint participant
in
ctivit ywhich, on that account cannot
9
be considered to ^
have
been so "purely private"
WlthOUt the sco P e
of the Fourteenth Amendment. »
.

.

^

«*“,

Thus, the Court found Eagle's
refusal to serve

Burton a violation of the equal
protection clause.
Conclusion
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
states, not
private parties, from denying persons
due process and equal

protection of the laws.

53

However, as the cases have

illustrated, private actions may become so entwined
with
the state as to constitute state action. 54
As Justice Clark explained, the only way to
determine
if the state is involved in "non— obvious" cases is
"by

sifting facts and weighing circumstances."

5 2

55

Ibid.

The action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be
said to be that of the states.
That amendment erects
no shield against merely private conduct, however
discretionary or wrongful.
(Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1,

13

(1948).

54

Private conduct abridging individual rights does no harm
[Fourteenth Amendment] unless to some significant
extent the state in any of its manifestations has been
found to have been involved in it.
(Shelley v. Kraemer,
supra note 45.
to the

55

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, et. al., supra
note 41 at 721.
1
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This section has dealt with cases
concerning company
towns, political associations and a
public parking
lot.

They have all demonstrated that private
activity may become
so entwined with the state as to constitute
state action,
thus coming under the purview of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Can the actions of a private college or university constitute state action?

Although the Supreme Court has not ruled

directly on this question, the legal and educational pros
and cons of applying the constitutional safeguards to students
in private colleges will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER

V

THE CONSTITUTION'S APPLICABILITY TO THE

PRIVATE COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
Introduction
Private college students have met with little success
in convincing the courts or college administrators that they

should be afforded the same constitutional safeguards as

students at public institutions.

Courts have been reluctant

to interfere with their autonomy and have explained that

the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits states from denying

persons due process or equal protection of the laws.

The

"amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,"

whether discriminatory or wrongful.

1

However, as the Burton

case illustrated, private conduct may become so entwined with
the state as to constitute state action.

2

Can the actions of a private college or university

Although the Supreme Court has

constitute state action?

not ruled directly on this question, this chapter will

examine the cases which have raised constitutional issues

1

2

Shelley v. Kraemer

,

334 U.S.

1,

13

(1948).

Burton v. Wilmi ngton Parking Authority, et. al.

U.S. 715, 722

,

365

(1961).

Private conduct abridging individual rights does no
harm to the [Fourteenth Amendment] unless to some
significant extent the state in any of its manifestations
has been found to have become involved in it.
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concerning private colleges and
student rights, and explore
the legal and educational arguments
for applying constitutional standards in this controversial
area.
Part

I

The State Action Concept and the

Private College and University
There are a limited number of cases which have
grap-

pled with the problem of applying the state action
concept
to private colleges and universities.

The cases presented

below illustrate the different factors that have been
considered in this controversial area.
The application of the state action concept to

private education has been a relatively recent legal phencnena; hence, the law is still in its early stages of refine-

ment.

Because of this, no distinct pattern has developed

in the way courts have resolved these conflicts.

Therefore,

the following cases will be presented in a chronological

fashion so that the application of the state action concept
to private colleges may be examined from its inception to

the present.

Public function of higher education

.

The first case

to rule on the concept of state action relating to private

higher education is Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane

University of Louisiana

3

203 F. Supp.

855

3
.

It was decided in 1962

(E.D. La.

1962).

— one

year
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after the Supreme Court decision
in Burton
Two Black
women, Barbara Guillory and Pear lie
Ellioe, were denied
admission to Tulane University solely
on the basis of their
.

race.

The university maintained that it was
a private
institution and, hence, immune from the
commands of the

Fourteenth Amendment.
summary judgment.

The women filed suit asking for a

They contended that the university

was so involved with the State of Louisiana that it
should
be subject to the constitutional restraints on
governmental
action.

Judge J. Skelley Wright began his decision with this

general observation:
At the outset, one may question whether any school
or college can ever be so private as to escape the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a country
dedicated to the creed that education is the only
"sure foundation of freedom," without which no republic
can maintain itself in strength, institutions of learning are not things of purely private concern. ... No
one any longer doubts that education is a matter affected with the greatest public interest.
Clearly,
the administrators of a private college are performing
a public function.
They do the work of the state often
in the place of the state.
Does it not follow that
they stand in the state's shoes? And, if so, are they
not then agents of the state, subject to the consti" 4
tutional restraints on governmental action.
.

.

.

.

.

.

After addressing the relationship of education to the republic,
Judge Wright returned to the facts of the case.

He noted that

Tulane University operates under a special legislative

— in

part quoting from Jefferson, letter to
Whythe, August 13, 1786, in I Writings (Bergh ed. 1907, p. 396).
Also from Jefferson, Letter to Governor John Tyler, May 26,
1810, in XII Writings, p. 393.
4

Id.

at 858
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franchise, enjoys a very substantial state
subsidy in the
form of a tax exemption for commercially leased
property,
and has three public officials on its governing
board.

5

Having uncovered these facts. Judge Wright was able
to
decide the case without having to go as far as declaring
all schools and colleges under the commands of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

He applied the teachings of Burton

Terry and Marsh

6
,

,

Shelley

,

"that private ownership or operation of a

facility impressed with a public interest does not auto-

matically insulate it from the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment

.

"

7

Because Tulane University was involved with the state,
to the extent indicated above, it was sufficiently entwined

with the state to subject it to the constitutional restraints
on government action.

Specifically, Tulane*

s

refusal to

admit Blacks involved the equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

8

State financial assistance

.

In Grossner v. Trustees

of Columbia University in the City of N.Y.
5

Id . at 863-4.

6

See Chapter IV, pp.

9
,

the district

112-120.

Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University of
Louisiana supra note 3 at 859.
7

,

A1 though Judge Wright's decision was based on specific
findings of state involvement with the institution, rather
than just the public function theory, his views on the function of education have not been accepted by most courts
hearing these kinds of cases.
8

9

2 87

F.

Supp.

535

(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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court refused to grant a preliminary injunction
to restrain
the university from disciplining several students
who had
allegedly participated in demonstrations and the
occupation
of buildings on campus.
The students argued that although

Columbia was a private university, it was performing
function.

a

public

Furthermore, it was significantly entwined with

the City and the State of New York so as to constitute its

acts as state acts.

The university maintained that it was

a private institution and, therefore, not required to

comport to the constitutional demands of the Fourteenth

Amendment
The students argued that the university received

substantial public funds; "some 49,500,000 dollars in 1966
out of a total of 117,500,000 dollars, and in 1967, about

59,700,000 dollars of a total of 134,300,000 dollars."

10

The students further contended that the lease of public

lands for the building of a gymnasium indicated another

form of governmental benefit and assistance.

believed

a

11

They also

finding of state action was appropriate because.

In many respects, both insofar as the power it
exercises over students and insofar as defendant
Columbia University fulfills a public function of
to a "company
educating persons, it may be likened
12
system."
town" or a "party primary

A final claim of state involvement was the fact that
the New York county district attorney was also a member of

1

°Id.

at 546

1

Id. at 547.

1

2

Ibid.
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the Board of Trustees.

Because criminal actions were filed

and apparently being processed by the district
attorney's

office, the students claimed this was direct state
participation.
In rendering the decision of the Court, Judge

Frankel rejected the students' contentions:
The claim that the University receives larger
amounts of "government" money is grossly inflated in a
significant respect and relatively insubstantial in
any event.
The inflation inheres in the fact that
something over 80% of the public funds
comes from
the Federal rather than the State Government. The
jurisdiction ... is available for state, not for
federal action. 13 (Italics mine.)
.

.

.

The judge further declined to accept the students'

argument that the university performed a public function.
That Columbia performs a "public function" in
educating persons which may be likened to a "company
town" or a "party primary system" is briefly, without
It is not sounder for Columbia than it
any basis.
would be for Notre Dame or Yeshiva. Of course [students]
are correct in a trivial way when they say education is
But nothing
"impressed with a public interest".
supports the thesis that university (or private
14
elementary) "education" as such is "state action."

—

.

1

.

.

Ibid
This seems to be a strange doctrine, for it implies
that a private institution is less amenable to suit in the
federal courts when it is dependent upon federal funds when
Although the
it depends to the same degree upon state funds.
color of
"under
action
address
does
jurisdictional statute
the
with
incompatible
seems
state law," so literal reading
Robert
legislation.
objectives of the original civil rights
M. O'Neil, "Private Universities and Public Law," 19 Buffalo
L. Rev
155, 181 (1970).
.

.

1

4

Id.

at 549.
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Judge Frankel then developed an aspect of
state

action previously discussed by other courts when
he declared:

What is still more striking is the total absence
of any indication that the State (or any
government)
is involved as a participant in the University
disciplinary proceedings to which the motion for a preliminary injunction is directed. 15
.

The court did, however, indicate that because the

district attorney had been named as
additional issues may be posed.

a

defendant in the case,

Judge Frankel acknowledged

that official actions by them is state action, but that it
raises questions of "wrongs committed other than those

involved in the preliminary injunction motion."

16

Because

the court found no state action present in Columbia Univer-

sity's acts, the preliminary injunction sought by the

students was denied.

Public college within

tests" for state action

.

a

private university: "Current

In 1970, the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit was faced with the dilemma of applying

the state action concept to private higher education.

Students at Alfred University were suspended "on the spot"
by the Dean of Students for participating in efforts to

disrupt an awards ceremony for the R.O.T.C. parents' day

%

Id. at 548. Apparently, Judge Frankel does not consider
the distfrict attorney's prosecution of the students for
violations brought by the university, as direct involvement
in the disciplinary procedures; even though the district
attorney is also a menber of the Board of Trustees.
1

5

1

6

Id.

at 553.
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program held at the university's football
field.
dean's actions were upheld by a faculty

The

committee, so the

students sought reinstatement in a federal
district court.
Because Alfred University was a private institution,
the

court concluded that it had no jurisdiction under the
Civil
Rights Act of 1871 17 as it relates to actions under color
of state law.

18

The students, believing that the university

was so entwined with the state to constitute state action,

appealed to the second circuit.

19

Alfred University is a small liberal arts college in

western New York, not unlike private colleges such as
Hobart, St. Bonaventure, or Wells.

But there is one major

difference on which the case turned:

Alfred is the site of

the ceramics college of the State University of New York,

one of six specialized "contract colleges" that comprise a

distinctive part of New York's hybrid system of public higher
education.

20

The state pays the entire operating costs of

the ceramics college through a line item in the annual S.U.N.Y.

17
1

1

42 U.S.C.,

section 1983.

Powe v. Miles

,

294 F. Supp. 1269

Powe v. Miles

,

407 F.2d 73

(W.D.N.Y. 1968).

(2d Cir.

1968).

°Four of the other contract colleges are at Cornell; the
fifth is the College of Forestry at Syracuse University.
Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 158.
2
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budget.

21

The state also pays a certain amount
per credit
hour for courses which ceramics
students take in the liberal
arts departments of the university.
in addition, New York
pays a pro rata share of the administrative
costs of the
institution, including the salaries of Alfred's
president,
dean of students, and other university officials.
The

faculty of the ceramics college, although paid by the
state,
are hired and promoted on the same basis as liberal
arts

professors.

The ceramics college students enroll at and

receive a degree from Alfred, and the university is responsible for "the maintenance of discipline and

.

.

.

all

matters pertaining to its educational policies, activities
and operations

...

as the representatives of the state

university system." 22

The seven students who were suspended

included four enrolled in the liberal arts college

and

three in the ceramics college.
Judge Henry Friendly rendered the decision of the

three judge court.

In deciding this case. Judge Friendly

was presented with three options:

21

To uphold the district

The appropriation for the ceramics college during the
year of this case was approximately 1.8 million dollars. Powe
This
294 F. Supp. 1269, 1292 (W.D.N.Y. 1968).
v. Miles
figure represented 27.5% of the total university budget.
There are 550 students and 40 faculty members in the ceramics
college as compared with the university total of 1,800
Students in the ceramics college
students and 140 faculty.
arts, and liberal arts
liberal
in
the
take some courses
ceramics college. Powe v.
in
the
students may take courses
Miles 407 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1968).
22
N.Y. Education Law, section 6102 (McKinney 1953) as
reported in Powe supra note 18 at 75-76 fn. 3.
,

,

,
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court's decision that it lacked jurisdiction because Alfred

acted under color of no state law; to find state action as to
the institution because of its significant relation with the
State of New York; or to find state action only as to the

students enrolled in the ceramics college.
chose to follow the latter course.

23

The court

Judge Friendly found that

as to the ceramics students, there was state action "for the

seemingly simple but entirely sufficient reason that the
state willed it that way."

24

Under the New York statute,

the dean of students acted as the representative of the

trustees of S.U.N.Y. system in making and enforcing rules

against these students.

25

Judge Friendly proceeded to

explain that the "very name of the college identifies it
as a state institution

...

we see no reason why the state

shouldn't be taken at its word." 26

He continued;

The students of the New York State College of Ceramics
can properly regard themselves as receiving a public
education and entitled to be treated by those in charge
in the same way as their counterparts in other portions
27
of the State University.
The court next turned to the question of state action

regarding the four liberal arts students.

2

3

Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 159.

24 Powe v.
2 5

2 6

27

Here, Judge

Ikid

Miles

.

Ibid.
Id.

at 83.

,

supra note 18 at 82.
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Friendly drew a sharp distinction.

He noted that the college

was chartered by the state, receiving some financial
assistance from the federal and state governments, and
to some

degree benefited from the presence of the state's ceramics
college

financially and in prestige.

The court did not

these reasons to be an adequate basis for state action
as to the dismissal of the liberal arts students.

Judge

Friendly also did not find state action in the interdependence
and close involvement with the state, ruling that the ceramics

college was separable from the actions of the university.

He

also rejected the contention that the function of the university was analogous to a "company town" or "shopping center"

open to the public.

28

He pointed out that the university

was in general "open only to persons connected with the

university or licensed by it to participate in or attend
athletic

contests or other events." 29

The court, having rejected all the liberal arts
students' arguments, specified the most frequently used

test of state action:

28 Id.

at 80.

It should be remembered that the alleged mis-^
conduct took place on the university's football field at the
It is interesting to
R.O.T.C. parents' day award ceremony.
2

Ibid.

note that Judge Friendly did not even consider that during
the disruption the field was being utilized by the R.O.T.C.
which must be considered an agency of the government.
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involved not simply with some
activity of the
activitv
fh
institution alleged to have inflicted
injury upon a plaintiff but with the
activity that
1
Ury
Putt ing the point another way,
thTtt
ct on not the private action, must
be
t
Iht subject
l of
the
complaint.

^

*

'

3 °

Although the state paid for a third of the
dean of student’s
salary, who imposed the suspension, the court
found him
acting as a private official in his handling of the
liberal

arts students.

The court thus explained:

We do not have at all a case where the wholly statesupported activity is so dominant that the private
activity could be deemed to have been swallowed up. 31

Upon deciding that the liberal arts students had no claim

under the Civil Rights Act,

32

the court returned to the

issues presented by the ceramics college students.

Although

the court did find these students entitled to constitutional

safeguards, it found the dean of students' actions and the

university's guidelines reasonable, and wholly consistent

with the case law concerning the rights of public college

30

Id. at 81.
Professor O'Neil has taken objection to
this test:
This requirement that the injury complained of be
inflicted by that part of the institution in which the
governmental involvement is clear seems out of keeping
with the developed principles in this field. ... No
such requirement seems to have been imposed in several
other contexts where state action has been on the part
of private institutions. (Robert M. O'Neil, supra note
13 at 160.)
3

3 £

at 82.

Id.

U.S C.
.

,

section 1983.
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students.

33

Therefore, the circuit court affirmed
the
district court's decision as applied to
the liberal arts
students and modified the opinion so that
the complaint of
the ceramics students was dismissed on the
merits rather

than for lack of federal jurisdiction.

3

It should be noted that Judge Friendly did
acknowledge

the difficulty Alfred would face with different sets of

rules for the students at the university.
If we should hold there was state action with
respect to the C.C. students, it would be impracticable
to have different rules for the two groups.
Perhaps
so, but that would be Alfred's problem.
Whether or not
it decided to establish the same policies for students
outside C.C. was for those within it, its choice and
the administration of the policies chosen for the
former would be private action. 35

Tax exemptions

In a similar case. Browns v. Mitchell

.

3
,

a federal circuit court rejected student arguments claiming

that the University of Denver was involved in state action

when it summarily suspended them for refusing to vacate

a

university building in which they were demonstrating.

See also the cases presented in Chapter III
on the right of public college students to due process and
free expression.
3

Id. at
-

85.

34

Powe v. Miles is important because it formulated the
principle which has been used as the legal test for determining state action in similar cases. That is:
The state must be involved not simply with some activity
but with the activity that
of the institution
state action, not the private
the
injury
caused the
Powe v.
the complaint.
of
subject
action, must be the
Miles, supra note 18 at 81.)
.

.

.

.

.

.

(

3 5

Id.

3 6

409 F . 2d 593

at 82.
(10th Cir.

1969).

6
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The students maintained that although
the university
received no direct state aid, 37 it is tax exempt
and,

... by virtue of the original territorial charter
incorporating Colorado Seminary, the university receives
a special tax exemption not enjoyed by other
like
corporations in that the income from its non-educational
income producing property is also non-taxable
3

The court rejected this argument:

Assuming that the special tax exemption is tantamount to a financial contribution and that it was
intended to and does generally promote public education,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that this
bounty is or can be utilized in any way to dictate or
influence the administration of university affairs.
And even more critically, there is no suggestion that
the claimed involvement is in any way associated with
the challenged activity. 39
Chief Judge Murrah, relying on the test adopted by Powe,

declared
The benefits conferred however characterized have
no bearing on the challenged actions beyond the perpetuation of the institution itself. This we hold to be
short of the requisite state involvement. 40
It should be noted that the court indicated, in dicta
that if the actions of the students had taken place in a public

area of the university and that a finding of state action

"Indeed, the State of Colorado is prohibited by its
Constitution from making appropriations for any educational
activity not under the absolute power of the State." Browns
409 F.2d 593, 595 (10th Cir. 1969).
v. Mitchell
3

,

3 8

Ibid

.

3 9

Id . at 596.

4 0

Ibid.

,
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may have been appropriate only in such areas.

1

*

1

Although

this was incidental to the issues in the case,
it is

important because it marked the first time a federal
court
of appeals acknowledged that the public function theory

might apply to private higher education.
State intervention in college functions
v

*

Coleman

.

Wagner College 42 presented another opportunity for the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to tackle the

question of state action in private higher education.

In

1970, 24 students were expelled from Wagner College after

repeated warnings to vacate the dean's office.

The students

received a notice of expulsion, but it did not specify the
college rule they were alleged to have violated.

They were

also required to leave the Wagner campus prior to the time
the faculty council could hear their appeal.

43

After failing to convince the college to stay the

order requiring them to leave the campus,

24 of the

expelled

The students alleged

students brought their case to court.

that the procedures employed by the court in issuing their

expulsions did not comport to the requirements of due process.

That judged by the totality of its public functions,
for the
this university may be likened to Marsh
purpose of exercising First and Fourteenth Amendment
Ibid
rights in its public ways.

41

.

(

4 2

429 F. 2d 1120

4 3

Id.

at 1123.

(2d Cir.

1970).

.

.

.
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The students sought a hearing
that would conform to the
constitutional requirements of due process.
The district
court, after considering the question
of state responsibility
for the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions by Wagner College,
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Because
the students did not show state action, the
court declined
to interfere with the internal operations of a
private

college

4 4

On appeal, the students did not claim that all of the

actions of Wagner College, an institution affiliated with
the Lutheran Church and supported almost entirely by private
funds, are actions of the state.
(1)

They did allege that:

The State of New York passed legislation in 1969

requiring all colleges and universities in the state to
file with the regents and commissioner of education "rules

and regulations for the maintenance of public order on

college campuses;

4

45

and

(2)

"The penalties for violations

Ibid.

4 5

Id . at 1122.
The trustees or other governing board of every
college chartered by the regents or incorporated by
special acts of the legislature shall adopt rules and
regulations for the maintenance of public order on
college campuses and other college property used for
educational purposes and provide a program for the
enforcement thereof. Such rules and regulations shall
govern the conduct of students ... on such campuses
The penalties for violations of such
and property.
rules and regulations shall be clearly set forth therein
and shall include provisions for the ejection of a
Such rules and regulations shall be
.
.
violator.
.
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of such rules and regulations

forth therein,"

46

[were to] be clearly set

and could include "suspension, expulsion

or other appropriate disciplinary action,

violators.

47

for student

Therefore, colleges which failed to file such

rules and regulations lost their eligibility for state aid
to education.
%

The court noted that this case presented an interesting

variation on the "familiar theme of state action." In the
previous cases, the presence of state action has been alleged

because a private organization has undertaken to perform
public function.

a

Here, the approach to state action is the

"converse of the public function doctrine." 48

The state has

intervened in the performance of a function traditionally

entrusted to private institutions
order.

— the

maintenance of internal

By so doing, it has subjected the imposition of

filed with the regents and the commissioner of education not later than ninety days after the effective date
All amendments to such rules and regulaof this act.
tions shall be filed with the regents and the commissioner of education not later than ten days after their
of a college fail
adoption. ... If the trustees
to file the rules and regulations within the time
required by this section, such college shall not be
eligible to receive any state aid or assistance until
such rules and regulations are duly filed. (New York
State Education Law, McKinneys Consolidated Laws c.16,
section 6450
.

.

4

Ibid

.

4 7

Ibid

4 8

Id . at 1121.

.

.
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disciplinary sanctions by private colleges and
universities
to scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. 49
Although the court was impressed with this argument,
it wasn't convinced.

in Powe v. Miles

,

In referring to their previous holding

Judge Kaufman explained:

Neither the New York legislature, the regents, nor
the commissioner of education ever granted approval to
the particular conduct sought to be challenged.
Nor, in our view, was Wagner College's expulsion of
twenty-four students in a campus demonstration closely
tied to traditional governmental functions.
Moreover, it appears to us that the "regulations of
college discipline embodied in section 6450 appears
almost devoid of meaningful content." Colleges are not
required to secure approval of rules and regulations
[they] merely file them with the designated officials.
.

.

.

.

.

.

50

Judge Kaufman appeared to be headed for a strict

adherence to the Powe

v.

Miles test,

(direct state involve-

ment in the action complained of ); but, he stopped short of
this by noting that the statute

may be intended or applied as a command to the
colleges of the state to adopt a new, more severe
attitude toward campus disruption and to impose harsh
sanctions on unruly students. ... If [this] consideration has merit and section 6450 was intended
to coerce colleges to adopt disciplinary codes embodying a "hard line" attitude toward student protesters, it would appear that New York has indeed "undertaken to set policy for the control of demonstrations
in all private universities" and should be held responsible for the implementation of this policy.
.

.

.

5

Because the court would not resolve this issue with
the facts before it. Judge Kaufman remanded the case for

further hearings to determine whether or not section 6450

represented

5 o

Id.

a

meaningful state intrusion into the disciplinary

at 1124.

5

Id

.

at 1125.
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policies of private colleges.

A concurring opinion in this case was filed by Judge
Friendly.

He agreed that the district erred in dismissing

the complaint for lack of jurisdiction; however, he disagreed

with the majority in remanding for further hearings.

Judge

Friendly, author of the Powe decision, believed that state

action had been established.

Therefore, he would have heard

the case and decided it on the merits.

Arriving at this

conclusion. Judge Friendly based his decision on two con-

siderations

.

Plainly one objective of the New York legislation
was to deter student disturbances by the clear announcement of rules of conduct and of the penalties for disobedience. That is fair enough; indeed it is a principal
justification for our system of criminal sanctions. But
if the state wishes the benefits of such deterrence in
private colleges, must it not accept responsibility for
preventing overdeterrence by excessive sanctions for
lack of fair procedure for enforcement? Furthermore,
and perhaps still more important, do not rules of private
colleges framed in response to a state mandate have a
rules
significantly different symbolic appearance than
52
statute?
such
a
of
absence
the
in
formulated
Judge Friendly then addressed the actions of Wagner
College.

The institution had enacted rules and regulations

concerning student discipline and prefaced this document

with a statement that these rules were promulgated "in
129(a),
accordance with the newly enacted New York Public Law

which required such a document.'

52

Id. at 1126.

1

The document then set out
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section 6450 of the Education Law in its entirety.

Judge

Friendly noted that the "circulation of such a
document fits
rather precisely with the principle set forth in
Griffin
v.

Mary ! and.

5 3

Furthermore, objections to the very existence

of a detailed code would be met by the answer that one
was

state implied.

He concluded his argument by explaining that:

When a state has gone so far in directing private
action that citizens may reasonably believe this to
have been taken at the state's instance, state action
may legitimately be found even though the state left
the private actors complete freedom of choice. 54
Citing Burton

,

Judge Friendly indicated that here

the State has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence
that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity, which on that account, cannot be considered
to have been so purely private as to fall without the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. 55
.

.

.

.

.

.

The majority of the court was not willing to go as
far as Judge Friendly although they did consider the

New

York legislation significant enough to warrant further

proceedings
Substantial financial support

.

In Brown v. Strickler

5 6
,

a group of students were summarily expelled from the
*
-

-

‘

<

"If an individual is posses(1964).
to act under that authorpurports
and
sed of state authority
action."
ity, his action is state
5 3

378 U.S.

5 4

Coleman v. Wagner College

130,

55 Burton v.

U.S. 715, 725
5 6

,

supra note 42 at 1127.

Wi lmington Parking Authority, et. al.

(1961)

422 F 2d 1000
.
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(6th Cir.

1970).

,

365
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University of Louisville.

The students filed suit in a

federal district court alleging that their
expulsion constituted state action and thus deprived them of their
constitutional rights of due process. The district court
dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, because "the
operation
of

University of Louisville cannot be characterized as

a public function for purposes of Title 42 U.S.C., section
5 7

1983.

The court of appeals disagreed:
The University of Louisville
receives substantial financial support from the City of Louisvill
the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the United States
Government.
"An institution such as this, serving
an important public function and financed by public
funds .is sufficiently linked with the state for its
acts to be subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment 5 8
.

.

.

.

In a brief opinion, the appellate court reversed and

remanded the case to the district court explaining that these
students were entitled to due process because the university's
actions "must be regarded as having been taken under color
of law."

59

Education as a public function

.

Washington University

was faced with a law suit of a different nature.

57
5 8

Id.
I bid

In Belk

at 1001.
-

It would have been helpful to the reader if the
Ibid.
court had expounded on the indicia necessary to find state
action. Apparently, this court found it an easy case to find
state action; whereas the other courts have found it just as
easy to find no state action under apparently similar situ59

ations

.
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v

*

T he_ Chancel lor of Washington University 60
an action
.

was brought, not by the demonstrators, but, by
the other
students affected by the demonstrations. The students
filed a class action suit seeking a mandatory injunction

that would order the chancellor to prevent repeated dis-

ruption of classes and educational activities.

They fur-

ther sought to enjoin him from condoning or encouraging or

knowingly failing to prevent activities which he knew or
should have known would have the effect of abridging the
rights of students who desire to engage in educational

activities
The students contended that although this was a

private university, the deprivation of their right to

participate in an orderly education constituted state action
in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

The chancellor moved to dismiss the action on

the grounds that the federal court had no jurisdiction

because his actions were the internal concerns of a private
university.
The court did not agree.

Judge Harper declared:

This court holds that the conduct of the chief
executive of a private university, in light of the
public function of a private university in education,
could amount to sufficient "state action" in order to
It now remains for
grant jurisdiction to this court.
such allegations
prove
to
the plaintiff at the trial
6
jurisdiction.
as would confer the necessary

6 0

336 F. Supp.

45

(E.D. Mo.

1970).

61

Id.

at 49

*
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Although the case is not definitive, it is worth
noting because the court relied primarily on the
public
function theory propounded by Judge Skelley Wright in

Guillory

.

Here the court announced:

The acts of a private university can constitute "state
action" when said university is denying to its students
their right to participate in the educational process.
Education is a public function
The state granted a
charter under which said university could operate as
an educational institution.
Hence, the private university's performance of a public function could render
its action subject to constitutional restraints. 62
(Italics mine
.

.

Substantial involvement with
v.

Hof stra University

school property.
the damages done.

6 3

a

a student was

state agency

.

In Ryan

accused of destroying

He was expelled and fined $1,000 for
64

Ryan, believing that he was unfairly

disciplined, filed suit in the state court alleging that the

procedures the university employed to expel him violated his
rights to due process.

He contended that the university was

engaged in state action when it disciplined him, and, therefore, should have been controlled by constitutional inhi-

bitions.

The university, however, made "no claim to

the

Implied in this statement is the assertion
that a private university's performance of a public function
could render its in actions subject to constitutional requirements.
6

6 3

Id. at
-

48.

324 N.Y.S.2d 964

(N.Y.

1971).

decision turned not only on the state action theory,
but also on the elements of contract and inherent authority.
For an account of the facts and these aspects of the case,
see Chapter II, pp. 14-29.
64 The
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reasonableness of its procedures, its position being that
it is a private university unfettered by any community

standards

6 5

.

In a lengthy opinion, Justice Harnett

the ruling of the court.

Hofstra

1

s

delivered

He began his examination of

relationship with the state by stating:

The responsiveness of private universities to
constitutional inhibitions is a lively current topic.
Because of the essential need for academic freedom, a
justly careful watch must be kept on outside interference in educational institutions. Yet, the principle
of personal right is also an essential need of democratic society.
In this competition of principle, a
constitutional domino theory is occasionally advanced
under which any collegiate restriction is viewed as
an opening fall which will surely tumble the entire
institutional array.
We cannot agree that the right of academic freedom
requires the total preclusion of personal rights,
whether they be of faculty, students, or affected
members of the public. Where a "right" can be identified, its force and priority must be measured with the
conflicting rights of others. These questions of
social balance weave through our whole constitutional
texture 6 6

After establishing the issue of balancing rights.
Justice Harnett addressed the contention that Hofstra UniverHe noted that Hofstra

sity was engaged in state action.

has the major state goverrmental presence of the
New York Dormitory Authority ... [and] over half of
the total book value of Hofstra University consists
.

6 5

6 6

.

.

Ryan v. Hofstra University
Id.

at 977.

,

supra note 63 at 974.
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of assets not only constructed but
owned bv
y the
Dormitory Authority 67
.

He also found that the size and
dispersion of these

facilities "make it useless to think of Hofstra
as a fully
functioning university apart from them, they are
integral
to the university."

68

in addition, the court took notice

that signs declaring the authority facilities appeared

conspiciously throughout the university," and that the
offenses committed by Ryan occurred on authority
property.

Although the university's involvement with the

Dormitory Authority was sufficient to find state action in
this case. Justice Harnett also noted that over $1,000,000

out of the total university budget of $25,000,000 comes

67

Id.

at 979.

Formed under the provisions of the New York Public
Authorities Law, sections 1675-1692, the Dormitory
Authority constructs dormitories and other buildings
for universities, state operated, statutory and contract
colleges, as well as other higher educational institutions such as Hofstra.
Under the statutes, the state
owns the facilities and leases them to universities
authorized to confer degrees by the State Board of
The construction
This includes Hofstra.
Regents.
money comes from municipal bonds issued by the public
authority upon the guaranty of the public authority.
The Dormitory Authority itself has the power, under
Public Authorities Law, section 1670, to make by-laws
for the management and regulation of its affairs, and
to maintain and operate its buildings.
.

6 8

Ibid.

.

.
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directly from governmental grants, that during the
past five
years it received over $3,000,000 in direct federal
constrution grants, and that the large majority of students

at the

university receive state scholarships and incentives.

He

also highlighted the fact that 125 acres of Hofstra's 225
acre campus was donated to the institution from the federal

government and all the land is tax exempt.

Another form of

involvement was indicated by the operation of

a

police

training center by Hofstra for the county of Nassau.
Justice Harnett, armed with the indicia above and the
cases previously discussed in the chapter as precedent, could

have found state action in this case and stopped here.
he went further.

But

Although he acknowledged that some of

Hofstra's assets are owned by a university corporation.

Justice Harnett explained:
"Private" connotes ownership or possession by someNo private person owns Hofstra University or
body.
its property directly, nor even indirectly in the form
The university is replete with
of shares of stock.
public interest, requirement and supervision. The
university is in the most real comparable sense a
public trust for the rendition of education. It is
only for this reason that so much public worth and
effort has been supplied to it.

A private university like Hofstra is an oligarchal
Its fundamental
form tending to be self-perpetuating.
Its existence
public.
the
to
legal responsibilities are
a public
as
only
justified
and favored position can be
6 9
stewardship.

6 9

Id.

at 981.
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The court further explained that Hofstra operates

under a charter from the New York State Board of Regents

which can move to dissolve the university corporation if it
ceases its educational functions
that Hofstra'

s

70
.

The court also noted

degree requirements are controlled by the

Board of Regents

71
.

Justice Harnett continued in an unprecedented fashion
by examining the "deminishing difference" between public
and private colleges:
In modern practice, there is a deminishing difference between the actual operation of the universities,
whether they be "public" or "private" in format. While
the state university system is under the control of the
governor and the legislature, it is financing which
forms the dominant relationship of the state politic
Substantial autonomy is afforded
to its own schools.
boards and faculties, which abound with private citiTo a greater degree, state
zens in board positions.
universities are operating internally free of public
political control. On the other hand, "Private"
universities financed through state action also have
important regulation by the State Board of Regents.
And so the two types continually approach a similar
The state makes the university fiscally posreality.
the faculty
The university's Board of Trustees,
sible.
7
and school administration make the place
.

The court found that Hofstra University was engaged in

state action when it expelled Ryan, and, therefore, its
constituprocedures should have been commensurate with the
Amendment.
tional requirements contained in the Fourteenth

considerations.
The court based its opinion on three

First,

Dormitory Authority
Hofstra 's significant involvement with the

7 0

Ibid

7

Ibid.

7 2

Ibid
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and other state benefits; second Hofstra was performing

a

public function; and third:
Here, as in the Burton case, the state could have
affirmatively required Hofstra to discharge minimum
guarantees of constitutional procedures in nonacademic
discipline for offenses against property as a condition
of state participation ... no state may effectively
abdicate its responsibilities by ignoring them or by
failing to discharge them no matter the motive. 73

Therefore, Ryan was ordered reinstated to the univer-

Hofstra was to provide the student with a proper

sity.

hearing if it wished to reinstitute the disciplinary proceedings against him.

Those proceedings would have to be com-

mensurate with due process afforded to students at public
institutions as specified in the Dixon case.

73

74

Id. at 983.

at 984. This case is especially interesting because
a state court went farther than any federal court in upholding
It had been the opinion of the
federal constitutional rights.
author that civil liberties were more ostensibly protected
Perhaps New York students
in federal rather than state courts.
suit
or teachers alleging state action would do better filing
there
that
indicate
to
seems
opinion
For this
in state courts.
really is no such thing as a private university unfettered
with constitutional restraints on its actions. Unive rsity,
- v. Fisk
Compare this case with Blackburn
a very
443 F 2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) in which the court
in
engaged
not
was
brief opinion held that the university
hearing.
a
without
state action when it suspended students
The court found that:
afP H
private
a n«vn
transform
to
sufficient
involvement
state
requires more than
university into a "state" university
providing financial a
merely chartering the university,
granting a tax exemption.
in the form of public funds, or
(Id. at 123.)
74 Id.

_

.

m

7
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The sale or granting of public property
v.

Brooklyn Law School

75
,

.

In Grafton

Judge Friendly was called upon

again by students alleging that their school was involved
in state action.

In 1973, Brooklyn Law School expelled two

students for scholastic deficiencies.

The students argued

that they were actually being expelled for expressing their
%

views on the Vietnam War and as members of the school news-

paper writing a critical editorial on state judges.
Brooklyn Law School, originally a division of St.

Lawrence University, became a wholly independent school in
It operates under a charter granted by the State

1941.

Board of Regents.

It has adopted policies and practices

entitling it to be considered an "approved" law school

established by the New York Court of Appeals so that

a

graduate

is eligible to take the state bar examination without having

studied for four years in

a law

office.

76

The school receives

In 1965,

some financial aid from the state.

it was the sole

bidder on a public building which now houses the law school.
facilities at
As the only bidder, the law school received the
a cost far below its actual value.

7 7

indicia were
The students maintained that the above
Judge Friendly
sufficient to have a finding of state action.

7 5

478 F 2d 1137
.

76
7 7

Id.

at 1139.

Id.

at 1141.

(2d Cir.

1973).
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was not impressed.

Powe v. Miles

,

Referring to his earlier opinion in

he explained that "the mere granting of

property to assist the construction of an educational
facility has not been thought sufficient to convert it from
a private into a public institution." 78

Although this case concerned

a law school.

Judge

Friendly still rejected the public function theory applying
to private higher education:

The circumstance that we are here dealing with a
law school rather than a liberal arts college does not
the
make law teaching "governmental in nature"
sucthe
instruction
mere fact that a school is giving
the
more
cessful completion of which affords one, and
generally desired, party to the taking of a state bar
examination, does not make its function any more governmental than the imparting of the pre-legal instruction
which is also required. 79
.

.

.

Therefore, Judge Friendly found no state action as

required by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, thus, giving the
court no jurisdiction on which to hear the merits of the case.

7 8

7 9

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

The
Consider: Massachusetts has no public law schools.
sector
private
people and state are wholly dependent on the
With the ac cepted
to produce persons trained in the law.
hard pressed not
these oeople play in society, one would be
a vital public function
find the private law schools performing
invested with the highest public interest.
shouxd have conAnother aspect Judge Friendly perhaps
undergraduate liberal
sidered is the distinction between an
d
d
If n
arts college and a professional school. what
listic
realis
^^
^
a
the
are
expelled or suspended from a law school,
school? The
chances of that person being accepted by
ablate pursu
possible harm to the individual no longer
bureiy n
small loss.
or her chosen profession, is no
80

"er^

^
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Federal financial assistance

.

The latest case raising

the issue of state action and private education is Williams

v

»

Howard University

81
.

A student applied for readmission

to the medical school after withdrawing for medical reasons.

The school's executive committee denied his application on
the basis of his unsatisfactory performance in his first

and second years of study.

After Williams was refused

a

hearing on the matter, he filed suit alleging that Howard

University denied him due process to which he was entitled;
because, Howard was substantially funded by the federal

government and tax exempt, thus making Howard's action
federal action.

82

In a brief three page opinion, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the district court's grant of Howard's motion for
summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction.

The court first

dispelled the state action claim by explaining that the
District of Columbia is not considered a "state or territory

within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act.

Thus, the

student's claim of jurisdiction under that provision fails.

action.

federal
The court next turned to the issue of alleged
acknowledged that if the student could demonstrate
It

safeguards afforded
of fairness should require the minimal
universities.
students at public colleges and
8

528 F 2d 658

8 2

Id . at 660

.

(D.C. Cir.

1976).
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that Howard's involvement with the federal crovernment
was

sufficient to make Howard's readmission decisic. equivalent
to federal action, the school would be subject to due process
The court did not believe there was governmental

•

action.

There is no doubt that Howard's action has serious
consequences for appellant but it is not subject to
all the constraints put on governmental action by the
due process clause.

Furthermore, the court held:
the fact that the federal government contributes
.
.
funds to the university, by itself, is insufficient to
show the exercise of influence on university decision
making or the encouragement of specific policies
we must conclude that federal jurisdiction does not
exist for his due process claim, because it has not been
shown that the government exercises some form of control
over the actions of Howard. 83
.

.

8 3

.

.

It is indeed curious that the court can hold that
Ibid
funding is not sufficient, when in the case of Howard, the
federal government contributes almost all of the operating
costs of the institution; a large share of the capital construction funds come directly from Congress; the administration
is subject to extensive regulation by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare; faculty appointments are processed on
regular civil service forms; and the university is frequently
listed in official documents as a federal quasi-governmental
agency (see "Reasonable Rules, Reasonably Enforced--Guidelines
53 Minn. L. Rev.
for University Disciplinary Proceedings,"
assistance
federal
of
removal
If the
301, 308 n. 44 (1968).
not make
this
does
would mean the end of Howard University
the governprecisely
the government a partner at least or more
programs.
its
ment's allowing private individuals to administer
icant^involvesignif
As Burton demonstrated, this is exactly the
the
ment between government and private parties that constitute
actions of both as governmental.
.

,
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S ummary and

comment

These cases have exemplified the

.

position courts have taken concerning the
concept of state
action and private higher education. 84 Most

courts are not

disposed to finding state action in the context of
student
discipline or expression. But several of these courts

indi-

cated that, had racial discrimination been alleged, they may
%

have been inclined to find state action because of the

invidiousness of the constitutional violation alleged.

85

See also: Counts v. Voorhees College 312 F. Supp. 598
(D.S.C. 1970), public function insufficient for a finding of
state action; Torres v. Puerto Rico Jr. College 289 F. Supp.
458 (D.P.R. 1969), receiving some federal financial aid insufficient for finding of state action; Robinson v. Davis 447
F 2d 753 (4th Cir 1971), state action not involved when campus
security work for both town and college. Related cases:
Greenya v. George Washington University 512 F.2d 556 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)
higher education not state action so as to trigger First and Fifth Amendment rights in university's relations
with employees; Wahba v. N Y U
492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974),
federal research grant insufficient for finding of state
action requiring hearing for dismissed teacher working under
such grant.
,

,

,

.

.

,

,

.

.

,

85

See, e.g., Powe v. Miles
407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968);
Browns v. Mit chel l 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Grossner
287 F.
v. Trustees of Columbia University in City of N.Y.
,

,

,

(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
I decline to accept this position.
It is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to arrange
federal constitutional rights in an ascending hierarchy
What is clear is that any deprivation of such
of value.
a right, whether to the equal protection of laws as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment or to the freedoms
of speech and association as guaranteed by the First
Amendment, is a matter of extreme importance to the
It is equally clear
person who suffers the deprivation.
to any
sensitive
especially
be
should
courts
the
that
who
man
black
a
involves
it
whether
such deprivation,
two
or
restaurant,
segregated
a
is refused service in
a
about
minds
their
speaking
[students] disciplined for
of
freedoms
The
university’s publication policies.

Supp. 535
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The leading case in this field is Powe v. Miles which

established the legal test for finding state action in
private
higher education. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled
on this controversial area,

test established in Powe

86

many courts have applied the

:

The state must be involved not simply with some activity
of the institution alleged to have inflicted injury
upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the
injury. Putting the point another way, the state action,
not the private action, must be the subject of complaint. 87

These courts have held that the state must be signifi-

cantly entwined with the private college so as to constitute

speech and association have been held so fundamental
to the concept of ordered liberty that they have been
incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Clearly then, the courts should be
alert to their infringement "under color of" state law,
and quick to vindicate them if they have in fact been
curtailed. (Isaacs v. Board of Truste es of Temple University , 385 F. Supp. 473 [E.D. Pa. 1974], state action
present in dismissal of two faculty members, therefore.
Temple required to provide hearing consistent with
Fourteenth Amendment.)
86

The Supreme Court may have come closer to hearing a case
concerning state action and private education when it held
that private schools (with some exceptions) could not refuse
In McCrary v.
to admit qualified Blacks to their schools.
Runyon, 44 U.S.L.W. 5025 (1976), the court held that a private
school's policy of refusing to admit Blacks solely because
of their race violates the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.,
section 1981, by denying Blacks the same right "to make and
as is enjoyed by white citizens.
enforce contracts
This case was not decided on state action but it is importan
Court
to this study because for the first time the Supreme
holding
and
education,
has "entered the dominion" of private
policy.
public
it responsible to certain aspects of
.

.

.

Powe v. Miles, supra note 19 at 81. As previously
discussed, this "test" appears to be more strict than the
one developed in Burton the leading case concerning state
action.
8

,
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state action.

This entwinement has taken many different

forms, but the courts will not recognize a claim of state

action unless to a significant extent the state has become
involved with the private action.

As the above cases have

indicated, courts have considered the following indicia
to determine the state's involvement with private colleges:
(1)

Does the university

function?

(2)

perform a public or governmental

Does the state grant the university substan-

tial financial assistance, particularly in

grants or direct appropriations?

(3)

th.e

form of

Does the university

issue statements in its catalog and other publications

emphasizing its close relationship with state facilities?
(4)

Is the university exempt from taxation?

(5)

Are any of

the university's activities subject to state control or

supervision?

(6)

Does continued financial assistance depend

on the university's filing with the state written rules and

regulations governing students?

Has the state donated

(7)

or leased buildings or land to the university?

university been granted a charter by the state?

(8)
(9)

Has the

Does

the charter reserve the power to the state to make amendments

without the university's consent?

(10)

Does the university

Does the state

receive surplus government property?

(11)

appoint all or some of the trustees?

(This fact alone might

support a finding of state action.)
normally will
As the cases illustrated, state action
above indicia are
not be found if only one or a few of the

156

present.

However, if a college is involved with the state

in a number of the above ways, a few courts are willing to

declare the college and state significantly entwined.
In sum, although most courts have not been willing

to accept the above factors of involvement as important,
a few courts have found state action present where it

has been shown that a number of the indicia are involved in
the relationship.

Only a couple of courts have found state

action present when only

one of the indicia signifies the

relationship of the college and state

In addition, there

.

are some factors which would indicate still further entwine-

ment between state and private colleges that have not been
reviewed.

One area of involvement is in accreditation.

88

The fact that a public or private college is accredited

enhances its reputation, attracts students and faculty and

Paul L. Dressel "Accreditation and Institutional Selfstudy," The North Central Association Quarterly 46 (Fall 1971)
8 8

,

277-287.'

"

Accreditation as practiced by institutions of higher
education in the United States, is without parallel elsewhere
Through regional accrediting associations,
in the world.
colleges and universities have banded together to establish
accrediting procedures which: (1) Certify to the general
presence
public, to government, and to other institutions, the
acof at least minimal qualifications in the institutions against
credited; (2) provide limited protection to the public their
by
degree mills and disreputable educational policies
an
counsel
provide
inability to acquire accreditation; (3)
toward
moving
institutions
assistance to new and developing
institutions y
accreditation; (4) encourage improvement in
to instiprotection
review activities; and (5) provide some
autonomy
their
tutions against threatened encroachments on
quality.
which might also be destructive to educational
,

Id.

at 277.

.

.
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furthers communications with other institutions.

importantly

,

More

an institution cannot receive government grant

monies if it is not accredited.
The state is involved in the process through the

accreditation associations to which
and universities belong.

a

majority of colleges

Each institution pays an appli-

cation fee and thereafter an annual affiliation fee.

It

becomes obvious then, that the private colleges receive
some benefits from associating with and belonging to a cor-

poration which includes the resources of state colleges and
universities.

89

The same has been said of athletic associ-

ations, such as the National Collegiate Athletic Association

which is comprised of public and private colleges and
universities

9 0

See, e.g.. New England Association of Schools and
Colleges, Inc., Amended Set of By-laws Approved at the
Annual Meeting of the Corporation, December 13, 1974.
89

large majority of which are public institutions.
Every college pays acceptance and annual fees. Also, member
institutions share resources, such as playing fields when
athletics
competing with each other. Rules for the conduct of
association.
and colleges are established by the
to be
In several cases, the N.C.A.A. has been held
reguand
rules
performing state action when it enforced its
1973]).
La.
[W.D.
lations (Parish v. N.C.A.A. , 361 F. Supp. 1220
can
members
Althoucrh this does not mean that individual
demonstrate th
does
it
actions,
said to be performing state
further invove
private colleges and universities are stiH
n ot he suffi
Sith the state. By itself, it probably
the state, but
with
cient for showing significant involvement
many ways private colleges
it is just another indicia of how
mutual benefi
and the state are entwined to the
90 The
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Another indicia to consider in this area are cooperative
programs between private colleges and neighboring state institutions

91

Usually these programs involve sharing facilities,

.

transferring credit and teaching.
Doesn't a program of this sort benefit the private
college?

This involvement would certainly not constitute

sufficient state entwinement; but if it were another indicia
considered by the court, perhaps it would be the "final spoke
in the wheel" to create the significant involvement of the

state with a private college or university.

Perhaps the

courts would consider them insufficient, but one wonders why

they have not been presented.
Not one of these factors alone imply sufficient entwine-

ment with the state or one of its agencies.

However, they are

indications of involvement and benefit between the state and

private college or university.
These indicia would not have mattered to Judge Skelley
Wright.

For his decision in Guillory ventured further than

any federal judge in the area of state action and private

education.
Clearly, the administrators of a private college are
performing a public function. They do the work of the
state often in the place of the state. Does it not
if
follow that they stand in the state's shoes? And,

The cooperative program in the Pioneer Valley among
and
the five colleges Amherst, Holyoke, Smith, Hampshire
example.
one
but
the University of Massachusettsr“is
91

—

I

159

so, are they not then agents of
the state, subject to
the constitutional restraints on
governmental action.

Almost no judge, however, has been willing to
accept Judge
Wright's view in this matter.
Part II

Rationales For and Against Applying

Constitutional Standards
In order to understand the significance and complexity

of the problem, it will be necessary to examine the major

rationales for and against applying constitutional standards
to the relationship between students and private colleges

and universities.

This section will first explore four

rationales for applying constitutional standards; and, second,
it will explore rationales for not applying them.

The value

of private education and the application of constitutional

principles to it will also be presented in the context of

developing the argument for and against their application.

Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University of
Louisiana, supra note 3 at 858. Perhaps somewhere between
the Powe and Guillory reasonings, the courts will settle on
a definitive rationale for applying state action to private
It is hard to sustain a position
colleges and universities.
a state to contribute almost
would
allow
which
such as Powe,
and as long as it was
college
all the revenue of a private
that caused the
"activity
not directly involved with the
Likecomplaint', there would be no finding of state action.
state
of
finding
wise, to sustain Guillory would require a
action in every case.
9 2

1
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Rationales for applying constitutional standards

.

This section will outline several major arguments for

applying the state action concept to private colleges:
Control or sponsorship of unique educational programs; the

university as a "company town"; government supervision
and regulation; and the public purpose of higher education.
%

1.

programs

.

Control or sponsorship of unique educational
In most instances, students have the choice of

attending public or private institutions for their education.
In some states, however, a particular course of study or

specialized degree can be pursued only at a private college.
For example, a student in Massachusetts who wants to study
law without leaving the state, has a wide choice of good

schools

— Harvard,

Boston College, Boston University, North-

eastern, Suffolk, Portia and Western New England
are all private.

— but

they

Although no state is constitutionally

required to furnish specialized graduate education at the
public's expense, the study of law and its practice in the
state is essential to both the private and public sectors.
the
Therefore, the private colleges (having a monopoly on

perform an
study of law granted because of state inaction)

essential public function

— providing

the state with legal

scholars and practioners.
educational
This private monopoly of an essential

relationship of the
program appears to be analogous to the
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political association in Terry

v.

Adams

9 3
.

In this case,

the Supreme Court had no difficulty in deciding that the

association was performing

a

public function and was thus

so entwined with the state as to constitute state action.

94

Another result of this situation, although not as
significant, is that students are effectively denied the

choice of attending a college or university at which constitutional standards are practiced.

There have been some

cases that suggest that beneficiaries of such a monopoly

9 3

345 U.S. 461

(1953)

.

94 See

Chapter IV, p.119. Also consider: William 0.
Douglas, "Should not the Corporate Giants be Considered as
'States'? Is it not Naive to Think of Them as 'Persons'?"
Douglas Book Review, The New York Times Book Review (October
22, 1961), p. 3.
As a beginning, we can set out the following propositions: (1) The Constitution was framed on the theory
that limitations should exist on the formal exercise of
power in government but not on power exercised unofficially.
(2) The essential problem of individual
is one of freedom from arbitrary rehowever,
liberty,
wherever and however imposed.
restrictions,
straints and
be so construed as to apply
should
Constitution
(3) The
power against individuals
of
applications
to arbitrary
(4) The main flow of
government.
private
by centers of
be
group decisions in the [academic] community would not
thrown into litigation or controversy by such constitutional construction, but only those which directly
(5) It would
and substantially affect an individual.
constitutiona
present
take only a slight modification of
construction.
doctrine to effect such a constitutional
,

i
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are themselves subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.

College as a "company town".

2.

95

All colleges and

universities exercise some control over the lives of their
students

whether they are public or private.

However,

public institutions are limited by constitutional restraints
and some private universities exercise limited control over
%

the lives of their students.

Students attending schools in

the major metropolitan areas are hardly dependent on the

institution for their entertainment, recreation or social
But what about the students attending private colleges

life.

in rural and out-of-the-way places?

Institutions which are

isolated in this way do exercise a quasi-governmental power
over the lives and activities of all members of the academic
community.

9 6

A number of private colleges require students to eat,
play, and live on the college campus.

Many private insti-

tutions have their own security forces, power plant and
Some of

provide housing for both students and faculty.

For an interesting discussion on the importance of a
to
monopoly control over certain educational opportunities Robert
and
Alstyne
the state action question, see William Van
See
Karst, "State Action," 14 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 32-36 (1961).F. 2d
413
also: Sams v. O hio Valley General Hospital Ass n
A. 2d
172
Hospital
Newcomp
826 (4th Cir. 1969); Grusnan v.
hospital associations considered acting under
817 (1963)
and "governmental
color of state law because of public function
or loans °
donations
aid and support— through cash payments,
of
combination
buildings, special tax exemptions, or some
these ingredients."
95

1

,

,

,

9 6

Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 187.
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these colleges promulgate curfew regulations, and forbid

certain activities (such as card playing and certain displays
of affection) not otherwise restricted

9
.

There are also instances where a whole community may
be economically and culturally dependent upon a private college or university.

Stanford has been considered a classic

example
It is not merely a comprehensive and diverse university, with a full program of facilities and activities
for its members; it is quite literally a governmental
Even more clearly than the company town in Marsh
unit.
In
v. Alabama , Stanford exercises municipal powers.
colleges
most
addition to a campus security force (which
and universities possess today), the town of Stanford,
California, has its own fire department, power plant
and for what it may be worth. Zip Code. Many members
of the Stanford faculty lease housing from the University and thus live under the governance of the body
that also employs them. What more could be needed to
38
make Stanford as much a town as Chickasaw, Alabama ?

Clearly, all private colleges and universities do not

control the lives of their students as much as Stanford.

But

here is a private university that allegedly has "all the

characteristics of any other American town ."

99

The Supreme

same
Court found that a company town which provided the
the state
functions as any other town was so entwined with

to constitute state action.

College, Dover,
See the student catalog for Wesley
hand experience
first
The author also received
Delaware
at this institution.
9 7

"Robert

"Marsh

M.
v.

O'Neil, supra note 13 at 188.

Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502

(1946).
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People living in company-owned towns are free
citizens of their state and country first, as residents
of municipalities. And there is no more reason for
depriving them of liberties guaranteed by the 1st and
14th Amendments than there is for curtailing these
freedoms with respect to any other citizens. 100

A college is a unique establishment in our society.
Here, there are people living and working together in a

common cause

— education.

self “Sustaining.

In many instances, the college is

Students and faculty need not leave the

campus, for everything they need is provided.

Therefore,

there is little difference between some private colleges
and company towns

Furthermore, the reason for joining together is the

common goal of education, whether to learn, research or
So, here is a "town" of people whose whole purpose

teach.

for being is concerned with a public interest
3.

— education. 101

Government supervision and regulation

.

State

involvement with private colleges and universities is

reflected by state supervision and control over the affairs
of private colleges in two ways:

through legislative

charter and by authorizing the granting of degrees.
In some cases, the private college is chartered by

specific
a special act of the legislature which includes a

1

0 0

Id. at 508.

entering
It should be noted that today most students
when
case
college are of legal age. This was not the public function
several courts rejected the "company town,
407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
See, e.g., Powe v. Miles
101

theory.

,
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delegation of legislative powers.

The Charter of Dartmouth

College grants the institution authority to "make and

establish such Ordinances, Orders and Laws as may tend to
the good and wholesome government of said College and all
the students." 102
The Charter of Yale University grants the college

power

... to make, ordain and establish all such wholesome
and reasonable Laws, Rules, Ordinances, not Repugnant
to the public laws as they shall think fit and proper
for
Ordering, Governing, Ruling and Managing the
said College
which shall be laid before this
[state] Assembly as often as Required or Disallowed
by this Assembly when they shall think proper. 103
.

.

.

.

.

.

Here, the state has granted the authority of governing

students to a private college.

Does this not represent the

delegation of state power to a private institution?

By the

delegation of this power, is not the private college, when
it disciplines its students, acting "under color of state

law"?

Furthermore, because the charter granted allows the

state the option of reviewing and repealing any "laws, rules,

ordinances," of the college, the state is required to ensure
that the college's rules are consistent with public law.
relationship
It appears that Connecticut has established a
and
with Yale which makes it responsible for all the rules

Edwi
Ame:

Co., Inc.
1

0 3

Id.

,

1974)

,

p.

at 591-92.

185.

166

regulations of the college.

Since a state may not partici-

pate in actions which it is constitutionally forbidden from
doing, it can be argued that Connecticut has created a

relationship which demands it take affirmative actions in
requiring constitutional compliance. 104
States also supervise or control private colleges in
less direct, but no less important, ways.

The awarding of

degrees is a principal power conferred to private colleges
by states which maintain control by establishing requirements
to be met, determining

qualifications of teachers, and

reviewing of new degree programs. 105

Professor Martin Levine considers a different aspect
of the authority of private colleges granting degrees:

Colleges are among the few institutions in our
society whose function is the award of new statuses-Though the status of degree recipient
degrees.
is or can be awarded by a "private" school"— with all
the rights, privileges, and immunities thereunto
appertaining" the status is recognized by the state
for such purposes as qualifications for professional
106
licensing and civil service requirements.
.

.

.

—

The failure of a state government to act can only be
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Chapter IV,
State Action, pp. 112-20.
However, it should be noted that no case to date has
substantively considered all of the "language contained in
these charters. Perhaps it is the fear that in finding state
action
action in education, they would be forced to find state
incorof
in every case where the state has granted charters
state
poration. Most courts have not been willing to find univer
a
action when the only involvement the state has with
sity is its charter.
1 0

4

105 Robert M.

O’Neil, supra note 13 at 185.

Martin Levine, "Private Government on the Campus:Comments)
and
Judicial Review of University Expulsions," (Notes
72 Yale L.J. 1362, 1384 (1963).
1

6
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This presents another picture of state involvement
and investment in higher education.

The fact that it super-

vises and establishes degree requirements, and then considers
and utilizes those people who acquire the degrees, demonstrates
the public function a private college plays in providing the

education necessary for the acquisition of a college degree.
Once source of authority for allowing states to

regulate private colleges and to require them to comport to
the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment may be Pierce
v.

Society of Sisters

1

0 7

.

The Supreme Court held that it was

beyond the power of the state to compel all children to
attend public schools.

However, the Court did not prohibit

the state from regulating private schools.

No question is raised concerning the power of the
state reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect,
supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils
to require that all children of proper age attend some
school, that teachers shall be of good moral character
and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly
essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be “aught which is manifestly inimical to the
public welfare 0 8 (Italics mine.)
-

1

.

By allowing states to regulate private education and

require certain studies "essential to good citizenship" and
to ensure that "nothing be taught which is inimical to the

public welfare," the Supreme Court has created a door whereby
to
states could require that every private college adhere

public
the same constitutional standards operating at

1

07

1

0 8

268 U.S. 510
Id.

at 534

(1925)
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colleges.

Interpreting the wording of the term "taught"

to encompass behavior and practices present on a
college

campus, could include disciplinary procedures.

Is it in

the interest of a democratic society to have adults unfa-

miliar with its practices of fair play and justice?

A

state could maintain that a college, in order to develop
"good citizenship," practice those principles and qualities

found in a democratic society

— those

principles and qual-

ities embodied in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. 109
In sum, the power of a college to grant or withhold

academic degrees is significant.

This power is also the

cause for extensive state regulation and supervision of

education which "underscores the essentially governmental
character of the degree-granting institution."
4.

110

The public purpose of higher education

.

Chief

Justice John Marshall believed that private colleges like

Dartmouth "do not fill the place, which would otherwise be
occupied by government, but that which would otherwise
remain vacant."

111

That may have been the case in 1819, but

the opposite seems true today.

Higher education is osten-

sibly a public or governmental responsibility, which private

colleges and universities share and supplement in vital ways.

education in a democracy and the hidden
this
curriculum will be developed in more detail later in
chapter
109 The aspect of

°Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 181.
truste es of Dartmouth College v. Woodward
Wheat. 1 518, 647 (1819)
1

1

,

17 U.S.

(4
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Public colleges and universities are numerically

dominant today

,

and roughly two out of every three students

are enrolled at a public college or university. 112

The

states have assumed an impressive role in all aspects of

education.

Most states have now recognized the importance

of higher education as well as the established need of

elementary and secondary education.

The New York Regents

has expressed this importance in the state's plan for

higher education:
College attendance and a college degree are necessary today as high school attendance and a high school
diploma were in the past. The economic, social and
cultural forces in our society are all pushing in that
direction.
1

1

1

2

1

Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 187.

Regents of the University of the State of New York,
The Regents Statewide Plan for the Expansion and Development
(New York: Regents of the University of
of Higher Education
the State of New York, 1964), p. 9.
Although applying to public secondary education, the
importance of education was illuminated in the landmark
decision of Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483, 493
1 1

,

,

(1954):

Today, education is perhaps the most important
the great
function of state and local governments
our
demonstrate
expenditures for education
education to our
of
importance
the
of
recognition
It is required in the performance
democratic society.
service
of our most basic public responsibilities, even
It is the very foundation of good
in the armed forces.
Today, it is a principal instrument in
citizenship.
In these
awakening the child to cultural values. ...
be
reasonably
may
days it is doubtful that any child
oppor
the
denied
expected to succeed in life if he is
tunity of an education.
category
Professor Martin Levine suggests that the
''^tivities of
"governmental function" properly includes
kind which are regular and substantial the pnva| t .
operation." The reasoning is that were
.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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The value of a college education and degree can be

measured in different ways.

An average college graduate

will in his lifetime earn approximately $150,000 more than
a person not receiving such a degree. 114

As Professors

Jencks and Riesman have observed:
The bulk of the American intelligensia now depends
on universities for a livelihood and virtually every
would-be member of the upper middle class thinks
he needs some university's imprimatur, at least in
the form of a B A and preferably in the form of a
graduate professional degree as well. 115
.

.

Although few courts have accepted the public function
theory of private higher education, it is interesting to note

enterprises to shut down, the government would have to take
their place. Thus, it is concluded, the private enterprises
are performing a function in the place of the government.
Under such an analysis, education and justice the two chief
activities of state and local governments would be the
"governmental functions" par excellence and justice on campus
would be a "governmental function" and therefore subject to
constitutional requirements. (Martin Levine, supra note 106

—

—

,

at 1385.)
1

1

4

Robert M. O'Neil, supra note 13 at 178.

Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, "Where Graduate
(February 1968), p. 49.
Schools Fail," The Atlantic
reached by Jacques Barzon
was
A similar conclusion
when he commented:
to
In American society the college is the gateway
Every year the figure goes up that
good employment.
expresses the value of a college education in future it.
Banks publish it, parents daydream about
earnings.
tunnel ou
Depressed minorities view the college as the
equagreat
the
is
of prison into economic freedom it
u
education.
lizer, as Horace Mann once said of all
(Jacques
now nothing short of college is education. Jossey Bas
[Calif.:
Barzon, The American University
1 1

,

.

—

,

,

'

Inc., 1968]

,

p.

212.)
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that another branch of the law has already
accepted the
great importance of a college education. Upon the
dis-

solution of a marriage, a court must decide whether or not
adequate provisions have been made in the settlement or

decree for the education of a minor child.

At issue is

the extent of the father's duty to pay for higher education.

In the past, the position of most courts was that

adopted by the Supreme Court of Vermont in 1844.

The court

held that a college education was not a "necessary" for

which the father was liable because "the mass of our citizens pass through life without

.

.

[higher education]." 116

.

However, a number of recent cases simply assume that higher

education is indispensable for success and good citizenship,
that its inclusion within the support obligations of the
father are almost automatic. 117

It is interesting to note

that students have not raised this aspect of the importance
of higher education when seeking judicial review of college

actions depriving them of an education.

Arguments against applying constitutional standards

.

The issue of applying the Fourteenth Amendment to private

colleges and universities in matters of student discipline

1 1

Middlebury College v. Chandler

,

16 Vt.

683

(Vt.

1844)

117 Some cases which have held higher education as a legal
father
necessary dependent only on the financial status of the
ell^
Mitch
1962);
(111.
are: O'Berry v. O'Berry, 183 N.E.2d 539
118
Pass,
v.
Pass
and
v. MitcheTlT 166 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1960);
College

Wrights
So. 2d 769'TMi. 1960). See also: Douglas R.
1400
Education as a Legal Necessary," 18 Vand. L. Rev.
,

(1965).
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has met with severe opposition from the private sector 118
.

They have accepted that a private college may be regulated
to some extent by the state, but these institutions maintain

that they are private entities, and the Fourteenth Amendment
only proscribes state action.

Furthermore, they maintain

that discipline is an internal affair of the college and
%

that in any event the student has agreed to comport to all
the school's rules, regulations and procedures when he or
she enrolls.

This includes the statement in most college

and university handbooks which states that a student may be

dismissed for any reason, without a hearing, when the institution believes it to be in its own best interest.
The major argument of private colleges is simply

that they are, indeed, private not public, and therefore not

bound by the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

As

private entities, they contend that the relationship between
the college and student should be based on the concepts of

contract, inherent authority and, to a lesser extent,

parentis

1 1
.

iri

Ioccd

As the cases presented in chapters II and IV

as
illustrate, most courts have recognized these concepts

colleges and
controlling in the relationship between private
state action
students and have been unwilling to apply the
rejected indicia
concept to this relationship. They have

in the first section
As indicated by the cases presented
of this chapter.
119 These concepts are developed in Chapter II.
1

1
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for finding state action in private education, when many

courts with the same, or less, criteria have been willing
to find state action in areas other than education. 120

Why

have the courts been reluctant to apply the state action

concept to private educational institutions?

The paramount

reason is the great fear held by private institutions and
>

persons sympathetic to their plight that the governmental

intrusion requiring them to comply with the requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment would not stop there.

They

maintain that a domino effect would, in fact, occur, ultimately destroying the private nature of these institutions.

1

^

1

The effect would be caused by the ever increasing encroachment
by the Congress, the Executive Branch and the courts.

Thus,

by rejecting the state action concept, the courts are

See for example: Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
private company town performs a public function and, therefore,
its actions are considered to be those of the state; Simkins
323 F 2d 959 (4th Cir.
v. Moses H, Cone Memorial Hospital
1963), cert, denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), private hospital
received federal and state money, state contributed land and
Newton,
buildings sufficient to warrant state action; Evans v.municipal
are
382 U.S. 296 (1966), services rendered by a park
regard ess
facilities,
maintained
state
in nature, and because
of the
of ownership, the park is subject to the regiments iv.
In general, see also Chapter
Fourteenth Amendment.
1

0

,

,

.

and the
Henry Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case College,
Dartmouth
(New Hampshire:
Public-Private Pnumbra
1969),
pp^
example: The President's Panel on Non-Public
Good: Fina_ l
Education, Non-Public Education an d t he Public
urrice,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Re port
Schools: From
__
1972 )T and Otto F. Kraushaar, Private
Phi
The
Indiana:
(Bloomington,
Pur itans to the Present
Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1976)
1 2

,

,

,
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guarding against a sequence of encroachments that
could
possibly destroy the qualities of private colleges
that
differentiate them from public institutions.
In order to understand the underlying rationale for

not applying the state action concept to private colleges,
it-

will be necessary to explore the value and importance of

private colleges and universities.

Alexis de Toqueville

noted in a famous passage, "Americans of all ages, all
conditions and all dispositions constantly form associations." 122

One purpose of forming associations, he

explained, was "to found establishments for education" which
in turn lead to the founding of schools and colleges.

The

significance of associations, de Toqueville believed, was
if its creation "be proposed to advance some truth, or to

foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example,

they form a society." 123

De Toqueville maintained that the

uniqueness and quality of American democracy was in the
ability and desire of the American people to form associations to achieve certain common goals or aspirations.
That these associations reflect the diversity of the American

people is no happenstance.

One of the best examples of the

"phenomenon" is the private college or university.

edited by
122 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America
1956), p.
Library,
American
New
Richard D. Heffner (New York:
,

206.
12

3

Id.

at 129.
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Briefly, the first colleges in this country were

established by private individuals or groups.

Although, as

illustrated earlier, the distinction between public and
private was not very apparent in the early stages of this
country, public government did little to promote education.

1214

As Chief Justice Marshall pronounced in the famous Dartmouth

College case, private institutions like colleges and universities "do not fill the place which would otherwise be

occupied by government, but that which would otherwise remain
vacant.

1 2 5

The impetus for founding colleges rested with private

groups and individuals.

These people were usually affiliated

with particular religious sects, and the college's main function was to perpetuate the ideals, beliefs, and customs of
the particular religious orientation.

Academic pursuits

were also of import, but they were considered as tools for
acquiring the necessary abilities for ensuring the continued

viability of the religious order.
Today, however, most private colleges, although

m

technically affiliated with a church, are nonsectarian
educational
Their purpose is to provide an alternative
nature.

For an interesting indepth discourse
See Chapter IV.
period and beyond, see: Lawrence
on education for the colonial
The Colonial E xperrence-ISOT^
l. Cremin , Africa n Education:
1783, (New York: harper & Row, iy/0).
1

2 4

nf Dartmouth College v. Woodward

(4

Whe It!rll87WTI^Wr-Ali^¥ee

,

Chapter IV.

17 U.S.
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experience to that offered by public institutions.

126

In general, this is the importance of a college's

being private.
diverse.

Our society is in many respects uniquely

As such, there are many different philosophies

as to what education is and should be.

Private colleges,

as autonomous institutions, are free in theory at least, to

be as imaginative and experimental or as traditional or

eccentric as they please. 127
The Dartmouth College case upheld the right of a

private college to remain private.

It forbid the state from

"taking over" the governance of the institution.

Although

the public system of education is well established, and

today the overwhelming majority of students attend public

colleges and universities, people have the right to choose

whether they want

a

public or private education.

In a case dealing with secondary education, the Supreme

Court declared it beyond the "general power of the state to

standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
128
from public teachers only."

This, Justice McReynolds

stated, was based on "the fundamental theory of liberty

upon which all governments in this Union repose.

126 0tto F.

1,1
.

.

29

.

Kraushaar, supra note 121 at 45-52.

In reality, of course, they are conditioned
at 45.
by what is salable in the educational market.
127 Id.

128 Pierce v.
1

2 9

Ibid

Society of Sisters

,

268 U.S. 510 535

(1925).
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Thus, the court affirmed the right of private institutions
of education to exist 130
.

The constitutional right to form or attend private

schools is based on the implied right of association, liberty
and academic freedom.

Justice Frankfurter poignantly

explained one practical reason for providing this right:
Great diversity of psychological and ethical
opinion exists among us concerning the best way to
train children for their place in society. Because
of these differences and because of reluctance to
permit a single, iron-cast system of education to be
imposed upon a nation compounded of so many strains, we
have held that even though public education is one of
our most cherished democratic institutions, the Bill
of Rights bars a state from compelling all children to
attend public schools 131
.

To this end. New York's Heald Committee has recognized

that private institutions
give American education diversity and scope not
possible in tax-supported institutions alone, and they
.

.

.

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), invalidating state statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign
languages to students in public or private schools; Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra note 125; Wisconsin
upheld right of Amish alternav. Yoder, 406 U'lsT T05 (1972)
comtive to public education (upper secondary level) underU.S.
273
pulsory education laws; Farrington v. Tokushige
content of
284 (1927), invalidated Hawaii act regulating
curriculum materials, teacher qualifications in private
130 See also

,

,

concerned with
In another case although not directly
that the First
private colleges. Justice Douglas indicated
a child in a
educate
Amendment encompassed "The right to
pnvaiie o
public,
school of the parents' choice— whether
479,
U.S.
n^rnnhiral." (Griswold v. Conn ecticut , 381
,

which

reversed eviction and overturned statute
U965)
materials.
declared it illegal to give out birth control
1

599

Gobitis 310 U.S 586
school
upheld mandatory flag salute of public

^inersvill e School District
(1940)

students

,

v.

,
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have an opportunity to emphasize, if they wish, individualistic patterns of thought, courses of social
action, or political or religious activity. 132

Judge Friendly has suggested that the importance of
a college being private is in "the very possibility of doing

something different than government can do, of creating an

institution free to make choices government cannot."

133

Another aspect which highlights the importance of
having private colleges, is the view of what public education
is all about.

John Stuart Mill argued that public education

is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be
.
exactly like one another: and as the mould in which
it casts them is that which pleases the predominant
power in the government, whether this be a monarch,
a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the
.

.

132 Heald Committee,

"Meeting the Increasing Demand for
Higher Education in New York State: A Report to the Governor
and the Board of Regents," 1960.
1 3

Henry Friendly, supra note 121 at 30.
Jencks and Riesman think the reasons for people
choosing private colleges may simply be social: Parents may
know, for example, that the faculty at the University of
Colorado is better than at the University of Denver, and may
nonetheless prefer Denver on the grounds that their daughters
will be less likely to marry the wrong man at Denver or
that their sons are more likely to make friends who will be
useful in later life. Christopher Jencks and David Riesman,
The Academic Revolution, (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc.,
, ,
_
p. 287.
1968)
Although this may seem like a trite reason, it should
What may
still be the choice of the parent and/or student.
to
important
very
seem insignificant to one person may be
another.
,

,

.

,
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existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient
and successful, it establishes a despotism over the
4
mind
1

.

.

.

3

.

Thus, private colleges and universities provide higher

education with a diversity and scope not possible in public
institutions.

Because there is no one idea of education,

private schools enable people to have a choice in how and
%

what they wish to learn, live and associate

— in

ways not

always similar to that provided in public colleges.
The fear that the application of the state action

concept could lead to the destruction of private education

must be balanced with the significant questions: What
benefits may be gained by applying constitutional standards
to the student/college relationship?

Would the benefits

(London: John W. Parker
On Liberty
& Son, Ltd., 1859), pp. 190-91.
For an interesting and persuasive article on the entire
question of government regulation and control of education
and parent and child rights (through an examination of Pierc e
and related cases) see: Steve Arons, "The Separation of
School and State: Pierce Reconsidered," Harvard Educational
76-104.
Review 46 (February 1976)
proclaimed:
Desraeli
And as
with its
If I were asked, "would you have Oxford
with
self-government, freedom and independence, but yet
you have the
its anomalies and imperfections, or would
imperfections,
University free of those anomalies and
I would say,
Government?"
and under the control of the
i s
all
with
"Give me Oxford free and independent,
supra
Friendly,
anomalies and imperfections." (Henry
quotes
note 121 at 40, in footnote Judge Friendly
134 John Stuart Mill,

Desraeli

.

,
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be better than the possible loss of
autonomy? 135
1.

Risk.

if all the rights guaranteed public
college

students were provided to those attending
private institutions, their autonomy would indeed be
threatened.
For
example, one recognized conflict could involve
the rights
of students to organize clubs or associations
a right well

—

established in public colleges and universities.

However,

should a private institution such as Yeshiva University
be compelled to recognize a Nazi youth group?

Catholic

University, a chapter of the Klu Klux Klan? or Brigham

Young University a chapter of Gay Liberation?
obvious conflict inherent in these examples

Besides the

— the

autonomy

of the institution and the aspect of having to recognize
a group it in principle abhores

of alumni support.

— is

the very real problem

It seems reasonable to believe that

alumni would withhold support if their college were to begin

recognizing groups that they disdained.

The consequence of

this action for the private college does not need elaboration.

Another recognized conflict could be in the area of
student expression.

If a college promulgated rules

requiring a certain mode of dress and hair style because

135 It should be noted that the question of applying the

concept of equal protection has been basically decided by
the federal government in relation to both sex and race.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial
discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in any educational
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
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it believed it to be morally and pedagogically sound,
could

students disregard the requirements because they violated

their rights to freedom of expression?

Limiting risk

.

It is apparent that applying all

the constitutional restraints to private colleges raises

major concerns that must not be considered lightly.

However,

what benefits and risks would there be in applying the
Fourteenth Amendment standards of due process to the student/
college relationship?

Would the benefits be greater than the

possible loss of autonomy?

Simply, the question is whether

or not private colleges are less able than public colleges
to afford their students fair hearings? 136

Professor Arons, a strong advocate of less government
involvement and more private autonomy, does indicate that
there may be some circumstances when the state may regulate

private schools.

In 1887, for example, a Pennsylvania trial court reviewed
the decision of a private college to suspend a student for
infraction of its rules. The court found no threat to
institutional autonomy in the inquiry there undertaken. The
court was also unconcerned about the prospect of a wave of
litigation invited by its decision:
Nor, if such a practice were adopted (judicial review
of disciplinary proceedings), would it have any tendency
to limit the patronage of the colleges and universities.
Offenses, for the commission of which sentences of
dismissal may be affixed, are not so frequent that it
will impose any great hardship upon facilities to duly
their
inquire into the guilt of the accused, nor will
consider
any
entail
to
action be so often questioned as
ex.
ealth
Commonw
able additional burdens on the court.
(1887).
78
rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. Co. Ct. 77,
1 3 6

(

182

A state that seeks to impose any
substantial
burden upon First Amendment rights must
demonstrate
a compelling interest for doing so.
Therefore, a
state that seeks to regulate private schooling
must
show either that the regulation affects only
the
incidents of schooling ... or that there is an
overriding justification for the regulation.
It might,
in some circumstances, be able to produce such
a
justification.
1

'

The concepts of fairness and justice embodied in the
\

Fourteenth Amendment and which are now applied to public
colleges would not, in the author's opinion, destroy the

necessary autonomy of private colleges and universities.

Requiring these colleges to provide notice and a hearing
to students accused of breaching regulations that could lead
to suspension or expulsion would not interfere with the

unique features and academic integrity of private education.
The institution could still have any reasonable rules or

regulations; but, if a student is suspected of violating the
rules, he or she would have to be afforded due process.

Although affording due process may add some administrative
costs and inconvenience to the institution, they would be
minimal.

Due process only requires that the students be

given written notice of the specific charges against them,
the time and place of the hearing, evidence which will be

presented against them, and the possible action to be taken
if the charges are supported.

The notice should be provided

to the students in enough time to allow them to prepare a

137 Steven Arons, supra note 134 at 103.

183

proper defense before the hearing.

The hearing should

provide the students an opportunity to present their defense
and present witnesses in support of their case.

If the

hearing is not before the highest administrative authority,
he or she should be allowed to appeal the decision to that

authority.

The hearing is not considered to be criminal

in nature and, therefore, it would not entail all the raiments

of an adversary proceeding.

It should simply be a fair and

ample opportunity for both sides to present the facts of
the case

1 3

0

What would be the benefits of applying these constitutional standards to the private student/college relationCould these benefits rise to the compelling interest

ship?

rationale?

In order to answer these questions, it will be

necessary to examine the educational justifications for
applying the Constitution to private colleges and universities.
The importance of applying constitutional principles
to the student/college relationship

.

Since the inception

of American democracy, education has been regarded as the

cornerstone of society.

Professor Arval A. Morris succinctly

explains the importance of education:

A citizen's willingness and ability to participate
of
effectively in the social, civil and political life
education.
the United States is uniquely dependent upon
138 See Chapter III, pp.

i3g

36-51.

Arval A. Morris, The Constitution and American Education
113.
American Casebook Series (Minn.: West Pub. Co., 1974), p.
1

3 9

,
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Dr. Donald Cowling, once President of
Carleton College,

recognized the importance of education, and in
particular,
private colleges in education:
The American college, especially the separately
organized and privately supported college, is indigenous to the United States, and is one of the most
important agencies our country has developed for
preserving and making effective its basic social
and political philosophy
that have led to the
American way of life. 40
.

.

.

The overall goal of higher education seems to be the

"development of sufficient mind and character" that will

enable a person to know how "to live and participate effec-

tively in American democracy. 141
This country is founded on a Constitution and Bill of

Rights which embody the social and political philosophies
of our society that Dr. Cowling describes as the "American

way of life."

Yet, some of these institutions that profess

to be "one of the most important agencies" for preserving

and making effective this country's social and political

philosophy, do not incorporate the values inherent in our

democracy with their actions regarding students.
The previous chapters illustrated how private colleges

have suppressed unpopular ideas of students and suspended or

expelled them without providing a hearing.

Basic to our

°Donald Cowling and C. Davidson, Colleges for Freedom
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. vii.
1

,

supra note 138 at 114. Global statepremise can be found in almost all
this
ments which reflect
college catalogs.
141 Arval A. Morris,
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society are the concepts of justice and fairness.

Although

these terms are not readily definable, and
people have disagreed with their meaning, the Fourteenth Amendment to
the

Constitution has been an attempt to provide one meaning
these concepts.

Fundamental to our society's sense

of justice is the notion that before someone can be punished,

they must at least be given the opportunity to be heard.
However, as Professor Warren Seavey eloquently

stated:

Our sense of justice should be outraged by denial to
students of the normal safeguards. ... It is shocking
that the officials of an educational institution, which
can function properly only if our freedoms are preserved, should not understand the elementary principles
of fair play.
It is equally shocking to find that a
court supports them in denying to a student the protection given to a pickpocket. 142
The effect such practices can have on students has

been explored by the President's Commission on Higher
Education.

The Commission found that:

Young people cannot be expected to develop a
firm allegiance to the democratic faith ... if
their campus life is carried on in an authoritarian
atmosphere 4
1

3

The Commission also explained the significance of

this problem.

142 Warren A. Seavey,
70 Harv. L. Rev. , 1406,

"Dismissal of Students:
1407 (1957).

'Due Process',"

Higher Education for American Democracy, A Report from
the President's Commissiorr~on Higher Education^ (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 14.
1

4 3
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To teach the me aning and the processes
of democracy
the college campus itself should be employed
as a
laboratory of the democratic way of life.
ideas and
ideals, and the habit of cooperation in a
common
enterprise can be gained most surely in practice.
this learning cannot take place in institutions
of higher education that are operated on
authoritarian
principles 4 4
,

1

The disparity between what is professed to be the

goals of private colleges and what is practiced therein is
a crucial issue facing our society today.

The values inherent

in our democracy, reflected in the Bill of Rights, can only

be protected and preserved if they are practiced.

R.

Freeman Butts reiterated the same point recently when he
noted:

The prime purpose of the
schools is to
cultivate the political virtues that are appropriate
to constitutional self-government and that are required to achieve a society which stands for justice,
equality, and freedom in the modern world. 145
.

.

.

Although most private colleges offer courses and
extoll the meaning and processes of democracy, it is the

everyday operations of the institution that impact significantly on the student:
The college is a major agent in promoting the personality development of the young adult. Whether it
realizes it or not, the college has a major effect
upon the development of the whole personality for
Moreover, the young person becomes
the student.
what he becomes not only because of what he hears in
the classroom and not even mainly because of what he
His interaction with teachers.
hears in the classroom.
.

144

.

.

Id . at 51.

14s R. Freeman Butts,

Teachers College Record as quoted
in "The Public Purpose is the Mam Purpose of the Public
Schools," Education Summary 26 (February 1974), p. 5.
,
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his encounter with the social structure
of the
administration , the atmosphere of flexibility colleq e
or
rigidity which permeates the school environment
have an immense, if not yet precisely measured,
impact. .
The college cannot escape the fact
that it does have such an impact.
146
.

.

.

.

.

This form of teaching (and learning) has been
described
as the "hidden curriculum" or "hidden agenda."

Students

learn not so much from their studies as from the patterns
of

behavior that the organizational structure generates.

Thus,

private colleges in their refusal to incorporate constitutional
standards to the relationship they have with students, under
the concept of autonomy, have "follow [ed] undemocratic courses

of action in the very name of democracy." 147

Consequently, "our schools are now educating millions
of students," said Alan Westin, Director of the Center for

Research and Education in American Liberties, "who are not
forming an allegiance to the democratic political system

because they do not experience such a democratic system in
their daily lives at school." 148

Report of the Committee on the Student in Higher
(The Hazen Foundation: January 1968), p. 5-6.
Education
1

4 6

,

Higher Education for American Democracy supra note
This has been true of many public colleges as
143 at 12
But, for the purposes of this study, only private
well.
colleges are being examined in the context of applying the
minimal standards required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
1

4 7

,

.

140 From the

Weston Report as reported in the New York
Times, (September 22, 1970), p. 25. In the same article.
Dr. John F. DeCecco, Professor of Psychology and Education
at San Francisco State, declares, "of all American institutions,
it is the one charged with the mission of teaching democracy
is usually perceived by the student as one that leaves him

powerless

.
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One important outcome of the disparity between
what
is professed and what is practiced at private
colleges

may be reflected in a study conducted by the American
Council on Education.

The Council reported that:

Private universities are most likely to have
violent or disruptive protests
[the study] said
that 34.4 percent of the private universities had
experienced violent protests, and 70.5 percent had
had disruptive protests.
[In contrast], Public
universities had 13.1 percent experiencing violence
and 43 percent undergoing disruption. 149
.

.

.

Although there is no conclusive evidence indicating
the reason more disruptive and violent protests have taken

place at private colleges, one reason may be the lack of

constitutional standards of fairness and justice which could

work to defuse the need for "disruptive or violent actions."
It should also be noted that many private colleges have

not tolerated any form of protests whether peaceful or

disruptive. 150

In contrast, public colleges are required

to allow constitutionally protected assembly and speech.

The importance of private colleges embodying the

values inherent in the Bill of Rights is necessary if their

"A.C.E.'s Studies of Protesters Stir
Faculty-Student Critics," Chronicle of Higher Education 3
(September 15, 1969), p. 8.
149 Ian E. McNett,

presented in Chapter II, IV, and in the
first section of this chapter.
150 See the cases
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students are to reflect the ideals of a democratic
society.
Conversely, if the graduates of these colleges have
not

151

P art:i c;*-P ate d in a college atmosphere imbued with fairness
-

and justice, they will be less able to practice these
values
in the society at large. 152

The Supreme Court, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters 153
,

did not question the right of a state to require "that

certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must

151

The necessity of private (as well as public) colleges
adopting the principles embodied in the Bill of Rights is
illustrated by the lack of understanding of basic democratic
principles by students, faculty, and administrators in secondary schools. See, e.g., studies that examined understanding
of basic rights: J. Pock, Attitudes Toward Civil Liberties
Among High School Seniors, Cooperative Research Report
(Project #5-8167)
United States Office of Education, 1967;
Ronald A. Gerlach and Lunne W. Lamprecht, Teaching About
the Law
(Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1975); J. Weiser
and J. Hayes, "Democratic Attitudes of Teachers and Prospective Teachers," Phi Delta Kappan 47, (May 1966); The Danforth
and Ford Foundations, The School and the Democratic Environment
(New York: Columbia U. Press, 1970); Civil Education
for the Seventies: An Alternative to Repression and Revolution
(New York: Columbia U. Press,
Final Report (Project #8-0457)
October 1970)
,

,

,

,

.

152 In an interesting study, E.H. Erikson suggested that

the schools of Germany which were organized on the basis of
an authoritarian, autocratic model, produced the kind of
authoritarian child training that made possible the political
organization of Nazism. Because of the controversial nature
of the study, it is presented herein as merely a caution to
autocratic organizational behavior. E.H. Erikson, Childhood
(New York: Norton, Inc., 1955).
and Society
,

1

5 3

268 U.S. 510, 534

(1925)

,
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be taught and that nothing be taught which
is manifestly

inimical to the public welfare."
If the definition of teaching is to include
what is

taught by the "hidden curriculum," then a state could

conceivably require private colleges to comply with the

Fourteenth Amendment concerning student discipline.
t-bis

meet the compelling interest rationale?

Would

If the preser-

vation of the democratic ideals of fairness and justice are
compelling, then this form of regulation might satisfy the
rationale.

1

5 4

Indeed, education isa public interest, and those

providing it are performing a vital public function.

As

Judge Skelley Wright eloquently stated:
In a country dedicated to the creed that education
is the only "sure foundation ... of freedom without
which no republic can maintain itself in strength"
institutions of learning are not things of purely
private concern. . . . 155

154 As Henry

Burch wrote:
Education is the bulwark of civilization. It is the
fundamental basis of democracy. Through it, society
secures the discipline and training needed for its
progressive development. In no other way can the social
inheritance of a people be transformed into sound national character. (Henry R. Burch, Problems of Democracy
(New York: The MacMillian Co., 1934), p. 543-4.

,

Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University of
Louisiana, 203 F. Supp. 855, 858 (E.D. La. 1962).
Because the necessity for society to reflect the
values inherent in the Bill of Rights, the now retired Supreme
Court Justice William O'Douglas declared:
We need a spirit of liberty which extends beyond
what a court can supply, and which accepts in our.
daily lives and behavior the attitudes of toleration
dignity
of unorthodox opinions and respect of the
1 5

5
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Although it is the author’s opinion
that the importance of applying constitutional principles
outweighs
the

risks involved to private colleges, there
are still those
who are concerned with its application and
consequences.
1.

Concern

.

A typical concern of independent school

administrators was expressed by Dr. Otto Kraushaar when
he
wrote:
It is imperative that much thought be given to the
form and limits of state regulation of private schools,
lest the schools suddenly find themselves shackled by
hastily conceived regulations which would deprive them
of the freedom and diversity which are their raison
d'etre 156
.

Many people contend that the very existence of private
schools would be threatened if the state became too involved

with the private institution.

157

Thus, compelling private

colleges to afford students the rights guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment would be perceived by many as a form
of governmental control that would lead to the demise of

private education.

and privacy of each human being, which our Bill of Rights
(William 0. Douglas, A Living Bill of Rights
reflects.
(New York: The One-Nation Library Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith, 1968).
,

156 0tto F.

of Diversity
p. 315.

,

Kraushaar, American Nonpublic Schools: Patterns
(Baltimore John Hopkins University Press, 1972)

157 See Donald A.

Schools,

:

Erickson, Public Controls for Nonpublic
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)
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ft-E°.-ssible

consequence

1

.

6

Despite the above

concerns about state control of private
education, an
alternative consequence of state action in
this field might
be the mutual benefit to both private colleges
and their
students.
If thoughtful consideration is given
this

significant endeavor, the conclusion may in fact mean the
%

increased support of private colleges and universities.
However, if private schools were to continue the practice
of following undemocratic courses of action and maintaining

authoritarian and autocratic methods of control, most
students in such an atmosphere would tend to acquire those
same traits of characteristics.

When the students left

this particular atmosphere, they would probably maintain
and operationalize this learned behavior.

Conversely,

to teach the meaning and processes of democracy, the college

campus should be employed as a laboratory of the democratic

way of life.
they lived.

150

Only when ideas and ideals become dynamic are
"But this learning cannot take place in

It is recognized that one principal consequence of
affording students at private colleges constitutional rights
would be the necessity of informing college administrators
It would be
and faculty what these rights actually entail.
highly unlikely that private college officials would be
familiar with the rights provided public school students.
The financial cost of teaching these officials about the
constitutional rights of students might not be small. But,
because of the public purpose and governmental requirement,
the financial burden should fall upon the state.

193

institutions of higher education that are operated on

authoritarian principles."
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Thus, graduates of this form of education lack the

ideas and ideals embodied in our Bill of Rights.

Lacking

these values, would they protect the civil liberties of
others?

Would they respect the concept of diversity?

Would they even appreciate the unique role of private education in our society?

It is doubtful that they would. 160

However, if a private college does practice the ideas and

ideals of democracy, thereby affording students the consti-

tutional standards of fairness and equity, wouldn't students
be more likely to defend such an institution?

Furthermore,

having been educated in an atmosphere of fairness and justice,

wouldn't these students have

a

better understanding of the

values inherent in the Bill of Rights?

Would it not, in

the long run, be to the benefit of private schools to afford

1 5

9

Higher Education for American Democracy

supra note 143

,

at 51
°See, H. H. Remmers and D. H. Radler, The American Teen
Philip
and
ager, (New York: Bobbs Merril Co., Inc., 1957)
E. Jacob, Changing Values in College: An Explanatory Study
of the Impact of College Teaching, (New York: Harper & Bros,
1957TT These studies showed a lack of knowledge of the Bill
1

;

A more
of Rights among teenagers and college students.
students
explored
which
study
research
complex and detailed
was
Rights,
of
Bill
the
in
application of principles found
students
many
that
indicated
conducted by J. Pock. His study
cause,
approved of secret trials, search without justifiable
J.
witnesses.
excessive bail and the use of anonymous
Pock, supra note 151.
^
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their students the constitutional standards
guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment? When private institutions
propose
and follow democratic principles upon which our
social and

political systems rest, they would help ensure the preser-

vation of American democracy, which in turn protects their
own existence.

For the private school's right to exist is
%

founded on those values inherent in the Bill of Rights
the right to association, academic freedom and privacy.

Summary

.

This section has explored the legal and

educational arguments for and against applying the state action
concept to private colleges and universities.

It was acknow-

ledged that the application of constitutional standards to
these institutions would involve certain risks to their autonomy.

However, the importance of applying due process presents

the least risk to private schools; and, the benefits to the
students, institutions, and society far outweigh the costs
involved.

Although the courts have not been willing to apply the
state action concept to private education, a new evaluation
of the present state of the law is called for.

The ever

increasing involvement of the government with private colleges
and universities and the increasing importance of higher

education for the individual and society demands that a new
look be taken.

The next chapter will examine the various

fairness
methods for applying the constitutional standards of

and justice to private colleges and universities.
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CHAPTER

VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

AND NEEDS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Introduction
This study has explored the complex and contro-

versial problems of applying the state action concept to

private higher education.

Through a review of the litera-

ture of the educational and legal professions and by

analyzing case law, the relationship of students to private
and public colleges was developed.

The issues and arguments

for and against the application of constitutional standards
to the relationship between private colleges and their

students were examined.

The importance and value of private

colleges and of applying the principles of fairness and
justice, as well as the possible risks and benefits, were

also explored.

This section will summarize the significant

points raised in the previous chapters.

The author's con-

clusions and recommendations will then be presented.

The

needs for further research will be examined and the possible

trend for the future highlighted.
Summary
In Chapter II, the background of the student/college

relationship was examined by studying the concepts of in
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loco parentis

,

contract, and inherent authority.

By uti-

lizing these legal doctrines, the courts have granted

schools wide discretionary powers.

In their concern for

protecting the autonomy of colleges, they were unwilling
to impose their judgments upon the institutions.

The concept of in loco parentis

,

in general, allowed

school officials to act in the place of the parent.

As

such, schools were acknowledged to have the authority to

regulate all areas of a student's life commensurate with
that of the parent in all matters pertaining to the function
of the school.
The student/college relationship was also viewed
as contractual.

The contract theory assumes that the

student and college are parties to a contract.

The school

advertizes and seeks students, thereby making an offer; and
the student, by registering, accepts.

The student agrees

to pay tuition and other fees, and the college agrees to

provide instruction, and subsequently, a degree if the
student remains in good standing academically and abides
by the school's rules.

This theory, as interpreted by the

courts, provided students with little protection.

Colleges

time for
were granted the power to dismiss students "at any
If
reasons.
any reason" without having to explain their
most courts
the college had such a clause in its catalog,
the students
considered it to be part of the contract which
contract theory prevailed
agreed to when they registered. The
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for well over one-hundred years without such a distinction.
In recent years, however, courts have drawn a distinction

between private and public colleges, maintaining that the
contract theory can apply to private schools, but must be

modified by constitutional considerations at public institutions

.

The concept of inherent authority has also been

used to explain the student/college relationship.

American

colleges and universities have a tradition of autonomy.
Courts have consistently held that educational institutions

have the inherent authority to maintain order and freedom
and to discipline students whose conduct is disruptive.

The foundation of this authority has been based on the long

standing custom of schools and on the statutory charter
grants to colleges.

These charters empowered colleges to

promulgate regulations for "the necessary tone and standards
of behavior

in

a body of students" and in the power to

discipline "to protect itself and its property."

The courts

not
have, however, pointed out that this authority is

limitless.

The university's rules and actions may not be

arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.

Although the schools

past, the courts
were given broad discretionary powers in the
when it conflicts with
have modified the colleges' authority
a student's constitutional rights.

although primarily
The concept of trust/fiduciary,

presented because of its
advanced in legal literature, was
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possible impact on the student/college relationship.

The

fiduciary relationship is characterized by the special

relationship between two parties; if one party has reason
to repose confidence in the fidelity and integrity of

another, a fiduciary relation exists.

Examples of this

relationship are; attorney/client, doctor/patient, and
husband/wife.

No court has ruled on the applicability of

this theory to date.

The concept could have a great impact

on private and public colleges.

It would require these

institutions to treat students with the highest degree of
fairness and equity recognized by law.
In Chapter III, the constitutional rights of public

college students was examined by analyzing the leading cases
that have established and defined their rights to due process
of law, equal protection and freedom of expression.

In

general, it was found that students enrolled in state colleges
and universities are constitutionally guaranteed the right
to notice and a hearing prior to suspension or expulsion by

the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

The students

should be given written notice of the specific charges

against them, the time and place of the hearing, evidence

which will be presented, and the possible action to be
taken if the charges are supported.

The hearing should

their defense
provide the students an opportunity to present
There is no general
and witnesses in support of their case.
represented by
requirement that students be permitted to be
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counsel.

Only in unusual cases where the
university proceeds
through counsel must the students be
permitted representation.
The hearing is not considered to be
criminal in
nature, and

therefore, the student is not entitled to
all the raiments
of an adversary proceeding. The hearing
should simply be
fair and provide ample opportunity for both
sides to present
their case.
The student's right to equal protection of the laws

was examined through the case law related to race and
sex

discrimination.

Racial discrimination was studied by

analyzing the evolutionary process of the law from the
concept of "separate but equal" to the principle that separate is inherently unequal.

Today, unless a state has a

compelling interest in a racial classification, it is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race.

In a

similar evolutionary process, sex discrimination is slowly

being relinquished in this society.

Although in many areas

the doctrine of "separate but equal" is permitted, classi-

fying persons on the basis of sex must be based on a "fair

and substantial relation" to the purpose of such classification.

There must be some educational or other sound

rationale which supports the reason for the discrimination.
Today, sex discrimination does not rise to the compelling

interest test employed in racial discrimination cases.

But,

it must be remembered that it has taken over two-hundred

years for redressing racial discrimination; and, the question
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of sexism has been a relatively recent legal development.

Regardless of the standards employed by the courts, students
at public colleges and universities are clearly entitled to

the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection

clause
The rights of students to freedom of expression has

been well established.

The Supreme Court has interpreted

the Fourteenth Amendment to bring the actions of the state

under the restraints of the Bill of Rights.

Whether the

expression be oral, symbolic, or written, the cases illustrated that students at state colleges and universities are

guaranteed the right to freedom of expression.

As long as

the expression does not materially and substantially disrupt

school work or discipline, or infringe upon the rights of
others, the expression is protected by the Constitution.

A

school may reasonably regulate the time, place, and manner
of expression and its distribution; but a public college may

not shut off the dissemination of ideas "in the name alone
of conventions of decency."
in
In Chapter IV, the rights of students enrolled

present case
private colleges was examined by analyzing the
law.

enjoy the same
It was found that these students do not

rights as public college students.

Because the college is

apply to the
considered private, the Constitution does not
illustrated that
student/college relationship. The cases
to its students was
the relationship of a private school
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primarily contractual.

As such, the institutions are not

required to provide students with due process
or freedom
of expression.
Today, these students can be suspended
or expelled without being afforded notice or
a hearing.
1

Next, the general history of private and public
col-

leges was explored to examine the distinction between
these

institutions.

It was found that the colonial college was

considered neither public nor private in the modern sense.

Although managed by private persons, it was seen as
trust subject to state regulation.

a

public

Its activities and sol-

vency were viewed as public rather than private questions.
However, the landmark decision in the Dartmouth College case

perceived a difference between "a civil institution to be

employed in administration of government and a private

eleemosynary institution."

The Court rejected the claim by

New Hampshire that the college was performing a public
purpose and, therefore, should be considered
poration.

a

public cor-

The rejection may have been based on the Court's

observation that higher education was essentially a private
activity which might occasionally be supplemented by the
public sector.

Thus, by holding that institutions privately

The issue of equal protection has basically been
resolved by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Together,
these laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race,
color, national origin, or sex, in any educational program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
x
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established to conduct higher learning are
to be considered
corporations, the Court effectively removed
them from the
constraints of the Constitution.
Today

,

both the state and federal governments are

once again becoming more involved with private education.
®

,

the question was raised as to whether a private

college's actions can become so entwined with the state
as to constitute state action.

Finally, the chapter examined the case law which

established and defined the state action concept.

The Supreme

Court's landmark decision in the Burton case explained that

private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence
to the Fourteenth Amendment unless the state has signifi-

cantly become involved in it.

Hence, private activity may

become so entwined with the state as to constitute state
action, thus coming under the purview of the Fourteenth

Amendment.
Since private actions sometimes can be considered

state actions. Chapter V analyzes the cases involving

private higher education and the state action concept to

determine the present state of the law.

Although the

Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this question,
several cases have been decided by federal and state courts.
It was found that most courts are unwilling to find state

action even when a number of indicia of state involvement
are present.

However, a small number of courts have found
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state action present when the state has involved
itself

with a college in numerous ways.

For example, state action

has been found when the state provides substantial
amounts
of financial assistance and supplies public buildings to

institutions.

Two courts found state action present,

because the private college was considered to be performing
a public purpose.

The leading case in this field is Powe v. Miles

2
,

because it developed the "legal test" which many courts
have used to determine whether or not state action is present.
The Powe case held that state action may be found when the
state is significantly involved, not simply with some

activity of the college, bub with the activity alleged to
have violated the rights of the students.
In order to understand the significance and com-

plexity of the problem, Part II of this chapter explored
the major rationales for and against applying constitutional

standards to the relationship between students and private
colleges.

The importance and value of private higher

education and the application of constitutional standards
were examined in the context of developing the argument for
and against their application.

The rationales for applying

the state action concept included:

(1)

a

private college may

control or sponsor unique educational programs not offered
at public institutions.

*407 F.2d 73

(2)

(2d Cir.

Private colleges may be compared

1968).
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to "company towns" because they
perform quasi-governmental
functions. They can require students
to eat, play, and live
on the campus. Some have their own
security forces, power
plants, housing facilities and most
of the characteristics

of an American town.

The Supreme Court found a company

town that provided the same functions as
any other town
so entwined with the state to constitute
state
action.

This rationale argues that there should be
no legal distinction between a company town and a college campus,
and
a finding of state action should follow because
the college

is performing a public function.

(3)

If the government

supervises or regulates the activites of private
colleges, a finding of state action should follow.

For example,

where it can be shown that the state has delegated authority
to colleges to maintain order, it is argued that the dele-

gation of this power makes the college act "under color of
state law" when it disciplines its students.

(4)

Because of

the importance of higher education to the individual and

American society, it is argued that education has become
public purpose.

a

As such, any institution providing higher

education is performing a public function, and thus, any
acts of the college should be considered state acts.

The major arguments against applying the state

action concept to private higher education are based on the

proposition that private colleges are private corporations,
and thus, not bound by constitutional standards.

It is
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contended that the relationship is one of contract; and
as
such, if a student agrees to attend the institution,
he or

she has agreed to follow any and all rules and regulations

of the college.

The primary rationale for not applying a

constitutional standard is the belief that it would destroy
the autonomy and unique educational features of private

higher education.

It has been argued that the application

of the Constitution to private colleges would have a domino
effect, and in no time private colleges would in reality

become no different from public schools.

The risks involved

in applying constitutional standards were examined and it

was acknowledged that there was some risk in affording students
at private schools the same rights as those in public colleges.
But, there was little risk seen in applying the concept of

due process to private college students.

In fact, the

benefits may far outweigh the risks and possible expenses
involved.

The importance and benefits of applying the concept

of due process were presented in the context of the students,

institutions and society.

In general, the practice of demo-

cratic principles upon which our social and political systems
rest will ensure the preservation and progress of American
democracy.

Although the courts have not been willing to

the
apply the state action concept to private education,
higher
increasing involvement of the government with private
education
education and the increasing importance of higher

that a new lock be
for the individual and society demands
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taken.

The following section will examine
the various methods
for applying the constitutional
standards of fairness and
justice to private colleges and
universities.

Conclusion and Recommendations
Private colleges and universities provide higher
education with a diversity and scope not possible
in public
institutions.

Because there is no one idea or philosophy

of education, private schools enable people to have
a choice
in how and what they wish to learn, live and associate.

Private education can afford this in ways not possible in

public colleges.

There has been much said about the fear

that applying the state action concept to private colleges

would destroy the autonomy, integrity, and the unique features private higher education can provide.

However, it is

questionable whether the fear that the application of
constitutional standards to these institutions will have

negative consequences is justified.

Even if it is, these

negative effects must be balanced against the potential
benefits to the student and society.
It has been acknowledged that the application of all

the rights enjoyed by public college students to private

colleges could indeed threaten the special characteristics
of private education.

For example, the right of the college

to express and practice its education and social philosophies

might be infringed upon if students were entitled to the same
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rights to expression as public college students.

Or, if

a private college wished to promulgate rules
concerning

student appearance (e.g., forbiding the wearing of long

hair because of social and educational reasons)

,

students

accused of violating this rule could file suit alleging
that the school was violating their right to symbolic

sxp^sssion.

Thus, the right of the college to express

its philosophy and the right of the student to symbolic

expression could be in conflict.

If the student should

be afforded the right to expression in this case, the

college would have to surrender its social and pedagogical
beliefs.

The consequence of this type of conflict does

raise serious concerns and its resolution must carefully

consider the effects on private education.

However, there

would be relatively little risk if the constitutional
standards of due process were applied to private colleges.
The concepts of fairness and justice embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment, and which are now applied to

public colleges, would not in the author's opinion destroy

Although this form of expression is not a clearly established right, some courts have held that it is a form of
symbolic expression protected by the First Amendment. See
for example: Zachry v. B rown 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala.
the classification of male students by their hair1967
Re ichen
style is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;
may
berg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970), a student
supstate
to
a
admission
from
not be constitutionally barred
of his
ported college if ban is based solely upon the length
Saddlebacjc
v.
King
However, compare these cases with:
hair.
college
Junior College, 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971), a state does
hair
regulation prescribing the length of a student s
violence to the Constitution.
3

,

)

,
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or seriously threaten the necessary autonomy of
private

colleges and universities.

Requiring these institutions to

provide notice and a hearing to students accused of violating
regulations that could lead to suspension or expulsion would
not interfere with the unique attributes and academic integ-

rity of private higher education.

The college could still

promulgate any reasonable rules or regulations it believed
were necessary.

But, if a student were accused of violating

the rules, he or she would have to be afforded due process,
and, thus, could not be suspended or expelled without a

hearing.

The hearing would provide a fair opportunity for

both sides to present their case; it would not be criminal
in nature, and it would not entail all the raiments of an

adversary proceeding.

Although requiring due process at private colleges

would add administrative costs and inconveniences, the
benefit of applying this constitutional principle far
outweighs the costs involved.

This is because it is neces-

sary for private colleges to embody the values inherent in
the Bill of Rights if their students are to reflect the

ideals of a democratic society.

The graduates of these

colleges should participate in a college atmosphere imbued

with fairness and justice if they are to manifest these
values in a society at large.
the
There are several possible approaches to secure

guaranteed
constitutional standards of fairness and justice
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by the Fourteenth Amendment for students
enrolled in private
colleges and universities. The problem could
be resolved
by:

(1)

State legislation;

the judicial process; and

(2)

federal legislation;

(3)

the executive branch of the

(4)

federal government.
State legislation

.

Private colleges may be

compelled to provide students the rights to due process by
state legislation.

The state could require colleges who

receive any state financial assistance to afford the same

principles of due process that public college students
receive as a condition for obtaining the assistance.

Further-

more, the Supreme Court did not question the right of the

state to require "that certain studies plainly essential to

good citizenship must be taught and that nothing be taught

which is inimical to the public welfare." 4

If the concept

"taught" as applied here were expanded to include what is

practiced by the college, it would present another avenue
for providing due process.

Because our society is based

on the values inherent in the Bill of Rights, it could
be considered harmful to society if the concepts of justice

and fairness are not practiced by private colleges.

Thus,

the state could require these colleges to provide due process

under its authority to prohibit anything taught that is
inimical to the public welfare.

4

Surely, the teaching of

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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authoritarian and arbitrary principles should
be considered
harmful when practiced by institutions that
have been portrayed as important agencies for perceiving and
making

effective our society's basic social and political
philosophy.
Federal legislation

.

5

A second avenue for applying

due process to students enrolled in private colleges is
^^^-ough federal legislation.

Today, the federal government

prohibits race and sex discrimination in educational programs
or activities that receive federal financial assistance.

The

same conditions could be legislated concerning due process.
Thus, students in educational programs or activities that

receive federal financial assistance would have to be afforded
the same constitutional standards of due process that public

college students enjoy.
3.

The judicial process .

A third avenue open for

applying the constitutional standards of fairness and justice

embodied in due process is by means of the judicial process.
Simply, if a private college was not affording students the

same rights of due process as those enrolled in public colleges,
the courts could review the complaint.

Because of the com-

pelling interest society has for preserving and fostering its

democratic ideals, it would not be too difficult to

interpret

the current "legal test" for state action so that the courts

The expulsion of students without providing them reasons
for such expulsion is considered by the author to represent
arbitrary and authoritarian principles.
5
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could have jurisdiction.

The application of the state action

concept utilizing the "public function/public
interest"
theory would not be cause for courts to find every
organization or corporation involved in state action. The peculiar
significance and importance of education in this society

would be the indicia needed for such a finding.

Only those

corporations involved directly with higher education would
be affected, and then only to such an extent as to provide
the constitutional standards of due process to problems

concerning student discipline.
4

.

The executive branch of the federal government

.

A possible fourth avenue for affording private college
students due process would be by executive action through
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Office
of Education.

Because of the importance of applying the

concepts of justice and fairness to the private college/
student relationship, the Office of Education could encourage

private colleges to furnish their students the same rights to
due process that are enjoyed by public college students.
This could be accomplished by granting monies to private

colleges to study the effects of supplying their students
due process.
(1)

This would have the threefold benefit of:

Providing students enrolled in the participating colleges

the same safeguards as public college students;

(2)

developing

rights;
pertinent data on the actual effects of affording such

and

(3)

initiating this process on

a

voluntary basis.
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In conclusion, it is important
to students and society

that the constitutional principles
of fairness and justice
are practiced in private colleges
and universities.
The
time has come for these institutions
to realize the extent
of their power to influence a student's
personality

and to

take responsibility for the way this
power is executed.

if

the ideas and ideals of democracy are to be
learned and

appreciated, the college should "be employed as a
laboratory
of the democratic way of life." Although the
application
the constitutional standards to private colleges

might involve certain risks to their autonomy, the importance
of applying due process presents the least risk to private

higher education; and, the benefits to the students, institutions and society far outweigh the costs involved.
Needs for Further Research
In addition to examining the case law and the legal

and educational arguments for and against applying consti-

tutional standards in student discipline cases, this study also
raises a number of questions which merit further research.
It would be useful if further research were directed

towards analyzing the future role of higher education in
general, and how it relates to democracy in particular.

Although the study touched upon legislative recourse for
redressing the disparities between the rights of students in
public and private colleges, an in-depth investigation
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relating to some of the many possible
ramifications of
applying legislative mandates to
private education would be
useful.
Specifically the application of all
the constitutional standards applying to private
colleges should be
analyzed.
The benefits and risks of affording
students
such rights to association, religion, and
unreasonable
search and seizure should be examined. How the
,

state

action concept should apply in a private college's
extra

curricular activities and admmission's process should also
studied.

In addition, a study of selected private

colleges that voluntarily provide one or more constitutional
rights to their students would be valuable.

Similarly, a

comparison of private schools that do and do not provide
such rights would be instructive.

It would also be useful to

tabulate and compare the attitudes of students, faculty,
administrators, and alumni at private colleges about due
process, freedom of expression or other constitutional
rights.

Whether or not there should be a difference between
secondary and higher education in terms of applying state
action to private schools would also be an interesting
and controversial inquiry.

Although this study explored

applying the state action concept to private colleges in

matters concerning students, further research is also needed
in analyzing how the concept would apply to faculty at both

the secondary and higher education level.
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Of equal importance would be further study to
determine

what effects, if any, private colleges have had on student
knowledge, attitudes, and behavior in relation to the demo-

cratic values embodied in the Bill of Rights.

A comparison

with the effects public colleges have had on their students
would also be important.
The legal aspects of education is a field ripe with

different topics and problems for research.

it is an area

that, by its very meaning, is impressed with a strong public

interest.

Trends for the Future
As Jencks and Riesman observed, the distinction between
a public and a private college, which became significant

after the Civil War, "seems once again to be losing some of
its importance."

Nevertheless, courts have been reluctant

to negate the fundamental distinction that today precludes

private college students from enjoying the same constitutional
safeguards as those enrolled in public colleges.

However, the

public interest is becoming compelling for affording such
students the constitutional standards of fairness and equity.
the need
As our society becomes more complex and impersonal,

greater.
for the ideas and ideals of democracy will become
to be
It is hoped that colleges, which proclaim

one

has developed for
of the most important agenices our country
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preserving our social and political
philosophy" 6 begin
to practice those values they suggest
they make most effective.
Although many private institutions have
not fostered
the ideas and ideals of democracy inherent
in the Bill
of

Rights, Justice Frankfurter explained why
society must

tolerate this circumstance:

Great diversity of psychological and ethical opinion
exists among us concerning the best way to train children
for their place in society.
Because of these differences
and because of reluctance to permit a single iron-cast
system of education to be imposed upon a nation compounded of so many strains, we have held that even though
public education is one of our most cherished democratic
institutions, the Bill of Rights bars a state from compelling all children to attend public schools. 7
The future of higher education in our society holds a

reaffirmation of the role and need of private institutions of
education.

Although the state will continue to regulate and

control certain aspects of private education, society will

recognize that private schools
give American education a diversity and scope not
possible in tax-supported institutions alone, and they
have an opportunity to emphasize, if they wish, individualistic patterns of thought, courses of social action,
or politics or religuous activity. 8
.

.

.

The private schools, however, should recognize their

responsibility in ensuring fairness and a sense of justice in
/

D Cowling and C. Davidson, Colleges for Freedom
York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. vii.
6

.

7

Minersville School Dist

.

v. Gobitis

,

,

310 U.S. 586

(New

(1940).

Heald Committee, "Meeting the Increasing Demand for Higher
Education in New York State: A Report to the Governor and the
Board of Regents," 1960.
8
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their relationship with students.

It would, of course, be to

the credit of all private schools if, in their tradition of

diversity and autonomy, they took the initiative to implement
the standards consonant with the values inherent in the Dill
of Rights

— for

their future.

in the long run it is the surest way to ensure
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